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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Climate change and greenhouse gas emissions
From the rise of the steam engine in the 18th century onwards, the
harnessing of fossil energy sources like coal and oil has enabled un-
precedented levels of economic growth and material wealth (Nord-
haus, 1977). Meanwhile, it has also resulted in ever-increasing levels
of annual anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, which accumulate
in the Earth’s atmosphere and continuously raise its CO2 concentra-
tion, at a rate which is not explainable by natural variation (Allen et al.,
2018; Bereiter et al., 2015). Due to the greenhouse gas effect, this leads
to increasing global mean air temperatures and a larger variability of
the climate system — a process which is known as climate change,
and attributable to human activities with virtual certainty (IPCC, 2014,
2018).
There is an almost linear relationship between cumulative greenhouse
gas emissions and observed global temperature changes. It is esti-
mated that anthropogenic CO2 emissions between 1876-2018 accumu-
late to around 2,220 Gt of CO2, which have already raised the global
mean surface temperature by around 1°C above pre-industrial levels
(Allen et al., 2018; Le Que´re´ et al., 2018). Additional temperature in-
creases will likely lead to further shifts in precipitation patterns, ris-
ing sea levels, ocean acidification, and losses in biodiversity, amongst
many other possible impacts on human and natural systems (Hoegh-
Guldberg et al., 2018). In the 2015 Paris Agreement, the international
community has therefore set the target to limit the increase in the global
mean temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and
to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C (UNFCCC,
2015).
In order to meet the 1.5°C target with a probability of at least 50%,
climate models suggest that cumulative net emissions from 2018 until
end-of-century must not exceed 580 GtCO2 (Rogelj et al., 2018a). Un-
der current (2017) anthropogenic emission levels of 41 GtCO2 per year
(Le Que´re´ et al., 2018), the climate system might thus be committed to
1.5°C warming between 2030-2040 (as illustrated in Figure 1.1). Stabil-
ising global mean temperatures is only possible when annual global
net greenhouse gas emissions eventually reach zero (Meinshausen et
al., 2009). Given the remaining emissions budget, pathways reviewed
by the Intergovernmental on Climate Change (IPCC) suggest that this
must be achieved until around mid-century for limiting global warm-
ing to 1.5°C (2060-2070 for 2°C), and that deep emission reductions
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Figure 1.1: Historic (in blue) and projected trend (in green) of human-induced
global warming, under a stylised decarbonisation pathway which is consis-
tent with the 1.5°C target as set in the Paris Agreement. Source: Allen et al.
(2018).
should start as early as possible (40-60% by 2030 from 2010 levels) (Ro-
gelj et al., 2018a).
Energy-related and industrial processes accounted for around 90% of
annual anthropogenic CO2 emissions and 75% of total anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 (IPCC, 2014). The key for climate
change mitigation is therefore the decarbonisation of the energy sys-
tem, so that the provision of energy services becomes decoupled from
the emission of greenhouse gases (de Coninck et al., 2018). The en-
ergy system can be divided into the energy supply and energy end-use
sectors. The energy supply sector encompasses all activities which are
related to the generation of electricity and the processing of primary
energy sources, such as the refining of oil. Together, such activities
were responsible for around half of all energy-related emissions in 2010
(Bruckner et al., 2014). The other half is attributable to energy end-
use sectors such as transport and industry (as shown in Figure 1.2), in
which energy is used directly to produce useful energy services such
as movement, heat or light.
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Figure 1.2: Global CO2 emissions from fuel combustion by sector in 2015, in-
cluding the allocation of CO2 emissions from electricity and heat generation
to energy end-use sectors. Source: IEA (2017a).
1.2 Innovation and policy-induced technological
change
For meeting the 1.5°C target , the low-carbon energy transition requires
technological change in all energy sectors, at a pace which is unprece-
dented at the necessary scale (Fouquet, 2016; Geels et al., 2017a). In
the energy supply sector, scenarios suggest that the share of renewable
technologies in electricity generation should reach 59-97% in 2050 (Ro-
gelj et al., 2018a). For the decarbonisation of energy end-use sectors,
the main technology options are low-carbon electrification, increased
energy efficiency, and the use of bioenergy. End-use electrification
foremost means the replacement of fossil-fuel based technologies with
electricity-powered alternatives, such as electric cars and heat pumps.
Increased energy efficiency includes all cases in which the same en-
ergy service is provided with less energy input, for example by using
more efficient electric motors in fridges or machines. Bioenergy refers
to energy derived from biomass, such as liquid biofuels for transport
or solid wood for heating. The net emission reduction potential of
bioenergy highly depends on the sustainable management of bioen-
ergy sources over time, and bioenergy use at larger scales is highly de-
bated, for example due to land competition with food production and
potentially devastating effects on biodiversity (Creutzig et al., 2015).
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Innovation describes the chain of processes that bring new develop-
ments from the stage of basic research all the way to their eventual dif-
fusion into the market (Gru¨bler and Wilson, 2013; Schumpeter, 1934).
For being successful at this stage, an innovation must be sufficiently at-
tractive to potential users, either in price or performance (Comin and
Mestieri, 2014). For new technologies, this means that they can only
have an impact on economy-wide CO2 emissions if people decide to
buy and use them (Wilson, 2012). Therefore, the decarbonisation of the
energy system crucially relies on the diffusion of low-carbon technolo-
gies.
Technology diffusion depends on technology choices over time. These
are made by billions of heterogeneous people and firms, depending on
their individual contexts, needs and preferences (Mercure et al., 2016a).
Importantly, technology choices are not made in isolation, but recur-
sively reinforce each other: people can only choose what they know of
and have trust in, which depends on what they see being adopted by
others (Young, 2009). Meanwhile, the cost of new technologies tends
to decrease with increasing production levels (Weiss et al., 2010). The
combination of socially influenced adoption decisions and adoption-
dependent cost reductions leads to a self-reinforcing path-dependent
dynamic: technologies which are more successful initially are more
likely to increase their market shares even further (Arthur, 1989). The
resulting rates of technology uptake over time typically resemble the
S-shaped pattern of logistic curves (Nakic´enovic´, 1986; Rogers, 2010).
Initially, when a new innovation is still expensive and not yet well-
known, it will only be chosen by a relatively small group of ‘early
adopters’. As the word spreads and costs decrease, a technology can
become attractive to an increasing number of people, and diffuse into
the mass market (Rogers, 2010).
In particular in the early phases of diffusion, low-carbon technologies
tend to be relatively more expensive compared to fossil-based alter-
natives, which makes them unattractive to potential adopters (Dincer,
2000). Where their diffusion is beneficial from a societal perspective,
there can then be a strong rationale for policy instruments that are
aimed at inducing their uptake at increased rates (Jaffe, Newell, and
Stavins, 2005). One option is the introduction of a carbon tax, which
is levied proportionally to the carbon content of fuels, and thereby in-
creases the cost of operating fossil-based technologies (Clarke et al.,
2014). If set at a sufficiently high rate, such a tax may induce a switch-
ing of agent choices towards low-carbon technologies. Alternatively
5
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(or in addition to the tax), a subsidy can be paid for the purchase or
operation of low-carbon or very efficient energy technologies. If suf-
ficiently high, it can offset their relatively higher costs, and thereby
increase their attractiveness. Other policy approaches include regula-
tory instruments, such as minimum performance standards for a tech-
nology’s greenhouse gas emission intensity.
There is an important distinction to be made between policy instru-
ments and policy targets. In the context of policy-induced technologi-
cal change, policy targets describe specific envisioned future states or
properties of the technological system, such as the desirable market
share of renewable or electricity-based technologies in a given year. In
contrast, specific policy instruments are introduced as part of a strat-
egy for reaching given policy targets, for example by means of a carbon
tax. Importantly, there is an ongoing debate as to what the most suit-
able policy instruments are for incentivising the uptake of low-carbon
technologies, given different contexts and situations (de Coninck et al.,
2018; McCollum et al., 2018).
1.3 Models of technological change
The Paris Agreement demands that each signatory party specifies an
individual decarbonisation target (UNFCCC, 2015). For example, the
European Union has committed to reducing its domestic greenhouse
gas emissions by at least 40% until 2030, relative to 1990 (Council of
the European Union, 2014). Setting and meeting such policy targets
raises two important questions: First, what is the expected future tra-
jectory of technological change and resulting greenhouse gas emissions
in the absence of additional policies? Second, what is the potential im-
pact of different policy instruments on energy-technology uptake and
emissions, as well as on the economy?
Addressing such questions requires some form of quantitative analysis
(Riahi et al., 2012). Ideally, such an analysis allows to estimate the tech-
nology and emission trajectories with and without policy interventions
as realistically as possible. At the heart of such quantitative analysis
are energy models, which combine data on the energy system’s cur-
rent composition with assumptions on its future development (Jebaraj
and Iniyan, 2006). Additional model components are necessary for
analysing feedbacks of the energy system with the wider economy and
6
the environment, in which case an energy model becomes an energy-
economy or energy-economy-environment model. When such models
cover the whole globe and are linked to a model of the climate sys-
tem, they are also referred to as integrated assessment models (IAMs)
(Weyant, 2017). IAMs are regularly used to analyse global decarboni-
sation pathways, most prominently in the context of the IPCC (Clarke
et al., 2014).
There are different types of energy models, which can be grouped
into various categories, such as accounting-based, optimisation,
and simulation (Mundaca et al., 2010). Accounting-based models
primarily manage data and results, based on technology choices
which are defined exogenously by the modeller, and do not represent
any decision-making endogenously. Optimisation models are
designed to identify the least-cost technology configuration, assuming
that (hypothetical) decisions are taken so that overall system costs are
minimised. Decision-making in optimisation models is endogenous,
assuming a perfectly rational central planner (with or without
perfect foresight). Simulation models, on the other hand, aim at
replicating observed technology choices, irrespective of what might
be considered optimal from an outside perspective.
It is important to acknowledge that energy models can have different
purposes. Historically, many optimisation models were originally de-
veloped for identifying feasible technology pathways, which are op-
timised according to some objective criterion (such as system-wide
costs) (Pfenninger, Hawkes, and Keirstead, 2014). For analysing cli-
mate policy targets and possible decarbonisation pathways, a carbon
budget can be added as an additional model constraint. Such opti-
misation models foremost answer the question what the technological
trajectory should look like, in order to reduce emissions at the lowest
possible cost (Rogelj et al., 2018a). When aiming at identifying optimal
technological configurations or strategies, the purpose of optimisation
models can thus be described as normative (i.e. what agents ought to
do) (Mercure et al., 2016b). Normative models are powerful tools for
analysing the technological feasibility of pathways and policy targets,
and for identifying the potential contributions and costs of alternative
mitigation options.
The simulation of policy instruments and their impacts, on the other
hand, requires simulation models which try to answer the question
what the technological trajectory would look like, given the simulated
7
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policy context. When aiming at describing observed reality, the pur-
pose of simulation models can be classified as positive (i.e. what agents
are observed to do) (Mercure et al., 2016b). How would a certain policy
influence the behaviour and technology choices of people, and what
are the consequences for emissions and other indicators of interest? Po-
tential policy impacts depend on the uncoordinated behaviour of het-
erogeneous people and firms, who act with limited foresight and under
imperfect information. Importantly, there is no reason that the sum of
such decisions should correspond to what is seen as optimal from the
perspective of a hypothetical central planner (Kirman, 1992).
The use of different types of models may thus be more or less ap-
propriate for addressing different types of questions along the policy
cycle. The policy cycle construct conceptually represents the policy-
making process as a sequence of stages: agenda-setting, policy formu-
lation, decision-making, policy implementation, and evaluation (Jann
and Wegrich, 2007). In the context of climate change mitigation pol-
icy and energy transitions, it can be argued that normative modelling
is most useful at the stage of agenda setting, for analysing questions
such as: Should climate change be addressed by policy-makers? What
is the desirable level and timing of emission reductions? Which tech-
nological pathways could allow to reach emission targets at the low-
est societal cost? Such questions were addressed intensively by gov-
ernment agencies and the IPCC reports over the last decades, with a
strong reliance on optimisation-based models (Clarke et al., 2014; Ro-
gelj et al., 2018a; Stern, 2007). Once policy targets are set (such as a
country’s emission reduction target in the context of the Paris Agree-
ment), policy-making gradually proceeds to the stages of policy for-
mulation and decision-making: Which specific real-world policy in-
struments would allow to reach the defined targets? What impacts
would different policy instruments have on social, economic and envi-
ronmental indicators? Addressing such questions constitutes a positive
analysis (what would happen?), for which the use of simulation-based
models is appropriate. For example, parts of this doctoral thesis orig-
inate in work carried out for policy-makers at the European Commis-
sion, who wanted to gain better insights into the question: Which pol-
icy instruments would be effective for inducing a transition towards
low-carbon heating technologies in each Member State, given the Eu-
ropean Union’s policy targets for substantially increasing their market
share (see chapter 3)?
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1.4 Modelling human decision-making
For being useful to policy-makers, a model for the simulation of policy
effects must be based on a representation of human behaviour which is
as close to reality as possible, in order to plausibly estimate responses
of households and firms to changing variables: based on which cri-
teria and evaluation principles do they decide, what do they know,
how do they influence each other? Also, how can the micro-level be-
haviour of a multitude of interacting heterogeneous decision-makers
be represented in a macro-scale model? Is it adequate to describe the
behaviour of groups as the sum of individual choices, or can agent
interactions at the micro-level lead to unexpected dynamics and out-
comes at the macro-level (such as path-dependent, non-linear profiles
of technology adoption) (Rai and Henry, 2016)?
In standard neoclassical economics, it is assumed that households and
firms decide according to the axioms that define economic rational-
ity, which means that they rationally maximise their utility or prof-
its, without interacting with one another (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and
Green, 1995). In the context of energy technology choice, the assump-
tion implies that all available options should be objectively evaluated
based on their expected costs and benefits. If a new technology can
deliver the same energy service to the user at a lower cost, it should be
adopted. This is not what people do in practice. In contrast, empirical
studies indicate that the observed uptake of renewables and energy-
efficient technologies is often much lower than what is rationally seen
as being cost-effective from the perspective of outside observers, and
therefore likely inconsistent with the assumption of rational decision-
making (Gillingham and Palmer, 2014).
There are various possible reasons for which seemingly beneficial
technologies are not adopted (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012). From
a purely economic perspective, a technology might be rejected for
reasons which are perfectly rational, but not considered by the
observer — such as hidden costs, risks, or limited access to capital
(Sutherland, 1991). Furthermore, even if agents were to act rationally
at the micro-level, technological lock-ins at the macro-level could
prevent them from choosing an objectively superior technology
(Arthur, 1989). Nevertheless, empirical studies and experiments
provide overwhelming evidence that observed decision-making at
the micro-level is inconsistent with the axioms of perfect rationality,
irrespective of all economic and technological factors (Kahneman,
9
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2003). The large relevance of behavioural factors for energy and
climate policy is therefore widely acknowledged (Allcott and
Mullainathan, 2010; van den Bergh, Ferrer-I-Carbonell, and Munda,
2000).
In addition to an accurate representation of choices by individuals at
the micro level, it needs to be considered that choices are not made
in isolation, but within a broader context of social dynamics (such
as social influences between individuals) (Abrahamse and Steg, 2013;
Rogers, 2010; Steg, Perlaviciute, and Werff, 2015). From a more gen-
eral anthropological perspective, decision-making can be seen under
three different theoretical lenses (Wilk and Cliggett, 2007): (1) the self-
interested (utilitarian) model, used in microeconomics, in which choices
are directed by individual utility; (2) the social model in which de-
cisions are made by social groups, and (3) the moral model in which
agents make decisions according to beliefs, values, culture and tradi-
tion. While a general representation of behaviour should ideally in-
corporate all three classes, substantial knowledge gaps remain already
with the utilitarian model, that need to be resolved for its practical use
in policy-making. This thesis thus focuses on the representation of in-
dividual decisions (given social influences by peers), and is therefore
closest to the perspective of individual utility; however, it also inte-
grates elements from the perspective of social decision-making.
At the level of individual decision-making, Gillingham, Newell,
and Palmer (2009) identify three behavioural themes as being
most relevant for energy policy: bounded rationality, heuristic
decision-making and Prospect Theory. Bounded rationality is based
on the fact that firms and households need to make decisions
with limited time and resources (Simon, 1955). The assumption
of unbounded rationality is therefore replaced by the concept of
satisficing behaviour: An originally complex decision problem is
substituted with a simpler, roughly accurate one, which leads to
decisions which are satisfactory (though not optimal). Often, this
manifests itself in the form of heuristic decision-making, for example
by applying simple rules of thumb. Prospect Theory is a descriptive
theory of choice which aims at describing how people actually behave,
instead of how people should behave, according to some pre-defined
axioms of decision-making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Centrally,
the theory is based on the observation that preferences depend
on the subjective perception of gains and losses, as seen from the
decision-maker’s subjective reference point, and that losses have
10
a proportionally higher impact on decisions. Being consistent with
many observed ‘irrationalities’ in decision-making, Prospect Theory
is considered to offer the best available alternative to rational choice
theory in the field of economics (Barberis, 2013).
Integrating insights on human behaviour into models of technology
uptake can allow a more reliable analysis of policy instruments
and their impacts on the energy system, and thereby help to avoid
ineffective or misguided policies. The need for improved model
representations of human decision-making and social dynamics is
recognised by policy-makers and researchers alike, and increasingly
discussed by modellers (Kolstad et al., 2014; McCollum et al., 2017).
Nevertheless, most energy models on the national or global scale
remain based on optimisation, assuming that decisions are made
rationally. They thereby largely abstract from the question how
individual households and firms choose between demand-side energy
technologies, such as heating systems, cars or appliances. At the same
time, the industry, transportation and residential sectors have a large
untapped mitigation potential (Rogelj et al., 2018b), the realisation of
which depends on the behavioural decision-making of heterogeneous
actors.
It remains an unresolved question how model representations of tech-
nology choice behaviour could become more realistic, while also being
feasible to implement in a quantitative way at a large scale (McCol-
lum et al., 2017). Agent-based models allow to model high degrees of
behavioural detail by representing social systems as collections of indi-
vidual decision-makers with pre-defined decision-rules (such as ‘pur-
chase an electric car once most of your friends own an electric car’),
which can be based on theories from different fields (such as sociology
or economics) and empirically observed behaviour. However, due to
immense data and computational requirements, agent-based models
are usually restricted to local applications (Rai and Henry, 2016). On
the scale of national and global modelling, the inclusion of behavioural
features largely remains limited to more sophisticated model repre-
sentations of cost and technology characteristics. Examples are the
specification of non-financial preferences and heterogeneous consumer
groups in the modelling of transport technology choice (McCollum et
al., 2017; McCollum et al., 2018; Pettifor et al., 2017b), reduced sensi-
tivities towards cost variables (Li, 2017), or behavioural discount rates
(Beugin and Jaccard, 2012; Jaccard and Dennis, 2006). The latter are of-
ten used in energy models to implicitly represent the observed under-
11
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valuation of future benefits (relative to present day costs) in technology
adoption choices, without identifying the underlying sources (Schleich
et al., 2016). Meanwhile, the original models’ decision-making algo-
rithms in all these cases remain unchanged, and are still tied to the
assumption of rational behaviour and systems optimisation.
1.5 Aim and outline of thesis
Up to here, I have identified the important role of energy models for
the analysis of technological change in the context of climate change
policy and decarbonisation scenarios. Furthermore, I have argued that
the usefulness of models for the design and evaluation of policy instru-
ments depends on their ability to represent human technology choice
behaviour as realistically as possible. However, it remains unclear how
exactly representations of decision-making in energy models can be
implemented in a realistic and feasible way. Therefore, in this thesis I
address the following main research question:
How can the uptake and diffusion of energy end-use technologies
be modelled in a realistic and feasible way?
To answer this question, I focus on the following subquestions:
1. How can the choice of energy end-use technologies and the social dy-
namics of technology diffusion be modelled from a behavioural perspec-
tive?
2. How do model assumptions on technology choice behaviour and tech-
nology diffusion dynamics influence recommendations for the design of
decarbonisation policies?
Chapter 2 gives an overview of different theoretical perspectives on
decision-making, at the example of heterogeneous firms which need to
decide on energy efficiency investments.
In chapter 3, I analyse the relevance of behavioural decision-making
using the example of the buildings sector, and present a new
bottom-up model for the uptake of heating technologies in the
European Union, called FTT:Heat.
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In chapter 4, it is described how the spatial coverage of FTT:Heat is
extended to all world regions, and how global decarbonisation scenar-
ios for the residential building sector are impacted by assumptions on
technology choice behaviour.
Chapter 5 focuses on decision-making from the perspective of Prospect
Theory. Starting from a conceptual model, I analyse how reference-
dependence and loss aversion may influence technology uptake, and
exemplarily integrate the modelling concept into FTT:Heat.
In chapter 6, I extent the scope of the analysis to the interactions be-
tween multiple sectors. In particular, I ask the question whether un-
coordinated decision-making could undermine the emission reduction
potential of electrification policies, focusing on indirect emissions from
electric cars and heat pumps.
13
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Chapter 2. The behavioural aspect of green technology investments
Abstract
Studies report that firms do not invest in seemingly cost-effective
green technologies. While economic barriers can explain parts of
the gap, behavioural aspects may cause a further systematic under-
valuation. This is partly due to systematic deviations of decision-
making agents’ perceptions from normative benchmarks, and partly
due to their diversity. This paper combines available behavioural
knowledge into a simple model of technology adoption. Firms are
modelled as heterogeneous agents with different behavioural re-
sponses. To quantify the gap, the model simulates their investment
decisions from different theoretical perspectives, including different
barriers. Although relevant parameters are uncertain at the micro-
level, it is shown that randomised distributions, representing agent
diversity, can provide a useful simulation of the macro adoption
rate. To demonstrate the model’s abilities and the relevance of biases
and diversity concepts, it is calibrated using audit data for proposed
investments in energy efficient electric motors. The consideration
of behavioural and diversity factors reduces significantly expected
adoption rates: from 81% using a normative optimization perspec-
tive, down to 20% when including a behavioural perspective. The
effectiveness of various policies is tested in the model.
16
2.1 Introduction
Why are firms’ investments in green technologies lower than predicted
by engineering studies? Can the gap be sufficiently explained as a ra-
tional response to risky future cost-savings and information asymme-
tries? Or do behavioural aspects cause a further systematic underval-
uation of green technologies compared to contemporary mainstream
investment theory? If so, what implication does this have for policies
aimed at increasing such investments?
A green technology is one that generates or facilitates a reduction in
environmental externalities relative to the incumbent (Allan, Jaffe, and
Sin, 2014, p. 2). When this is achieved by reducing the input for a
given output, a technology potentially reduces operating costs along
with the externality. According to mainstream economic theory,
a profit-maximizing firm should undertake such an investment
whenever these future savings outweigh the upfront cost.
However, studies based on engineering data regularly report that
seemingly cost-effective green investments are not undertaken (for
a discussion, see Grubb, Hourcade, and Neuhoff, 2014, p. 132). A
reduction of environmental externalities at apparently negative cost is
consistently found within the literature (Allan, Jaffe, and Sin, 2014).
McKinsey and Company (2009) claims that global CO2 emissions
could be reduced by 11 Gt per year by investing in cost-effective
green technologies, which is not currently happening. The largest
potential is attributed to energy efficiency measures, and the gap
between realised market outcomes and the normative cost-minimising
benchmark is referred to as the energy efficiency gap (Jaffe and Stavins,
1994).
Considering the gradual process of technology diffusion (e.g. Geels,
2002; Rogers, 2010), it is meaningful to analyse how firms decide on
a green technology investment when it is directly presented to them,
such as after an energy audit. Firms apparently reject a large fraction
of seemingly cost-effective project recommendations, as seen from ex-
ternal engineering perspectives (Anderson and Newell, 2004). Firms
dismissing profitable investments in such a systematic way makes ef-
fective policy-making for stimulating technological change difficult: it
becomes unclear how to create fruitful incentives for technology adop-
tion. In the case of technologies that reduce energy use and emissions,
17
Chapter 2. The behavioural aspect of green technology investments
this has important implications for climate change mitigation policy
(Worrell et al., 2009).
There exists a vast quantity of literature that both analyses the scope of
the gap, and suggests possible reasons — the so-called market barriers
(Sorrell, 2004; Sorrell, Mallett, and Nye, 2011). Many studies attempt
to realign the observed adoption gap with the neoclassical theory
paradigm, in which the representative agent adopts cost-minimizing
or utility-maximizing measures. For example, Sutherland (1991)
argues that firms have rational reasons to reject green technologies,
but that these reasons are mostly omitted in engineering studies
— such as hidden costs, risk, imperfect information and capital
constraints. As a result, many investments may be less profitable than
they seem to be.1
While economic barriers can explain parts of the gap, others question
the behavioural realism of decision mechanisms assumed in theories
(e.g. DeCanio, 1998; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014). First, firms might
not act as profit-maximizers, but instead look for satisfactory solutions
(Simon, 1955). Second, behavioural economics shows that human deci-
sions systematically violate the axioms of expected utility theory, and
are better described based on psychological foundations (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Since decisions of
firms are a combination of human decisions, they can be subject to the
same behavioural biases (Grubb, Hourcade, and Neuhoff, 2014).
The relevance of behavioural factors for climate and energy policy
is now widely acknowledged (Allan, Jaffe, and Sin, 2014; Pollitt
and Shaorshadze, 2012). However, there is limited knowledge on
what drives people’s and firms’ behaviour, and how this influences
aggregate outcomes.
This is particularly relevant in the perspective of sustainability tran-
sitions studies, in which the process of decision-making by agents is
often not emphasised, but is at least as important as cultural, regula-
tory and other contextual factors that influence or limit the formation
of new socio-technical regimes (e.g. as in Geels, 2002). This type of re-
search can improve representations of agent behaviour, quantitatively
and qualitatively, in the various representations of the field (i.e. the
multi-level perspective and technology innovation systems), since it
1The issue with such a line of reasoning is that it allows accepting the use of an un-
falsifiable theory, where cause is attributed to unknown variables.
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is ultimately agent adoption choices that determine the successful re-
placement of old socio-technical regimes by new ones, and the diffu-
sion of innovations out of their niches.
To clarify current understanding and to improve quantitative analysis,
we combine known behavioural facts into a simple aggregate model
of decision-making by heterogeneous agents for technology adoption.
This allows identification and quantification of relevant barriers and
behavioural factors, without recourse to unknown variables, and aims
at a higher predictive power when modelling the adoption of a green
technology. Finally, it can provide key insight on the likely effective-
ness of policies from a behavioural perspective.
The diverse perception of a technology’s profitability by agents can
influence rates of uptake. Diversity implies varying adoption thresh-
olds across agents, and is thus partly responsible for the typically ob-
served gradual diffusion of innovations (Rogers, 2010). Thus, within
this model, investment decisions are simulated based on the technolog-
ical and behavioural diversity of firms. It is assumed that a technology
has different costs and benefits, as perceived by every single firm. Due
to heterogeneous decision-making parameters, investment decisions
by firms differ even when faced with the same problem and data. Fur-
thermore, behavioural aspects include systematic biases in firms’ per-
ceptions of technological opportunities. This is typically interpreted
with Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), in which gains
and losses are not valued equally. Thus we combine here both effects
of behavioural diversity and of behavioural biases.
To quantify the relevance of behavioural factors compared to a norma-
tive benchmark, the model simulates technology adoption using three
different possible types of decision-making — referred to as levels of
decision-making: optimizing, satisficing and behavioural. Each level
corresponds to a different point of view on the investment decision,
or method for project evaluation, and thus includes different barriers
and degrees of heterogeneity. The model can be used to estimate and
compare the effectiveness of policies according to different levels of
decision-making, or theoretical paradigms from the viewpoint of the
modeller.
To demonstrate the model’s abilities, we apply it to a case study of elec-
tric motors, which account for 43–46% of global electricity consump-
tion. It is estimated that cost-effective investments could increase their
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average efficiency by 20–30% (Waide and Brunner, 2011). Neverthe-
less, firms systematically reject these investment possibilities (ibid). To
explain this phenomenon, the model simulates these investment deci-
sions on different levels of decison-making. The results are compared
to observed decisions that have been taken by firms after energy au-
dits.
Policies can be applied to influence the rate of uptake of green tech-
nologies, and we suggest that these can take two forms. In the tradi-
tional sense, financial incentives such as taxes and subsidies can be ap-
plied to improve the rate of uptake — a rate that depends on the level
at which decision-making is made, i.e. the method of project assess-
ment by firms in a particular situation. However, policies can also seek
to change the way in which project assessment is carried out, shifting
the level at which decisions are taken, using methods such as information
campaigns. We show that for electric motors, this could have a high
impact on rates of uptake.
2.2 Literature Review and Background
The field of sustainability transitions studies (STS) provides a power-
ful, if mostly qualitative, rationale to describe and connect the com-
ponents influencing the diffusion of green innovations out of their ex-
isting niches to the mainstream (e.g. Geels, 2002, 2005, 2011; Genus
and Coles, 2008) and how to foster transitions (e.g. Rotmans, Kemp,
and Van Asselt, 2001). Little quantitative work, however, characterises
how these processes collectively act to make a transition happen (see
e.g. Holtz, 2011). A field of research is emerging for modelling sus-
tainability transitions (for a discussion, see Holtz et al., 2015). There,
emphasis is given to path-dependence, complexity and interactions
across domains, but perhaps insufficient attention is given to charac-
terise decision-making at the level of agents. Meanwhile, the parent
field of evolutionary economics also considers issues of technological
change; and there, more emphasis has been given to quantitative meth-
ods (e.g. see Mercure et al., 2014; Safarzyn´ska and van den Bergh,
2013; Saviotti and Mani, 1995), even if no dominant model yet ex-
ists. But concepts going beyond standard utility theory have gener-
ally been considered at the core of evolutionary theories and models
of technological change, in particular bounded rationality (Metcalfe,
1988; Saviotti, 1991), enabling quantitative considerations to be made.
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This work thus positions itself within an evolutionary economics per-
spective; but many of these evolutionary elements could also be con-
sidered in STS (e.g. see the comparison by Safarzyn´ska, Frenken, and
van den Bergh, 2012).
Technology diffusion describes the gradual adoption of innovations
by firms and consumers, which involves choices to be made. Adopters
first have to learn about the new technology’s existence and benefits,
and then decide whether to adopt or not. Considering heterogeneous
agents in this context implies a gradual diffusion process, as different
agents have different thresholds to their decisions (Rogers, 2010).
Many studies show that the process regularly resembles a path
similar to logistic curves (e.g. Fisher and Pry, 1971; Gru¨bler and
Nakic´enovic´, 1991; Gru¨bler, Nakic´enovic´, and Victor, 1999; Mansfield,
1961; Marchetti and Nakic´enovic´, 1978; Nakic´enovic´, 1986). Wilson
and Grubler (2011) identify seven ‘grand patterns’ of technological
transitions. Geels (2002) develops the multi-level perspective to
understand technological transitions in a complex societal context,
in which components of incumbent socio-technical regimes (e.g.
infrastructure, knowledge, regulatory context, culture and user
practices) influence their successful or unsuccessful diffusion.
However, in all of these analysis perspectives, the microeconomic
picture remains to some degree unclear.
From a microeconomic perspective, a gradual diffusion can be related
to changing costs or benefits as perceived by heterogeneous adopters
with different perspectives (see Figure 2.1). Various processes may
change perceived costs and benefits over time, such that the adoption
becomes increasingly attractive. As emphasised by Rogers (2010), het-
erogeneous characteristics of agents (e.g. risk-aversion, tastes and in-
come) imply different net benefits of adopting a new technology. With
learning-by-doing, gradual cost reductions occurring with cumulative
adoptions lead to a self-reinforcing phenomenon (Arthur, 1989).
Not adopting a green technology deemed profitable, however, consti-
tutes a gap between classical theory and reality. It can be explained
either by assuming that agents act rationally, but do not invest in seem-
ingly profitable technologies due to economic factors that are omitted
in engineering studies — so called market barriers. Or, agents sys-
tematically violate the rationality axioms of expected utility theory —
which would constitute irrational behaviour from a neoclassical per-
spective.
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Figure 2.1: Diffusion with heterogeneous adopters. Adapted from Allan,
Jaffe, and Sin (2014).
Some studies attempt to explain such recurrent efficiency gaps by
evoking purely economic factors. Sutherland (1991) argues that
the rejection of green technology investments represents ‘real costs
in real markets’: given that many such investments are illiquid and
undiversifiable, their rejection is a rational response to risk. The
reliance on ‘overlooked’ economic factors is a common explanation
in the literature. However, as Jaffe and Stavins (1994) argue, ‘such
explanations must advance beyond the tautological assertion that (...) there
must be some unobserved adoption costs’ (p. 805), which effectively
impedes constructive scientific thought in this context.
Sorrell (2004) classify different classes of barriers. Sorrell, Mallett, and
Nye (2011) is widely credited with the standard taxonomy, used here
as fundamental building blocks for our theory.2 Barriers are grouped
into six classes (Table 2.1), and defined as ‘a postulated mechanism that
inhibits a decision or behaviour that appears to be both energy efficient and
economically efficient’ (p. 4).
The central microeconomic theory of choice under risk is expected util-
ity theory (EUT) by Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). EUT can be
2Although the authors focus on the specific case of energy efficiency investments, the
classification can easily be applied to any green technology.
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Table 2.1: Barriers to energy efficiency, following Sorrell, Mallett, and Nye
(2011).
Barrier Summary
Risk The short paybacks required for energy efficiency investments may
represent a rational response to risk. This could be because energy
efficiency investments represent a higher technological or financial
risk than other types of investment, or that business and market un-
certainty encourages short time horizons.
Imperfect
information
Lack of information on energy efficiency opportunities may lead to
cost-effective opportunities being missed. In some cases, imperfect
information may lead to inefficient products driving efficient prod-
ucts out of the market.
Hidden
costs
Engineering-economic analyses may fail to account for either the re-
duction in utility associated with energy efficient technologies, or
the additional costs associated with them. As a consequence, the
studies may overestimate energy efficiency potential. Examples of
hidden costs include overhead costs for management, disruptions to
production, staff replacement and training, and the costs associated
with gathering, analysing and applying information.
Access to
capital
If an organisation has insufficient capital through internal funds, and
has difficulty raising additional funds through borrowing or share
issues, energy efficient investments may be prevented from going
ahead. Investment could also be inhibited by internal capital bud-
geting procedures, investment appraisal rules and the short-term in-
centives of energy management staff.
Split
incentives
Energy efficiency opportunities are likely to be foregone if actors can-
not appropriate the benefits of the investment. For example, if indi-
vidual departments within an organisation are not accountable for
their energy use they will have no incentive to improve energy effi-
ciency.
Bounded
rationality
Owing to constraints on time, attention, and the ability to process
information, individuals do not make decisions in the manner as-
sumed in economic models. As a consequence, they may neglect op-
portunities for improving energy efficiency, even when given good
information and appropriate incentives.
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seen as either a normative or a positive theory; however seeing it as
positive requires accepting heroic assumptions over agents thought
processes (rationality). Meanwhile, as a normative theory, it is not re-
stricted in this sense, and describes a subjective set of objectives. Nev-
ertheless, economists widely apply EUT as a positive description of
human behaviour, arguing their view in this way: so long as devia-
tions by agents from rationality are random and unsystematic, they
are irrelevant on average. Empirical evidence shows, however, that
many deviations from EUT are systematic3 as well as correlated, thus
not cancelling out without any impact.
Since most decisions of organisations are made by individuals, firms
display comparable behavioural characteristics (Grubb, Hourcade,
and Neuhoff, 2014; Shogren and Taylor, 2008). Consequently,
the assumption of profit-maximization may be an oversimplified
representation of a firm’s investment behaviour.
Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer (2009) identify three key areas from
behavioural economics that are most relevant for energy efficiency pol-
icy: bounded rationality, heuristic decision-making and Prospect The-
ory.
Bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) replaces unbounded maximization
with satisficing behaviour. Agents are assumed to behave rationally,
but within cognitive limits. Manifestations are heuristics in the form
of rules of thumb or the replacement of an originally complex decision
problem with a simpler, roughly accurate one. One possible impli-
cation is that managers maximize their own utility within the con-
straint of achieving satisficing (instead of maximal) profits (Williamson,
1967). For investments, this may explain why many firms use sim-
plified payback thresholds as a key decision criterion (instead of net-
present-value calculations). Even small individual discrepancies be-
tween satisficing and optimizing solutions can result in large devia-
tions of overall market allocations (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985).
Bounded rationality is a concept quite central to evolutionary
economics and evolutionary game theory. Having originated in
evolutionary biology (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), evolutionary
game theory offers a powerful method to explore social dynamics
(e.g. Safarzyn´ska and van den Bergh 2010; Saviotti and Mani 1995;
3Prominent examples being the choice paradoxes analysed by Allais (1953) and Ells-
berg (1961)
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for a review, see Safarzyn´ska and van den Bergh 2010), for instance
based on replicator dynamics as a dynamical equation. In that
framework, social dynamics are explained partly through bounded
rational decision, partly through multi-agent interactions (e.g. social
influence). This generally results in complex dynamical models (with
attractors; e.g. see the discussion on increasing returns by Arthur,
1989).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed Prospect Theory as a formal
descriptive framework for decision analysis. They systematically
mapped observed contradictions to EUT and conclude that for
most decisions, optimality considerations are less relevant than the
question, “What course of action seems most natural in this situation?”
(Kahneman, 2003, p. 1469). For example, in empirical studies, losses
are weighed roughly twice as much as gains (Greene, 2011) — termed
as loss aversion. Overall, Prospect Theory helps to explain various
behavioural biases that are potentially relevant for green technology
investments.
Both bounded rationality and Prospect Theory provide possible expla-
nations for the energy efficiency gap. Both are consistent with em-
pirical observations that the sensitivity to future cost savings is much
lower than to upfront costs: Jaffe and Stavins (1994) empirically anal-
yse the diffusion of thermal insulation and find investments to be three
times more sensitive to upfront subsidies than to the energy price. Has-
sett and Metcalf (1995) find that investments in energy conservation
are eight times more sensitive to tax credits than to electricity price in-
creases. Anderson and Newell (2004) analyse manufacturing compa-
nies’ investment decisions after energy audits and report a sensitivity
towards upfront payments that is 40% larger than to annual savings.
For a perfectly rational investor, a relative change in upfront costs
should have the same effect on investment decisions as a change in
discounted expected future payoffs of the same relative magnitude
(Allan, Jaffe, and Sin, 2014). The observed overweighting of upfront
costs could therefore indicate systematic behavioural deviations from
EUT. Unfortunately, to reliably diagnose a deviation from utility
maximization, researchers have to know the agents’ true subjective
expectations about future payoffs. In a real world problem, it is
likely that a whole variety of subjective decision-making procedures
are found, and it would be impossible to reliably enumerate them
when studying, for instance, nation-wide energy policy experiences.
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However, it is possible that simpler explanations, not based on EUT
and not chosen ad hoc, can be found, which may provide higher
explanatory power than EUT — as we attempt here.
2.3 A general positive model and classification of
decision-making
We introduce a model of technology adoption that explicitly includes
the diversity of agents and systematic behavioural deviations from
EUT. The overarching goal is the simulation of technology adoption
and policy outcomes in the context of different decision-making pro-
cesses of firms, i.e. how firms assess green investment projects.
2.3.1 Methodology
The model is based on three closely interrelated building blocks: per-
ceptions, heterogeneity and risk.
• Perceptions differ between individuals. The same set of data on
an investment may be interpreted in different ways by different
firms, and by modellers. All models of decision-making are sub-
jective sets of perspectives.
• Heterogeneity of economic fundamentals and decision-making
procedures imply heterogeneous decisions. The adoption of
a homogenous technology may be profitable for the average
firm, but not for all firms, due to varying contexts (in contrast
to varying perceptions). The relevant decision criteria are
heterogeneous: firms may have different planning horizons,
and may use entirely different sets of decision criteria (decision
protocols).
• Risk affects firms’ decisions. From the firms’ perspective, the
profitability of an investment is a risky outcome. This risk is not
necessarily an objective property of the world, but can be seen
as a subjective or psychological conception (Crawford-Brown,
1999).
Given that firms and individuals within them apply heterogeneous
decision protocols, it is generally not possible to forecast individual
choices. However, possible values of parameters used for decisions
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across individuals in a group are bounded, and based on plausible
assumptions on parameter distributions, it is possible to construct an
overview of how the choices are distributed among a sufficiently large
number of firms, as follows.
We define three levels of decision-making, plus a benchmark level for
a representative firm (see Table 2.2). Each level corresponds to the per-
spective and decision criteria of a specific hypothetical actor: the engi-
neer, optimizing and satisficing firms (acting according to unbounded
and bounded rationality), and individuals within firms.
We use these definitions to ask the question: if agents were to decide
according to the criteria of level X, what would be the aggregate system
level outcome? Different levels will bring different amounts of vari-
ations (distributions around EUT) and biases (systematic deviations
from EUT). Depending on their framing, particular problems can be
assigned to a particular level of analysis, and the model can be used to
obtain quantitative insight on likely aggregate outcomes of decision-
making. This insight can then be used for two purposes: to estimate
the likely effectiveness of particular hypothetical policies, and to clas-
sify impacts of various barriers on outcomes.
For each level, a different subjective decision protocol is formalised. It is
assumed for simplicity that each firm has a binary choice to adopt a
green technology or not, which is compared to an alternative default
technology with respect to perceived investment costs (denoted as ∆C)
and perceived future cost-savings (denoted as ∆B). Within the engi-
neering benchmark and the first level, the decision-making protocol
involves calculating an investment’s net-present-value (NPV ). The de-
cision criteria for levels 2 and 3 are formulated in a similar way, but
using an investment’s perceived net-present-benefit (NPB). On a given
level, a firm is assumed to invest in the green technology if and only if
the net-present-value (on level 0 and 1) or perceived net-present-benefit (on
levels 2 and 3) is larger than zero.
In section 2.4, the decision protocols are calibrated using a case study
on electric motors in industry. Based on audit data, probability
distributions are assigned to all heterogeneous parameters. The
outcome variable, net-present-value/benefit, is a combination of all
heterogeneous parameters. In order to combine the heterogeneity of
the superposed behavioural layers, the model evaluates combined
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Table 2.2: Levels of decision-making and their analytical relevance.
Level Decision behaviour Actor Defining question
0 Technological Engineer What is cost-effective for a repre-
sentative firm from a technological
point of view?
1 Optimizing Heterogeneous
firms with un-
bounded
rationality
What should be perceived as in-
dividually beneficial for profit-
maximizing heterogeneous firms
that decide according to the
concepts proposed by standard
micro-economics?
2 Satisficing Heterogeneous
firms as or-
ganisations
with bounded
rationality
What should be perceived as in-
dividually beneficial for a profit-
maximizing firm, given organisa-
tional structures and limited deci-
sion resources?
3 Behavioural Heterogeneous
individuals
inside het-
erogeneous
organisations
What is perceived to be individu-
ally beneficial by an agent inside
a profit-maximizing firm, given or-
ganisational structures, limited cog-
nitive resources and systematic be-
havioural deviations from EUT?
distributions of NPB up to each level of decision-making by
performing Monte Carlo simulations.4
The results are interpreted as the investment decisions of a heteroge-
neous population of firms. Each element of Monte Carlo simulations
corresponds to the decision of one individual firm. Based on these
simulations, the share of adopters and non-adopters is compared and
visualised for each level of decision-making. The results can be used
to identify the robustness of policies for the levels appropriate to the
problem of interest.
2.3.2 Levels of decision-making
In the following, we describe the levels of decision-making including
the respective assumptions and decision protocols. Ei(Xi) refers to
firm i’s subjective expectation value of a given X variable (e.g. price
4This can equally be done by calculating convolutions of probability distributions
with one another.
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of electricity) for firm i (see Table 2.3).
(0) Technological
The technological level is a hypothetical baseline. The green technol-
ogy investment is analysed from an engineering perspective (e.g. as in
McKinsey and Company, 2009),5 assuming a representative firm that
decides according to a perfectly rational decision protocol with infinite
amounts of perfectly reliable information taken into consideration (i.e.
protocol and information known by the modeller). There is neither risk
nor uncertainty.
According to neoclassical theory, the appropriate decision protocol for
a profit-maximizing firm is a net-present-value (NPV) calculation
(Damodaran, 2007): the investment’s value is defined as the present
value of its expected cash flows. If the NPV is positive, an investment
should be undertaken.
For the case of green technology investments, it is assumed that the rel-
evant cash flows are the upfront investment costs (∆C) in the present
period (t = 0) and annual benefits (∆B) throughout the investment’s
lifetime (n) (from t = 0 up to t = n). Investment costs are either the net
cost-difference relative to the default investment (e.g. if retired equip-
ment has to be replaced) or the green technology’s gross investment
costs (e.g. if the investments replaces current equipment prematurely).
Benefits are defined as input cost-savings relative to the default tech-
nology: the change in the required quantity (∆q) of an input (e.g. elec-
tricity) given a constant output, multiplied by the input’s market price
(p) (inclusive of any fees and taxes). From the technological (the tech-
nology producer’s) perspective, the green investment is assumed to be
risk-free. To account for the time-value and opportunity cost of money,
future cash flows are discounted by a discount rate r (on this level, the
rate of return on risk-free investments).
Given all assumptions, the decision criterion of the representative firm
can be described by formula 2.1:
NPV := −∆C +
n∑
t=0
∆Bt
(1 + r)t
= −∆C +
n∑
t=0
pt ∗∆qt
(1 + r)t
(2.1)
5The perspective of the technology developers, and according to them, how the tech-
nology is supposed to be used.
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Table 2.3: Levels of decision-making and their parameters.
Level Assumptions Barriers Parameters
0 —
Technological
homogenous
agents,
no risk or uncer-
tainty,
perfect informa-
tion,
unbounded ratio-
nality
none hypothetical baseline
1 —
Optimizing
heterogeneous
agents,
perfect informa-
tion,
unbounded ratio-
nality,
undiversifiable risk
+ hidden costs
+ external risk
+ business risk
+ restricted credit
+ imperfect infor-
mation
discount rates (ri),
expectations (Ei),
implicit weights (γi)
heterogeneity in:
cost and benefits
(∆Ci,∆Bi),
lifetimes (ni)
2 —
Satisficing
heterogeneous
agents,
undiversifiable
risk,
firms as organisa-
tions,
decision con-
straints
+ capital budgeting
+ split incentives
+ limited time
+ limited resources
Payback criterion:
critical thresholds (bi)
3 —
Behavioural
heterogeneous
agents,
undiversifiable
risk,
firms as organisa-
tions,
deviations from
EUT
+ loss aversion
+ status quo bias
+ values
Prospect Theory loss
aversion function:
weighting factors
(λ),
decreasing marginal
utility (α, β)
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The resulting decision is a point estimate for a representative firm,
which is used to predict the homogeneous behaviour of all firms. This
is what might be used for instance in cost-optimization models, based
on averaged technology costs and benefits.
(1) Optimizing
The optimizing level of decision-making analyses the optimal deci-
sions of firms according to the principles that are suggested by neo-
classical theory: how should fully rational firms behave in order to
maximize their profits? Compared to the technological level, there are
three main differences.
First, heterogeneity is introduced. A technology is assumed to have
different upfront costs (∆Ci) and benefits (∆Bi) for different firms.
The upfront costs depend on various heterogeneous factors, such as
staff costs or disruptions in the production process (Sorrell, Mallett,
and Nye, 2011). In terms of barriers, these differences are referred to
as ‘hidden costs’. Individual benefits differ in a similar way — both
due to differences in input prices (pi) and quantities saved (∆qi) (e.g.
due to varying load factors). Furthermore, overall benefits depend on
the investment’s expected useful lifetime (Ei(ni)), which may differ
between firms due to heterogeneous expectations about the technolog-
ical lifetime, as well as heterogeneous planning horizons for the use of
the technology (e.g. due to a planned factory shut-down).
Second, firms are assumed to differ with regard to capital access. Fu-
ture cash flows are therefore discounted by individual firms’ private
discount rates (ri), here defined as a their weighted average cost of capi-
tal (WACC). In terms of barriers, ri represents ‘restricted access to credit’
(e.g. due to being a high risk borrower).
Third, risk and imperfect information are introduced. While firm imay
know some determinants of future benefits (like its individual load fac-
tor), it has to rely on subjective expectation values (Ei) for others (like
the technological lifetime and future input prices). Furthermore, firms
may be subject to imperfect or asymmetric information on the tech-
nology’s true performance: if buyers cannot reliably observe promised
benefits and sellers cannot credibly communicate them, they might be
rationally ignored in purchase decisions, resulting in adverse selection
(Akerlof, 1970). The credibility of promised cost-savings is likely to be
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higher if a technology’s advantages are well proven or certified, and
lower if not directly observable (e.g. due to a lack of metering).
From the firm’s perspective, it could therefore be rational to perform a
risk-adjustment of expected benefits (Sutherland, 1991) — depending
on individual degrees of risk-aversion, as well as heterogeneous
perceptions of the investment’s riskiness and credibility. Since all
this is highly subjective, we restrain from explicitly modelling the
corresponding risk-adjustment by firms. Instead, based on Allcott
and Greenstone (2012), we define the parameter γi (between 0 and 1)
as an implicit weight on expected savings in the agent’s decision.
From an optimizing point of view, it can be evaluated as a statistic
for all investment inefficiencies. Since it is hardly possible to calibrate
γi beyond an arbitrary level, it is not used in any of the following
simulations (so by default set to 1). However, we implicitly estimate
γi in the sensitivity analysis by finding which average value of γi is
consistent with observed investment behaviour when assuming that
firms decide based on level 1.
The resulting decision criterion for heterogeneous optimizing firms
is:
NPVi := −∆Ci +
Ei(ni)∑
t=0
γi ∗ Ei(∆Bi,t)
(1 + r)t
= −∆Ci +
Ei(ni)∑
t=0
γi ∗ Ei(pi,t) ∗ Ei(∆qi,t)
(1 + r)t
(2.2)
The defining differences to formula 2.1 are to use subjective agent
expectations of the future Ei(:) for random variables, i-subscripts for
heterogeneity, private discount rates (ri) and the implicit parameter
γi. The respective parameters are assumed to be different for each
firm. This implies heterogeneous investment decisions, which will
result in a distribution of net-present-values (NPVi). From an
optimizing perspective, every firm with NPVi > 0 should undertake
the investment.
(2) Satisficing
The satisficing level of decision-making focuses on the behaviour of
firms as organisations, taking into account organisational constraints
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and limited resources for decision-making (time and attention). Gra-
ham and Harvey (2001) survey the budgeting behaviour of firms in the
US and conclude that most do not perform NPV calculations. Instead,
57% ‘always or almost always’ use a payback-time criterion, which does
neither include discounting, nor risk-adjustments. Most importantly,
it ignores all future cash flows after an arbitrary cut-off date.
To account for this observed behaviour, the decision criterion is re-
placed with a simple payback criterion. Firms are assumed to compare
a green technology’s investment costs with its expected future cost-
savings for a limited number of years, denoted by individual payback
thresholds bi. This threshold is commonly found to be between one
and five years, with a majority of firms requiring an investment to pay
for itself within one to two years (Anderson and Newell, 2004). As a
result, any future cost-savings beyond the cut-off date are ignored.
Given firms’ constraints on decision-making, the replacement of a NPV
calculation with a simpler criterion can still be interpreted as being op-
timal within the concept of bounded rationality. For instance, senior
staff may lack the capacity to monitor all projects. When a green tech-
nology investment is perceived as relatively unimportant, it may be
evaluated under a less demanding basis of payback criteria (Sorrell,
Mallett, and Nye, 2011). Furthermore, short payback thresholds might
be a consequence of split incentives and ‘managerial risk-aversion’ in-
side an organisation, for example, when the responsible staff is only
evaluated based on short-term goals.
The resulting decision criterion is summarised by formula 2.3.
NPBi := −∆Ci +
bi∑
t=0
Ei(∆Bi,t)
= −∆Ci +
bi∑
t=0
[Ei(pi,t) ∗ Ei(∆qi,t)]
(2.3)
Note that the decision criterion is no longer NPVi. To allow for a com-
parison between levels, it is instead defined as the net-present-benefit
(NPBi) as perceived by individual organisations.
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(3) Behavioural
The behavioural level of decision-making adopts a purely positive per-
spective. In no way does it imply how a decision should be made.
Instead, it focuses on the perspective of individuals, working inside
heterogeneous organisations — how do individual decision-makers be-
have? — taking into account not just organisational structures, but also
systematic behavioural deviations from EUT. The decision is seen here
from the perspective of the individual who is ultimately responsible
for the investment decision, according to internal structures and hier-
archies.
According to EUT, a decrease in upfront costs should result in the same
utility change as an increase in future benefits of the same relative mag-
nitude. However, it is a common finding that decisions on green tech-
nology investments are much more sensitive to the former than the lat-
ter (Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins, 2005). This is likely related to systematic
deviations from EUT — such as loss aversion, status quo bias and the
salience effect (Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer, 2009). In behavioural
experiments, individuals were shown to weigh losses roughly twice as
much as gains (Greene, 2011).
In order to model the observed decision behaviour, we here adopt
the positive framework of Prospect Theory. Specifically, we use a loss
aversion value function as proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
which conceptualises observed decision-making based on: (1) refer-
ence dependence: gains and losses are defined relative to the status quo
as a reference point, (2) loss aversion: since losses weigh larger than
gains, the function is steeper in the negative than in the positive do-
main — captured by the parameter λ, (3) diminishing sensitivity: gains
and losses are subject to decreasing valuation, resulting in a s-shaped
function — expressed by the exponents α (for losses) and β (for gains).
Empirically, it is estimated that λ = 2.25 and α = β = 0.88 (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992), which holds consistently in very different con-
texts (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995).
The decision criterion of level 3 is formula 2.4, with
∑bi
t=0Ei(∆Bi,t) =∑bi
t=0 [Ei(pi,t) ∗ Ei(∆qi,t)].
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NPBi := −λ ∗ (∆Ci)β +
[
bi∑
t=0
Ei(∆Bi,t)
]α
= −2.25 ∗ (∆Ci)0.88 +
[
bi∑
t=0
Ei(∆Bi,t)
]0.88 (2.4)
Note that formula 2.4 is based on the satisficing level, and therefore
includes the explicit payback threshold (bi). Given that individual
decision-makers decide within the given organisational constraints
of their firms, it is assumed that the long-term benefits beyond the
cut-off point are not relevant for their individual decision utility.
(4) Ensemble of all decision types
The different types of decision-making are not meant to be mutually
exclusive. Rather, one type of firm might decide based on a decision
rule similar to the NPV calculation in level 1, while others decide ac-
cording to rules that are closer to the payback threshold of level 2. Fi-
nally, a remaining fraction of firms might be subject to the behavioural
biases of individual decision-makers, as described best by level 3.
In reality, a mix of firms with different types of decision-making for
the given investment is more likely than an exclusive prevalence of
just one type of firm. To simulate different distributions of decision-
making types among firms, we therefore construct an ensemble model
that contains levels 1, 2 and 3. Each firm is randomly assigned to one
level. The probability that an individual firm belongs to level 1, 2 or 3
is assumed to be exogenously given by p(level = 1), p(level = 2) and
p(level = 3), which sum up to 1.
Based on the results of Graham and Harvey (2001) for decision-making
of firms in the USA, we use the following default calibration:
p(level = 1) = 0.4; p(level = 2) = 0.3; p(level = 3) = 0.3 (2.5)
In a Monte Carlo simulation, these probabilities will equal the frac-
tions of firms assigned to the different levels. By means of numerical
exploration, the probabilities can be adjusted to any value, in order to
analyse the potential effect of any population composition.
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2.4 Case study: electric motors in the USA
In this section, we parameterise the model using data for
energy-efficient electric motors in the USA. We demonstrate what can
be done with the model and how it can enhance the policy-maker’s
understanding of a green technology’s rate of adoption. As an
example, we simulate investment decisions on the different levels of
decision-making and compare it to observed decisions after energy
audits. In a situation which otherwise would have been given the
un-instructive label of irrational behaviour, the model allows for better
understanding of the problem, and analysis of the likely effectiveness
of hypothetical policies.
2.4.1 Background information
The International Energy Agency (Waide and Brunner, 2011) estimates
that electric motor driven systems (EMDS) account for 43–46% of
global electricity consumption, causing annual CO2 emissions of
roughly 6 Gt. At the same time, the IEA estimates that the energy
efficiency of EMDS could be cost-effectively increased by 20–30%.
Throughout a potential lifetime of 20 years, electricity typically
accounts for 90% of a motor’s life-cycle costs, compared to 1% for
the purchase price. As a result, even “small gains in energy efficiency
can be highly cost-effective” (p. 72) and should more than justify the
initially higher investment costs (or even a premature replacement of
existing motors). However, despite the apparent attractiveness of
such green investments, the IEA considers their realisation as ‘difficult
or impossible’ (p. 13) due to a variety of barriers — for example higher
initial costs (∆Ci) and short-term thinking of firms (bi). Accordingly,
investment decisions focus on low investment costs, and largely
ignore the potential cost-savings.
Within the model, this ‘efficiency gap’ corresponds to the engineering
perspective of the benchmark level zero — the technological level of
decision-making. However, how are EMDS investments related to the
other levels?
2.4.2 Data and calibration
The model is calibrated to data from the US Department of Energy’s In-
dustrial Assessment Centers (IAC) (Center for Advanced Energy Stud-
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ies, 2015), which provide energy audits for small and medium-sized
manufacturing companies free of charge since 1976. Auditing teams
perform in-depth assessments of factories. These consist of surveys,
engineering measurements and a two-day site visit. The auditors then
provide the respective company with a detailed investment analysis of
projects that were identified as cost-effective. After six months, audi-
tors perform follow-up interviews on which projects are implemented
(ibid.). The key data of all project recommendations is consistently
reported in a public database, including: estimated investment costs
(∆Ci), estimated annual energy savings (∆qi), electricity prices (pi)
and the final implementation status.
We focus on audits between 2008 and 2013, assuming that the motor
technology throughout this period is roughly comparable. After re-
moving outliers (with reported investment costs being either zero or
unrealistically high), this provides information on 275 recommenda-
tions for the ‘use (of the) most efficient type of electric motors’. Note that
this only refers to a motor’s complete replacement (reconfigurations
are listed separately), allowing a treatment as a roughly homogenous
investment.
Descriptive statistics for all variables are summarised in Table 2.4. The
data on investment costs and quantities is transformed into relative
values ($ per kWh saved and kWh saved per $). For illustrative pur-
poses, this data is then scaled to the median project size (as measured
by kWh saved). All stated costs and prices are expressed in 2013-US-
Dollars.
First, the data reveal that there is considerable heterogeneity with re-
spect to estimated investment costs, annual energy savings and elec-
tricity prices (Figure 2.3). Second, calculated payback times are always
shorter than an electric motor’s expected lifetime, and shorter than 8.83
years for 95% of all projects. Therefore, the investment seems indeed to
be profitable for all firms. Despite these estimations, the observed im-
plementation rate is as low as 45%. This seems to be unrelated to the
considered economic fundamentals: by graphical inspection, project
payback times do not differ by implementation status (see Figure 2.2).
This indicates the relevance of other levels of decision-making.
The model is calibrated to the IAC data for ∆Ci, ∆qi and pi based on
the estimations of median-scaled motor projects (see Table 2.5). To
avoid having to specify a particular price path, pi is assumed to be
constant throughout an investment’s lifetime (so is ∆qi). Calibrations
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics of motor recommendations (absolute, relative,
median).
Variable Unit Mean Median Min. 95% perc. Max. Std. dev.
Absolute:
∆Ci $ 32 258 8 224 264 115 640 993 790 101 190
∆qi ∆kWh/y 178 250 46 050 999 708 940 5 645 400 496 380
pi $/kWh 0.073 0.070 0.020 0.130 0.220 0.031
∆Bi $/y 10 293 3 319 82 41 693 233 950 23 329
payback
time
years 3.34 2.65 0.15 8.83 16.41 2.57
Relative:
Ci/∆qi $/∆kWh 0.23 0.19 0.03 0.54 0.79 0.16
∆qi/Ci ∆kWh/$ 7.56 65.26 1.26 22.44 34.08 6.37
Median
motor:
Ci $ 10 311 8 685 1 341 24 527 36 256 7 270
∆qi ∆kWh/y 62 205 43 280 10 368 184 550 280 290 52 361
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Figure 2.2: Relative frequencies of project payback times, grouped by imple-
mentation status (green: implemented, red: not implemented).
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Table 2.5: Calibration of model parameters to electric motor project
recommendations.
Level Variable Distribution Parameter
values
Source
1 ∆C Weibull shape=1.51;
scale=11 493.28
fitted to data from the
p Weibull shape=2.46;
scale=0.08
Center for Advanced
Energy Studies, 2015
∆q Weibull shape=1.34;
scale=68 426.27
r Normal µ= 8%; σ =
3%; min=0%
Gilchrist, Sim, and
Zakrajsˇek, 2013
n Normal µ=15; σ =3;
min=0
Waide and Brunner,
2011
γi — 1 benchmark
2 b Normal µ=2; σ =1;
min=1;
max=5
Anderson and
Newell, 2004
3 λ — 2.25
α — 0.88 Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1992
β — 0.88
Ensemble p(level) Discrete
empirical
p(level=1)=0.4;
p(level=2)=0.3;
p(level=3)=0.3
Graham and Harvey,
2001
of discount rates (ri), lifetimes (ni), payback thresholds (bi) and the
Prospect Theory loss aversion function (λ, α, β) are based on literature
estimates.
To allow for Monte Carlo simulations, the empirical data (∆C,∆q, p)
is approximated by theoretical distributions. Graphical comparisons
with different distribution types as well as bootstrapped Cullen and
Frey graphs (plotting the kurtosis against the squared skewness) indi-
cate that the best fit is given by Weibull distributions. Parameter fitting
was done by maximum likelihood estimation.
The investment’s expected lifetime (Ei(ni)), cost of capital (ri) and pay-
back thresholds (bi) are approximated by Normal distributions. bi is
truncated between a minimum of 1 year and a maximum of 5 years
(based on Anderson and Newell, 2004).
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Table 2.6: Model simulations for levels 0 to 3 and the model ensemble — Im-
plementation rates (in %) and summary statistics of the simulated NPV/NPB
(in US$).
Level NPV > 0 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. dev.
0 —
Technological
100.0% 30 144 — — — 0
1 —
Optimizing
81% 29 729 18 711 −39 068 476 723 39 815
2 —
Satisficing
44% 220 −1 391 −44 887 124 314 13 008
3 —
Behavioural
20% −4 183 −3 907 −28 290 25 848 5 415
E —
Ensemble
52% 10 750 499 −40 480 335 300 30 474
2.4.3 Simulation results
To estimate the share of firms that would invest in a more efficient mo-
tor according to the different levels of decision-making (referred to as
the implementation rate), a Monte Carlo simulation of the calibrated
model was run with 10 000 trials. This enables to combine (or con-
volve) chains of probability distributions across levels (equivalent to
formal mathematical convolutions). Resulting implementation rates
and summary statistics of the NPV/NPB distributions are summarised
in Table 2.6. Density estimations of the distributions at different levels
are depicted in Figure 2.3.
First, the model simulation for the optimizing level of decision-making
is consistent with the IEA analysis: the investment in a more energy-
efficient motor appears to be profitable for a large majority of 81% of
firms. However, it proves to be unprofitable for the remaining 19%.
Although the investment is highly profitable on average (with a mean
NPV of 29 729$), the considered characteristics among firms are highly
heterogeneous. This implies that a fraction of them is characterised by
such combinations of high costs and low benefits that make it perfectly
reasonable to dismiss the motor investment.
Second, the simulated implementation rate decreases for the two other
levels — from 81% on the optimizing level to 44% on the satisficing
level and 20% on the behavioural level. In other words, the distri-
butions of simulated NPBs shift to the left. At level 3, only one in
40
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Figure 2.3: Distributions of simulated NPV/NPB for the modelled levels of
decision-making (representations of evaluation methods) 1 to 3, respectively
Optimizing, Satisficing and Behavioural (see text), as well as the model ensem-
ble (mixture of levels). The density estimations are shown with the break even
line at zero, as well as the point estimate of level 0 as a dashed line.
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five firms is predicted to invest, although it is seen as cost-effective for
four out of five firms from an optimizing perspective. This has to be
contemplated in the context of a relatively well-proven and risk-free
green investment, proposed to firms in the relatively credible form of
government-sponsored energy audits.
Third, the input data’s combined heterogeneity translates into even
more heterogeneous investment perceptions by firms, when evaluated
in form of NPVs and NPBs. From the optimizing perspective of level 1,
simulated NPVs range from −39 068$ to 476 723$, with a standard de-
viation of 39 815$ — due to the investment’s heterogeneous economic
fundamentals. The variance decreases along with the levels, which can
be explained by two effects. From level 1 to 2, it decreases along with
the considered time frame. This is because a large part of the variance
can be attributed to heterogeneous annual payoffs, and their relevant
magnitude is much smaller when assuming a payback criterion (as on
levels 2 and 3) instead of a full lifetime assessment (as on level 1). On
level 3, the Prospect Theory loss aversion function has two implica-
tions. The overweighting (λ) of losses associated with the upfront costs
decreases perceived NPBs. At the same time, the decreasing marginal
utility of both losses and gains (α and β) imply a less heterogeneous
perception of costs and benefits, further decreasing the variance.
Finally, the IAC data allows a comparison with the observed imple-
mentation rate. 45% of firms report that they have implemented the
recommended efficiency improvement, matching our result for the sat-
isficing level 2 (44%). The large gap between this rate and the 81% pre-
dicted by level 1 (the actual energy efficiency gap) can be interpreted as
evidence for organisational and behavioural barriers, e.g. in the form
of short-term investment planning and loss aversion. However, from
a policy perspective, this divergence could as well be interpreted as
evidence for the audits’ effectiveness: if we are to believe our model,
without it, the implementation rate could have been as low as 20%, the
model’s estimation for the behavioural level 3. By offering technolog-
ical assistance and pointing out profitable projects, the audits are very
likely to have shifted the decision from the behavioural to the satisficing
level.6 As a consequence, the investment decision might be less prone
to behavioural factors than it would have been without the audit.
6However this would remain to be proven, which cannot be done with the current
data, as it would require similar data in a counterfactual situation without energy
audits, but the audits are the actual source of the data.
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However, since the input data for many parameter was estimated and
randomly assigned to hypothetical firms, the model output can only
be interpreted in aggregate. We do not know if firms really decide
based on a decision-making procedure similar to level 2, of which the
prediction roughly matches the observed outcome. From a macro-
perspective, it might as well be that around 40% of firms are of the
optimizing decision type of level 1 (as found by Graham and Har-
vey, 2001), while the remaining ones are closer to the satisficing or
behavioural levels of decision-making. This would result in an imple-
mentation rate of 52%, as demonstrated by the ensemble model. Nei-
ther do we know which share of firms does actually decide based on
level 3 (or might have decided in the absence of any audit), and if the
audit indeed shifted the level of decision-making for some firms. The
fundamental problem here is similar to ‘Schro¨dinger’s cat’: we cannot
measure firms’ behaviour in the absence of an audit, while the audit
itself most likely influences what we want to measure.
2.4.4 Sensitivity analysis
To investigate how individual model parameter affect outcomes, one
parameter each is replaced with a range of point estimates. Figure 2.4
shows the simulated impacts on implementation rates.
The positive impact of the quantity saved (∆q) and the electricity price
(p) is largest on level 1, on which the decision criterion accounts for
benefits throughout the entire lifetime. It is lower on levels 2 and 3,
on which benefits are underweighted relative to costs. For the same
reason, the negative impact of higher investment costs (C) is largest on
level 3, and lowest on level 1.
The sensitivity towards the discount rate (r) and the parameter γ allow
an implicit estimation of the effect that imperfect information and risk
aversion need to have on firms’ valuation of benefits for an explana-
tion based on pure optimizing: which parameter values are consistent
with the observed implementation rate of 45%, assuming that all firms
were deciding based on level 1? The implicit discount rate is as high
as 45%, while the implicit level of γ is as low as 0.26 — meaning that
firms would value potential cost savings at only 26% of their value as
promised by energy auditors. However, across all project categories
within the IAC database, only 1.8% of firms state that ‘risk of problem
with product/equipment’ was a reason for non-adoption (Anderson and
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Newell, 2004). An explanation purely based on high risk-perceptions
and imperfect information therefore seems unlikely, and would at the
very least be insufficient.
All parameter show a decreasing marginal impact — which is rele-
vant for the design of policies. While the simulated changes in av-
erage NPBs are always linear, they translate into a decreasing impact
on firms’ investment decisions — consistent with the diffusion pattern
that results from the distribution of heterogeneous adopters (see Fig-
ure 2.1). The reason is as follows: for more extreme parameter values,
the linear increase (or decrease) in the mean NPB takes place along the
thinner ends of NPB distributions, so that it encourages (or discour-
ages) less and less firms to invest. Therefore, the higher the initial im-
plementation rate, the lower the sensitivity towards p, and the higher
the sensitivity towards C.
2.4.5 Evaluating the effectiveness of hypothetical policies on
implementation rates
Here, policies are introduced into the model, aiming at increased
implementation rates. From the perspective of welfare economics,
there are at least two rationales for doing so: uninternalised
externalities of electricity production and investment inefficiencies in
the form of barriers to green technology investments (Allcott and
Greenstone, 2012).
Uninternalized externalities: electricity tax
To account for negative externalities (e.g. CO2 emissions), a Pigouvian
tax on energy could be introduced, aiming at lower consumption. For
manufacturing firms, this is equivalent to increasing electricity prices
by ∆pi, thereby increasing the investment’s annual payoff (Ei(∆Bi,t)).
From the optimizing perspective of level 1, a tax should induce fully
rational firms to substitute away from electricity, and increase invest-
ments in green technologies.
Model input: An electricity tax (tax := +∆pi) is simulated as a
relative increase in a firm’s individual electricity price per kWh (pi) by
a tax rate t, so that the electricity price after tax equals (1 + t) ∗ pi.
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Figure 2.4: Sensitivity of the implementation rate (on different levels) against
the main model parameters: electricity price (p), quantity saved (Q), invest-
ment cost (C), payback threshold (b), discount rate (r), gamma value. Colours
represent the different levels of decision-making (see text).
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Table 2.7: Model simulations for the potential effectiveness of a 7% tax and
a 27% subsidy on the mean NPB and the implementation rate in absolute
terms (increase in percentage points) and relative terms (percentage increase).
Policy rates are chosen so that average subsidy payments equal average dis-
counted tax savings.
Impact on Absolute impact Relative impact
mean NPB on imp. rates on imp. rates
Level 7% tax 27%
subsidy
7%
tax
27%
subsidy
7%
tax
27%
subsidy
Relative
effect
subsidy/
tax
1 —
Optimizing
+2 812$ +2 821$ +1.2pp +5.2pp +1.5% +6.4% 4.3
2 —
Satisficing
+742$ +2 821$ +2.0pp +9.6pp +4.5% +21.8% 4.80
3 —
Behavioural
+204$ +1 830$ +1.5pp +7.3pp +7.7% +37.6% 4.87
Investment inefficiencies: subsidies
When firms’ decisions focus on upfront costs relative to future pay-
offs, this constitutes an investment inefficiency. Reduced investment
costs then promise a more effective leverage on decisions, and capital
subsidies (−∆Ci) could be socially beneficial (Allcott and Greenstone,
2012).
Model input: A subsidy scheme (subsidy =: −∆Ci) is simulated as a
relative reduction in firms’ upfront investment costs (Ci) by a subsidy
rate s, so that the investment cost after the subsidy equal (1− s) ∗ Ci.
The impact of financial incentives
Simulation results for different policy levels are depicted in Figure 2.5,
and exemplarily summarised in Table 2.7. Figure 2.6 illustrates the
potential effect of shifting firms’ level of decision-making. To allow
an easier comparison between tax and policy, simulated tax rates (0—
30%) are chosen so that for the average firm, the resulting sums of
discounted tax savings are in the same absolute range (between 0—
10 000$) as simulated subsidy payments (0—100%). For an exemplary
discussion, a tax rate (7%) and a subsidy (27%) are chosen so that aver-
age subsidy payments equal average discounted tax savings.
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Figure 2.5: Model simulations for policy effectiveness — Implementation
rates (%), simulated NPV/NPB (thousands US$) and marginal impact on im-
plementation rates (p.p.). Absolute US$ values are average values (for the
tax: sum of discounted tax savings). Colours represent the different levels of
decision-making of optimizing (blue), satisficing (green), behavioural (red) and
ensemble (black, see text for details).
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Figure 2.6: Simulation of policies that aim at changing the level of decision-
making of firms (or evaluation method): predicted implementation rate for
an ensemble in which firms first gradually change from the behavioural level
3 to the satisficing level 2 (green line), and then from level 2 to the optimizing
level 1 (red line).
Both the tax and the subsidy are predicted to increase implementation
rates. In comparison, subsidy payments are predicted to be more effec-
tive than an electricity tax on all levels, with the difference being largest
for satisficing and behavioural decision-making. There are two reasons
for this: first, the type of decision-making on levels 2 and 3 means that
future tax savings are only considered within the individual payback
thresholds. On level 3, the relative effectiveness of taxes is further low-
ered by the behavioural focus on upfront costs. As a result, taxes only
increase the NPB to the full potential extent on level 1. Second, for
the given range of data, the implementation rates show a higher (and
increasing) sensitivity towards reduced upfront costs, while there is
a lower (and decreasing) sensitivity towards price increases — for all
levels. This is why even on the optimizing level 1, the tax is less effec-
tive. For the exemplary values of a 27% subsidy and a 7% tax (which
increase the net-present value by the same absolute amount), the sub-
sidy (+5.2p.p. – +9.6p.p) is between four and five times more effective
than the tax (+1.2p.p. – +2.0p.p) .
With respect to levels, both policies’ effectiveness is highest on levels
2 and 3: compared to level 1, lower initial implementation rates
translate into larger sensitivities towards policies. As in the sensitivity
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analysis, there is an inverse relationship between a policy’s potential
effectiveness and the initial implementation rate without it (although
the mean NPBs increase in a perfectly linear way). On level 1, with
a high initial rate of 81%, an ever large change in the mean NPB is
needed for an any additional increase by 1 p.p..
The impact of information campaigns
Given the different implementation rates on different levels, there is a
potential alternative to monetary incentives: influencing the method
how firms assess a green technology investment. If it is possible to
shift their decision-making towards a more conscious level (e.g. from
behavioural to satisficing), this could potentially be more effective
(and probably cheaper) than marginally incentivising decisions
within a level. As an example, Figure 2.6 illustrates a gradual shift
in decision-making from level 3 to 2, followed by a gradual shift to
level 1.
Such policies could be the promotion of energy audits or training
programs for professionals, both of which may counteract behavioural
barriers (Grubb, Hourcade, and Neuhoff, 2014). After energy audits in
Australia, 80% of firms reported that they at least perform a payback
threshold analysis of recommended projects (while 30% perform
NPV calculations) (Harris, Anderson, and Shafron, 2000). Indeed,
industrial energy audits are generally found to lower investment
barriers, thereby increasing investments in energy efficiency in a
cost-effective way (Anderson and Newell, 2004; Harris, Anderson,
and Shafron, 2000; Schleich, 2004; Trianni, Cagno, and Farne, 2016).
In a recent review, Thollander et al. (2015) conclude that subsidised
audits are most cost-effective from a government’s point of view. This
evidence from the literature suggests that our match of observed
implementation rates to the satisficing level may well be attributed
to the energy audits themselves, and that real implementation rates
could well be at the behavioural level without energy audits, with
very low implementation rates.
Although from the modeller’s and policy maker’s perspective there
remains uncertainty on how firms really make decisions, such shifting
policies are likely to be quite robust: if, for example, we assume that all
firms are of the optimizing type (and no further shift is possible), within
a fully rational framework the policy could still increase the γ value,
thus counteracting the undervaluation of future benefits by providing
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more reliable information. Since they do not depend on cash transfers,
such policies have the additional advantage that they reduce the risk
of ‘free riding’ that comes along with subsidies.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The model introduced simulates technology adoption by
heterogeneous firms in the context of behavioural heterogeneity
and complexity. Simulations that were derived from it support the
hypothesis that behavioural aspects account for the larger part of
the energy efficiency gap, the gap between a normative benchmark
and observed investments into green technologies. Despite there
still being limited knowledge on what really drives firms’ decisions,
the inclusion of psychological and organisational findings increases
the model’s predictive power significantly compared to a classical
optimisation approach. From a practical viewpoint, this allows for
testing the robustness of policies ex ante, to adjust them accordingly,
and perhaps save governments time and money. From a theoretical
perspective, this contributes to strengthen our understanding of what
may enable or inhibit sustainability transitions from a microeconomic
perspective.
The model was structured according to three levels of decision-
making: optimizing, satisficing and behavioural, as well as an
ensemble model that combines all three levels. For every level,
the model simulated the adoption of a green technology from a
macro perspective. Using a case study of energy-efficient electric
motors, the model predicts an implementation rate as high as 81%
on the optimizing level 1. When taking into account satisficing and
behavioural decision-making, the predicted rate is reduced to 44% on
level 2 and 20% on level 3. The reported implementation rate of 45%
after energy audits is therefore consistent with the model’s prediction
for the satisficing level, as well as the 52% predicted by the ensemble
model. Considering evidence from the literature, we conclude that
energy audits likely influence firms’ decision-making behaviour. In
order to fully demonstrate this, further research is required on how
audits influence the micro-level behaviour, especially a comparison of
post audit outcomes relative to counterfactual decision-making in the
absence of audits.
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Behavioural aspects and heterogeneity significantly impact the effec-
tiveness of market-based policies. Investment subsidies are predicted
to have a relatively larger impact than an electricity tax — mainly due
to the larger focus on upfront costs, but also due to higher sensitivities
towards reduced investment costs relative to increases in the electricity
price, in the given range of data. In aggregate, a subsidy is predicted
to be more than four times as effective for inducing technology uptake
as a tax, even when both have the same (discounted) value in US$.
However, the largest effect could potentially be achieved by shifting the
investment decision to another level — for example, by providing tar-
geted audits to firms, aimed at changing the way with which decisions are
taken. In language of transitions theory and the multi-level perspective,
this means changing the heuristics and routines for decision-making
within the socio-technical regime.
With respect to the research design, the model is limited to a static anal-
ysis of present day technology adoption. It could, however, be cou-
pled to dynamic simulations of technology diffusion, driven by adop-
tion decision-making (e.g. as in evolutionary models such as Mer-
cure, 2012, 2015; Mercure et al., 2014). Such a method could provide
a firm basis for simulating the decisions of heterogeneous agents un-
der bounded rationality and expectations, in order to derive resulting
diffusion dynamics, and dynamics of evolving aggregate energy effi-
ciency. In more general terms, this model structure can also help better
understand what we mean with the ‘representative agent’ in conven-
tional economic analysis, by unpacking levels of understanding over
agent characteristics.
Policy-makers need to be made better aware that green technology
investments are governed by complex behavioural process, and that
firms behave in different ways. Four key insights can be taken home
for improved policy-making: (1) Behavioural aspects have a consider-
able effect on green technology investments. (2) The large gap between
normative-optimizing and positive analysis (the energy efficiency gap) is
at least partly predictable based on the degree of agent heterogeneity
and known behavioural barriers. A model simulation based on ran-
domised distributions can provide the policy maker with an estimate.
(3) A consideration of behavioural factors can increase the robustness
of policies. (4) Policies aimed at influencing the process and method
of decision-making can be at least as effective, and likely more effec-
tive, than financial incentives, to increase rates of adoption of green
investments.
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Chapter 3. FTT:Heat – A simulation model for technological change
Abstract
We introduce a new bottom-up model for simulating Future Tech-
nology Transformations in the European residential heating sector,
FTT:Heat. The model simulates the uptake and replacement of heat-
ing technologies by households in all individual Member States up
to 2050, and allows to simulate the potential effect of real-world pol-
icy instruments aiming at an increased uptake of low-carbon tech-
nologies. It features an explicit representation of households’ tech-
nology choices, based on observed preferences and non-linear diffu-
sion dynamics. Decision-makers are modelled as individual house-
holds, which are subject to limited information and bounded ratio-
nality. Their decisions reflect behavioural factors and preferences
at the micro level, and may result in sub-optimal outcomes from a
macroeconomic perspective. For demonstration, we simulate pol-
icy mixes for reaching the EU’s 2030 renewable heating targets in
each Member State. Under current diffusion trends, some countries
are estimated to continue an ongoing transition towards renewable
heating, while others would hardly see any decarbonisation. For in-
creasing the share of renewable heating by at least ten percentage
points until 2030, 20 Member States need to introduce additional
policies, the necessary stringency of which differs between coun-
tries. Due to the slow turnover of heating systems, resulting cost
increases faced by households could persist over decades.
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3.1 Introduction
Heating accounts for around half of the European Union’s (EU) fi-
nal energy consumption, and for 80% of the average European house-
hold’s energy demand (European Commission, 2016a). Given the EU’s
commitment to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% until
2030 and 80-95% until 2050 (relative to 1990), the decarbonisation of
residential heating plays an important role in the block’s long-term en-
ergy strategy (European Commission, 2011). Therefore, both the EU
and various Member States (MS) have enacted policies aimed at heat-
ing (Connor et al., 2013; European Commission, 2014). Perhaps most
prominently, the recent ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ package aims
at a zero emission building stock by 2050, which should be realised by
national decarbonisation roadmaps (as part of the energy performance
of buildings directive, see European Commission, 2017a).
Substantial reductions in residential demand for space heating are ex-
pected to result from improved levels of building insulation (Lucon et
al., 2014; U¨rge-Vorsatz et al., 2012b, 2013). Meanwhile, 75% of current
buildings in the EU will still be in use in 2050 (IEA, 2013a), and demand
for water heating is less impacted by insulation measures (Daioglou,
Ruijven, and Vuuren, 2012). Therefore, overall heat demand will likely
remain high, even when the building stock would undergo thermal
retrofitting at an ambitious pace (Connolly et al., 2014). Further decar-
bonisation needs to originate from technological change, both by re-
placing existing heating systems by more efficient ones, and by replac-
ing fossil fuel based boilers by renewable and electricity-based heating
technologies, such as solar thermal systems and heat pumps (see e.g.
IEA, 2014).
To this end, MS want to commit themselves to increase the share of
renewables in final energy demand for heating (excluding electricity,
including ambient heat) by one percentage point (p.p.) each year until
2030, whereby the specific measures are chosen on a national level (as
part of the revised renewables directive, see Council of the European
Union, 2017; European Commission, 2016b). However, it remains un-
clear how such an ambitious transition towards renewables can be re-
alised, and which specific policy instruments are necessary within each
MS (European Commission, 2016a).
The design of effective strategies to reach such targets requires to
more accurately simulate the outcome of different policy instruments
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(Li, 2017; Mercure et al., 2016a), a requirement which is also
stressed in IPCC-AR5 (Kolstad et al., 2014). This, in turn, requires
energy-economy models with non-idealised representations of
household behaviour and dynamics of technology uptake (Clarke
et al., 2014; Clayton et al., 2015; Rai and Henry, 2016). Most energy
models for policy-analysis are of the cost-minimising type, aiming to
identify optimal policy pathways from the normative perspective
of a social planner (for reviews, see Li, Trutnevyte, and Strachan,
2015; Mercure et al., 2016b; Mundaca et al., 2010). While this is a
powerful analytical approach for identifying policy targets which are
technically feasible or socially desirable (to answer the question what
should happen), it is less suited for an ex-ante simulation of policy
effects (what would happen), since it abstracts from many real-world
imperfections.
Household decisions for using a certain heating technology are not
necessarily identical to what is considered cost-optimal from a societal
perspective. Under conditions of limited information and bounded ra-
tionality (Simon, 1955), it is unlikely that all households would imme-
diately choose the same cost-optimal solution, immediately after it gets
introduced into the market (Rogers, 2010). On a micro-level, individual
decisions are heterogenous, depending on preferences and dynamic
effects of social influence (Achtnicht and Madlener, 2014; Hecher et
al., 2017; Kastner and Stern, 2015; Lillemo et al., 2013; Michelsen and
Madlener, 2012; Wilson, Crane, and Chryssochoidis, 2015), as well
as on norms, attitudes and values (Abrahamse and Steg, 2009; Abra-
hamse et al., 2005; Clayton et al., 2015; Dietz et al., 2009; Steg, 2008;
Stern, 1986). On a macro-level, the speed with which heating technolo-
gies can diffuse depends on the ability of industry to restructure its
production and installation capacities, leading to industrial inertia and
the structural resilience of dominant technologies (see Geels (2004) and
Grubb, Hourcade, and Neuhoff (2014) for general discussions, and Jo-
hansson (2017) and Karytsas and Choropanitis (2017) for the specific
case of heating).
Other models of heating technology uptake in Europe have included
some representation of household behaviour and preferences, mostly
focusing on one or several regions. Examples for the modelling of non-
idealised household behaviour for heating technology choice are the
BLUE model for the UK by Li (2017) and the incorporation of house-
hold preferences into the UK TIMES model by Li, Keppo, and Strachan
(2018). For the case of France, Giraudet, Guivarch, and Quirion (2012)
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include investment barriers into a bottom-up model for space heating
which is linked to IMACLIM-R, and Cayla and Maı¨zi (2015) represent
household heterogeneity within the TIMES-Households model. Typ-
ically, such approaches aim at the inclusion of household behaviour
into an otherwise still normative optimisation-framework. An alter-
native is the development of bottom-up models of technology choice,
such as the Invert/EE-Lab model for several EU countries (Kranzl et
al., 2013; Stadler et al., 2007), which is perhaps closest to our work.
It represents heterogenous household choices by means of multino-
mial logit functions, and includes empirically calibrated investment
barriers. Another alternative are agent-based models, such as Sopha,
Klo¨ckner, and Hertwich (2011) for the uptake of wood-pellet heating
in Norway, which can be rich in their behavioural resolution. Due to
enormous data requirements for their calibration, however, they typi-
cally focus on one region.
For the case of multi-regional energy-economy models, it has been
argued that the behavioural and socio-technial elements which
were identified as being relevant for technology transitions are so
complex that their detailed representation in such frameworks may
remain unfeasible (Geels, Berkhout, and Vuuren, 2016; Li, Trutnevyte,
and Strachan, 2015). However, we argue that at least a conceptual
representation is possible, and present FTT:Heat as a new bottom-up
non-optimisation model of intermediate complexity, which is at least
closer to reality. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first model of
this type for residential heating which covers all 28 EU countries.
FTT:Heat does not calculate cost-optimal pathways. Instead, it simu-
lates likely trajectories of technology diffusion in individual countries,
and possible outcomes of policies, given observed recent technological
trajectories and households’ decisions on technology uptake. It can be
used for an ex-ante simulation of market-based and regulatory policies
(as well as combinations thereof), and to assess which impacts they
would have on the technology composition, fuel use, emissions, and
investments. This makes FTT:Heat well-suited for an ex-ante impact
assessment of policies, while remaining tractable in a larger modelling
framework. It is hard-linked to the global macro-econometric model
E3ME (through fuel use, energy prices and investments) (Cambridge
Econometrics, 2014), which allows for economic feedbacks between the
heating sector and the wider economy, and is part of the simulation-
based Integrated Assessment Model E3ME-FTT-GENIE (Mercure et al.,
2018a).
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Conceptually, FTT:Heat is based on a stylised representation of
heterogenous household behaviour, observed choice preferences,
and the non-linear characteristics of self-reinforcing technology
transitions. We model households’ decisions between different
heating technologies based on statistically distributed parameters,
which implies a diversity of choices. Non-linearities in technology
growth are mathematically modelled by means of dynamic shares
equations (derived in Mercure, 2012, 2015), which endogenously
reproduce the typical S-shaped dynamics of technology diffusion
(Rogers, 2010; Wilson and Grubler, 2011). In combination with
endogenous technological learning (Gru¨bler, Nakic´enovic´, and
Victor, 1999), this leads to path-dependence and potential ‘lock-ins’
of simulated technological trajectories (Arthur, 1989), which makes
the model much more consistent with a transitions theory perspective
than standard engineering-based tools (see e.g. Geels, 2002). Unlike
in equilibrium models, reactions to policy changes are not fully
instantaneous, so that it takes some time to steer the system towards
a new direction. Inertia keeps the model in a trajectory that has
momentum, and policies are used to alter the direction of the
trajectory, which is henceforth maintained even if policies are
removed.
For demonstration, we apply FTT:Heat for simulating policy scenarios
consistent with reaching the EU’s objective of increasing the renew-
ables share in residential heating by 10p.p. until 2030, and achieving a
zero emissions building stock by 2050. In a baseline scenario, we anal-
yse the current trends of heating technology diffusion in all MS, reveal-
ing large discrepancies between countries: while some MS are on a tra-
jectory which may allow them to achieve their 2030 objective without
additional policies, others wouldn’t see any substantial decarbonisa-
tion. In a next step, a mix of policies is defined which is projected to
increase the share of renewables to the envisioned extent in each indi-
vidual MS. Results show that the necessary policy effort hugely differs
across the EU.
Section 3.2 describes the model and data. Section 3.3 introduces the
simulated policy scenarios and discusses the results. Section 3.4 con-
cludes. Additional information and results on the level of individual
countries are provided in the Supplementary Material.
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3.2 Methodology and Data
FTT:Heat is a simulation model of technological change. It does not
minimise/maximise some objective function — neither on the macro
level (the social planning approach), nor on the micro level (utility
maximisation of rational agents). Instead, the model simulates the di-
verse decisions of households: which technologies would they choose
in a context of bounded rationality, and which effects could policies
have? Conceptually, it is similar to other models for the power (Mer-
cure, 2012; Mercure et al., 2014) and transport sector (Mercure et al.,
2018b), using the same dynamic shares equation at its core.
3.2.1 Key elements
The model is driven by the exogenous demand of households for space
and water heating as an energy service, UDtot, in the form of time se-
ries of useful heat demand per country. Future demand foremost de-
pends on climatic conditions, building stock characteristics (such as
levels of insulation), floor space per person, income, and individual
temperature preferences (Daioglou, Ruijven, and Vuuren, 2012; Isaac
and Van Vuuren, 2009). Importantly, overall heat demand is not mod-
elled by FTT:Heat. Instead, the model can be soft-linked to other mod-
els, from whichUDtot is taken as an exogenous input. In case of this pa-
per, future trends are taken from the European Commision’s EUCO30
scenario, which projects improved levels of future building insulation
(see section 3.3.2).
The role of FTT:Heat is to simulate the technology composition over
time: which heating technologies (such as oil boiler or heat pumps, see
Appendix-Table 1) will supply which fraction of UDtot? Initial market
shares, Si(t = 0), are calculated from historical data. The model then
projects their future development in each period, Si(t), based on the
decision-making of households and the dynamic shares equations (see
section 3.2.2).
The model’s core is a representation of technology diffusion, which is
based on three key elements (described in more detail in the following
sections):
1. Distributed decision-making: households make decisions
regarding buying and replacing heating systems, choosing
between available technologies. Households have diverse
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preferences, which we represent by means of statistically
distributed parameters of technology characteristics, leading to
distributed choices.
2. Dynamic shares equation: technology uptake is subject to inertia,
due to bounded rationality of households, and limited produc-
tion capacities of industries. There is thus an endogenous, dy-
namic constraint on the potential speed with which technologies
can grow, resulting in the bottom-up emergence of S-shaped dif-
fusion curves.
3. Technological learning: costs of technologies endogenously
decrease with cumulative investment due to learning by doing,
further amplifying the path-dependency of technology uptake
over time.
In each simulation period (1/4 year), FTT:Heat first simulates the
changes in market shares per technology. The new level of useful heat
demand which is serviced by technology i, UDi(t), is then calculated
as:
UDi(t) = Si(t) ∗ UDtot(t) (3.1)
UDi can change for two independent reasons: when the overall heat
demand (UDtot) changes, and when the technology composition (Si)
changes. For any heating technology i, its installed capacity is then
estimated based on UDi. Positive changes can result from an increase
in its market share, and/or an increase in UDtot. Negative changes
either correspond to decreasing market shares, and/or an decrease in
UDtot.
Finally, the model calculates the resulting levels of final energy de-
mand, fuel demand, and CO2 emissions, based on technology-specific
conversion efficiencies and fuel-specifc emission factors.
3.2.2 The decision-making model core
Diversity of household preferences
Households are assumed to decide in the context of different individ-
ual situations and perceptions, related to the variety of households’
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characteristics and preferences. In the model, we represent this di-
versity by means of statistically distributed technology parameters on
which choices are made (e.g., upfront costs for gas heating may be
lower than this technology’s mean cost for one household, but larger
than the mean for another household). Due to such heterogeneity,
households’ preferences for heating technologies are also distributed
(e.g., solar thermal may be less attractive than gas on average, but still
be more attractive for some households). Such diversity stems from
the variability of technologies as such (e.g., varying characteristics of
boilers), and the diversity of households’ individual situations (such
as heating behavior, building properties or available income).
Mathematically, we represent the comparison of two technologies
based on heterogenous household preferences as a comparison of two
frequency distributions with unequal means (conceptually identical
to a binary logit). When the mean cost difference between heating
technologies starts to decrease, an increasing share of households
may start to prefer the alternative technology. Because all households
slightly differ in their individual characteristics and perspectives,
they make different decisions at different points in time for different
reasons. Distributed choices in combination with gradual cost
decreases partly explain how the model projects gradual profiles
of technology adoption, similar to the S-shaped trajectories which
have been empirically described for a wide range of technologies
(Rogers, 2010). This approach enables us to avoid using a normative
optimisation algorithm to represent the decision-making process,
and its conceptual limitations. A gradual substitution between
technologies can also take place when costs remain constant, driven
by the self-reinforcing dynamics of the dynamic shares equation (see
section 3.2.3).
The Generalised Cost of Heating
In each period, a subset of households is assumed to evaluate a sub-
set of technology options (the ones they know of and have access to,
see section 3.2.3), based on their respective generalised cost of heating
(GCOHi). It is defined as the present value cost of operating a heating
system of technology i throughout its technical lifetime, normalised for
the production of one unit of heat per year, including non-monetary
preferences:
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GCOHi =
∑
t
ICi,t
CFi
+
MRi,t
CFi
+
FCi,t
CEi
(1 + r)t
/∑
t
1
(1 + r)t
+ γi (3.2)
ICi, MRi and FCi are upfront investment costs, maintenance-repair
costs, and fuel costs. CFi is a technology’s capacity factor, and CEi
its conversion efficiency. γi is an empirical parameter which captures
‘intangible’ cost components and households preferences (see section
3.2.2). r is a discount factor. Importantly, it is not an implicit discount
rate (such as estimated by Hausman, 1979; Train, 1985, based on ob-
served market outcomes), and not meant as a cumulative representa-
tion of investment barriers (for a discussion of conceptual differences,
see Schleich et al., 2016). Instead, it expresses the relative importance of
future compared to present costs, as measured in choice experiments
(e.g. Rivers and Jaccard, 2006). Policies can be added on top of the ba-
sic cost components of GCOHi, such as subsidies on a technology’s
investment costs, or a fuel tax.
GCOHi is not meant to be a factual description of how houesholds
evaluate the costs and benefits of different technologies. Rather, it is
a conceptual representation which allows to incorporate the relevant
(known or estimated) decision parameters, and to make them compa-
rable across technologies. To account for the heterogeneity with which
households perceive and evaluate such characteristics, several terms
in GCOHi are distributed. The variation of investment costs reflects
the diverse individual characteristics of different buildings and house-
holds, such as different installation and replacement costs, or costs of
adaptive measures when switching between technologies. The cost
distributions of FCi and MRi reflect the volatility of (expected) en-
ergy prices and maintenance costs. The overall standard deviation,
dGCOHi, is obtained by combining all standard deviations of individ-
ual parameters, as the root of the sum of their squares (the standard
error propagation method):
dGCOHi =
√
dIC2i
CF 2i
+
dMR2i
CF 2i
+
FC2i
CE2i
(3.3)
Intangible household preferences
Households’ preferences for heating technologies can be influenced
by a wider set of factors, not all of which are explicitly specified in
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GCOHi. People may perceive certain technologies as less/more con-
venient or attractive than other technologies, for various reasons, not
necessarily related to pure costs.
In FTT:Heat, we define such components as ‘intangibles’. Their
technology- and country-specific value is an empirical parameter,
γi, which we derive from historical data on technology uptake. The
parameter captures the difference between the observed diffusion
in historical data, and diffusion as projected by the model from the
available data. It ensures that at the beginning of the simulation,
the projected rates of technology diffusion are consistent with the
historical rates.
We estimate γi by means of a two-step calibration process: first,
FTT:Heat is run with γi = 0 for all technologies, soley based on the
engineering cost components. For each MS, we then compare the
projected future growth of all technologies with their respective
historic diffusion trend in the data, using a graphical interface. In
case of deviations, the values of γi are adjusted iteratively, until the
empirical trend (from historic data) is consistent with the projected
trend at the simulation start (as modelled by FTT:Heat). The approach
is roughly similar to the empirical estimation of monetary equivalents
for ‘soft barriers’ by Stadler et al. (2007).
The resulting parameter, γi, is an empirical estimate of household pref-
erences which are not covered by the basic cost components. It is
technology- and country-specific, and added as a cost-equivalent con-
stant value to a technology’s levelised cost of heating (see section 3.2.2).
Due to their empirical estimation from recent diffusion trends, the ‘in-
tangibles’ also implicitly include any policies which are unspecified in
the explicit model assumptions, but had an impact on the historically
observed uptake of technologies.
Typically, our results suggest that oil, gas, district and electric heating
are more attractive to households than suggested by the pure costs,
resulting in negative values of γi (around -10% to -15%, relative to the
pure cost, up to -30% for electricity). Meanwhile, the data suggest that
biomass and coal are perceived as less convenient, with typical values
of γi between +40% to +80%.
The estimated values of ‘intangibles’ are not necessarily static, but
may well change over time, due to changing preferences or policy
frameworks. However, as a re-estimation is impossible before new
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data becomes available, we assume that the historically calibrated
‘intangibles’ remain constant over the whole simulation period. This
implies that our model projections are relatively more uncertain for
the longer term, if ‘intangibles’ should be subject to change under
different future conditions.
Pairwise comparisons
Decision-making by households is represented as a pairwise compari-
son of all available heating technologies, similar to discrete choice the-
ory (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Within each simulation period, for
each pair of technologies within a region, the model compares the dis-
tributions of their generalised cost of heating (GCOHi). The share of
households that – in this period – prefers technology i over technol-
ogy j is equal to the share of households for which the generalised cost
of heating with technology i is less than the generalised cost of heat-
ing with technology j. Mathematically, this fraction equals an integral,
which can be calculated as
Fij(∆Cij) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Fj(C)fi(C −∆Cij)dC, (3.4)
where ∆Cij is mean difference in generalised cost and ‘intangible’ pref-
erences between two technologies:
∆Cij = GCOHi −GCOHj . (3.5)
F (C) and f(C) are the cumulative cost distribution function and the
cost distribution density, respectively. Evaluating the integral yields
the classic binary logit. The standard deviation can be treated using
the standard error propagation method:
Fij =
1
1 + exp (∆Cij/σij)
, σij =
√
σ2i + σ
2
j . (3.6)
The resulting choice is stored in the probabilistic choice-based matrix
of household preferences, Fij . For example, if 20% of households pre-
fer technology i over j in a pair, then Fij = 0.2 and Fji = 0.8. The
model performs this comparison of frequency distributions for all pos-
sible pairs of heating technologies, which results in a complete order of
distributed household preferences between all heating technologies.
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3.2.3 Diffusion dynamics as a result of decision-making
Mean agent preferences and actual diffusion are related but not
necessarily equal, due to technical lifetimes, limited information
and bounded rationality on part of households, and due to limited
production capacity for new technologies.
Fundamentally, the potential speed of changes in the technology com-
position depends on the useful lifetimes of heating systems — for how
many years they ‘survive’.
In the model, households can replace their heating system for two dif-
ferent reasons:
1. End-of-lifetime replacements: a heating system needs replacement
when it comes to the end of its technical lifetime.
2. Premature replacements: a household may perceive it as
uneconomical to continue the operation of a system that is still
in working condition, and may therefore decide to replace the
system prematurely.
End-of-lifetime replacements
In case of end-of-lifetime replacements, the annual fraction of ‘break
downs’ for any technology of category j can be approximated by di-
viding its total population (Sj) by its average technical life expectancy,
τj . For each year of the simulation, the replacement need for any tech-
nology j is thus estimated as Sjτ−1j .
When it comes to the point that technology j ‘breaks down’ and a
household needs to choose between competing technologies, the frac-
tion of households who would prefer the (competing) technology i
over the (incumbent) technology j equals Fij (resulting from pair-wise
technology comparisons under distributed choice characteristics, see
section 3.2.2) — assuming that the household has the necessary infor-
mation on and access to technology i. Thus, in any simulation period
∆t, the hypoyhetical substitution of technology j by an alternative tech-
nology i is given by:
∆Sij = FijSjτ
−1
j ∆t (3.7)
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However, households only choose what they know of and have access
to, which is a subset of all technology options. In empirical studies, it
is found that household choices are informed by their peers and what
they see being used (Abrahamse and Steg, 2013; Frederiks, Stenner,
and Hobman, 2015; Mahapatra and Gustavsson, 2008; McShane, Brad-
low, and Berger, 2012; Rogers, 2010), while industry growth coevolves
with the growth in demand (Grubb, Hourcade, and Neuhoff, 2014; Jo-
hansson, 2017; Karytsas and Choropanitis, 2017). Both the available
first-hand information (obtained from peers) and capacity (built out of
an industry’s previous profits and experience) tends to be larger for
dominant incumbent technologies, while new entrants compete from
a position where only few people have the necessary experience for
evaluating, producing and setting up the new technology. We approx-
imate these dynamics in stylised form, as being proportional to the
competing technology i’s current market share, Si (derived in Mercure,
2015). Therefore, the realised substitution of technology j by an alterna-
tive technology i is smaller than the hypothetical substitution, and given
by:
∆Sij = SiFijSjτ
−1
j ∆t (3.8)
The introduction of Si acts as a dynamic growth constraint, which
evolves fully endogenously during the model simulation, resulting
in the bottom-up emergence of S-shaped diffusion profiles which are
so typical for the uptake and growth of new technologies (Rogers,
2010). This is an important difference to most other bottom-up energy
models, where growth-constraints tend to be imposed ad-hoc on a
case-by-case basis (to avoid abrupt changes in technology uptake),
often at the (subjective) discretion of the modeller.
To obtain the net change in the market share of any technology i, we
sum over all possible pairs of substitutions between two technologies
j and i, and obtain the dynamic shares equation:
∆Si =
∑
j
SiSj
(
Fijτ
−1
j − Fjiτ−1i
)
∆t (3.9)
Here, the net change of market shares of technology i is regulated by
the matrix Fij , minus its transpose. It is a standard representation of
the process of selection (similar to the replicator dynamics equation of
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evolutionary game theory, see Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), identi-
cally used in evolutionary biology and economics. Three key elements
determine the dynamics behind every substitution of a technology j
by an alternative technology i:
1. Replacement needs: which fraction of technology j’s stock needs
to be replaced within period ∆t, based on its average lifetime
(Sjτ−1j )?
2. Household preferences: if households need to choose a heating sys-
tem within period ∆t, how many of them would hypothetically
prefer technology i over technology j (given by Fij), given the
context and policies?
3. Share dynamics: which fraction of hypothetical technology substi-
tutions can be realised (dynamically constrained by Si)?
The third element above is a key difference between FTT:Heat and
normative optimisation models. Without the share dynamics, there
would be an implicit assumption that (i) households always have all
the necessary information on all heating technologies, and that (ii) the
production and installation of any technology could be immediately
scaled up, without any supply constraints. In reality, however, some
households may not have (trustworthy first-hand) information on
technology i, while the technology may be completely unavailable to
other households (due to a lack of industry capacity for producing
and setting up the technology). Therefore, new technologies can
only grow gradually. Over time, their changes in relative market
shares follow the typical S-shaped trajectory of technology diffusion
(Gru¨bler, Nakic´enovic´, and Victor, 1999; Sovacool, 2016). This
property is reflected in the mathematical formalism given here, which
ensures that growth of technologies is proportional to their current
market share, and the shares of other technologies.
Accordingly, technological change in the model simulations cannot
occur instantaneously, but the trajectory of technological change is
subject to inertia. On the one side, this implies that the full effects of
changing prices or policies cannot be observed immediately, since
it takes time to change the trajectory. On the other side, the inertia
of the technology trajectory means that the technology composition
can keep on changing, even when all prices are held constant. As a
simulation model with such properties, FTT:Heat can therefore not
identify ‘optimal’ technology portfolios (from a normative planning
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perspective). Instead, it aims at projecting the evolution of the market,
which is particulary important for evaluating the potential effects of
different policies (from the perspective of an impact assessment).
The dynamics of premature replacements
Apart from end-of-lifetime replacements, a household may decide to
prematurely replace a heating system that is still in working condition
– to ‘scrap’ it. Hypothetically, a completely rational decision-maker
with perfect information and zero risk-aversion would constantly com-
pare the marginal running costs of his currently installed technology
with the full costs of buying and operating any alternative heating sys-
tem. A premature replacement would then be profitable when the for-
mer exceed the latter.
In reality, empirical evidence shows that most households only con-
sider such a premature replacement if the potential savings exceed
the necessary upfront investment within a relatively short period of
time (Newell and Siikama¨ki, 2015; Olsthoorn et al., 2017). For heat-
ing systems, such a ‘payback time’ describes the number of years be-
fore which the reduced energy costs would have ‘paid back’ the initial
investment. The payback threshold describes the maximum payback
time for which a household would still perceive the investment as at-
tractive. Empirical studies regularly find that such thresholds are usu-
ally much lower than a technology’s technical lifetime (only a fraction
of potential savings is taken into account, see Gillingham and Palmer,
2014; Knobloch and Mercure, 2016; Sorrell, 2004). For the case of pre-
maturely replacing an existing boiler, Olsthoorn et al. (2017) have con-
ducted choice experiments with 15,000 households in eight EU coun-
tries.1 The reported mean payback threshold is as low as three years,
with a standard deviation of one year.
In the model, the premature replacement of a working system is thus
only simulated as being sufficiently attractive if the potential savings
(from reduced operating costs, MCi) exceed the necessary investment
costs of an alternative technology (inclusive of subsidies) within the
defined payback time, b:
(MCj −MCi) > ICi/b (3.10)
1France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, UK
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This is a much stricter condition to fulfil, since the household ignores
all savings that occur beyond the considered payback period, b. As
for end-of-lifetime replacements, the comparison is performed over all
pairs of technologies, yielding the hypothetical household preferences
for premature replacements. The realised premature replacements are
calculated based on the dynamic shares equation, and subject to the
same constraints (see section 3.2.3).
3.2.4 Learning and cost reductions
We represent endogenous technological learning as a process of ‘learn-
ing by doing’, in which the investment costs of a heating technology
(ICi) decrease with the cumulative installation of such heating sys-
tems over time. By permanently changing the cost structure, this fur-
ther amplifies the path-dependence of technology transitions (Arthur,
1989; Gru¨bler, Nakic´enovic´, and Victor, 1999). Cost reductions are en-
dogenously calculated based on learning curves:
ICi(t) = IC0,i
(
Wi(t)
W0,i
)−βi
(3.11)
Wi(t) is the cumulative produced capacity of technology i at time t.
IC0,i and W0,i are initial costs and cumulative technology capacity at
the start of the model simulation. βi is the learning exponent, which
is derived from the technology-specific learning rate: βi = ln(1 −
LRi)/ln(2), where LRi is the learning rate (set to values from Henkel,
2012; Weiss et al., 2010, see Appendix-Table 1).
3.2.5 Integration with E3ME
FTT:Heat is dynamically integrated with the global macro-econometric
model E3ME (Cambridge Econometrics, 2014), which is consistent
with FTT:Heat in its underlying philosophy and assumptions.
Notably, E3ME is a simulation model rather than an optimisation
model, and accounts for fundamental uncertainty. The dynamic
feedbacks between FTT:Heat and E3ME foremost work through fuel
use, energy prices and household expenditures (Mercure et al., 2018a).
Any changes that occur in residential heating can potentially impact
other economic sectors (such as electricity generation or fossil fuel
extraction), which are represented in E3ME. When simulating new
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policies, the integration of both models allows to analyse induced
changes throughout the economy, as well as the resulting impact on
economic indicators (such as employment).
3.2.6 Data
Final and useful energy demand by country
For estimating the current trends in technology diffusion, FTT:Heat re-
quires disaggregated historical data on useful heat generation per tech-
nology, for each MS. Since such disaggregated time-series on energy
end-use are not readily available, we compiled a new database, which
is made available as Supplementary Material.
The main data input is final energy demand for residential heating
by fuel type, which is available in the ODYSSEE database (Enerdata,
2017). Data on heat generation by heat pumps over time is taken from
the European Heat Pump Association (EHPA) (2016), supplemented
by the EurObserv’ER (2017) database. For solar thermal heating, we
compiled time-series from the annual reports of the IEA Solar Heating
& Cooling Programme (2017).
In the case of oil and gas, the final energy demand per fuel is further
sub-divided between conventional and condensing boilers, based on
their relative share in the installed capacity (as reported by European
Commission, 2017b). For biomass, the final energy demand is sub-
divided between conventional biomass systems and modern biomass
systems with higher efficiency, such as biomass boilers, based on ca-
pacity shares from Fleiter, Steinbach, and Ragwitz (2016).
The resulting time series of final energy demand per technology (Di(t))
are transformed into time series of estimated useful energy demand
(UDi(t)), based on technology-specific conversion efficiencies (CEi)
(see Appendix-Table 1):
UDi(t) = Di(t) ∗ CEi (3.12)
Technology data
Appendix-Table 1 shows the assumed technology-specific data for all
heating technologies: upfront investment costs (including installation
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costs), maintenance and repair costs, conversion efficiencies, learning
rates, and lifetimes.
Cost levels for buying and installing heating systems are different
in each MS (for example, due to local variations in building codes
or wages). For each country, we converted the stated mean costs to
country-specific values based on relative cost differences for buying
and installing across countries, taken from Connolly et al. (2013) and
Fleiter, Steinbach, and Ragwitz (2016).
For the representation of distributed costs, a standard deviation of 1/3
of the mean costs is assumed for all technologies, based on the cost
ranges given by the Danish Energy Agency (2013, 2016) and the Na-
tional Renewable Energy Laboratory (2016).
Capacity factors are constant and calculated based on the European
Commission’s (EC) reference values for annual active mode hours of
heating systems in colder, average and warmer climate conditions (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2013a). The capacity factor of solar thermal heat-
ing systems is defined as the country-specific solar yield: the amount
of useful heat generated by every unit of installed capacity, which is
influenced by different levels of solar irradiation. For each MS, we cal-
culated the respective factors based on data from the IEA Solar Heating
& Cooling Programme (2017).
3.3 Results and Discussion
3.3.1 Policy Scenarios
This section introduces several scenarios: a current technology
and policy trends scenario, and three policy scenarios aiming at
the increased uptake of renewable heating technologies by households.
Current technology trends
In the current technology and policy trends scenario, we assume that
historical trends in technology diffusion are maintained, implicitly
including the impact of existing policies (the impact of which on
technology choices is implicitly captured by the ‘intangible’ cost
parameters, which were derived from the recent diffusion data).
Importantly, due to the ongoing diffusion, some MS may therefore
see increasing shares of renewables without the implementation of
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additional policies. Furthermore, projections on future levels of
residential heat demand take into account improved levels of building
insulation, as projected in the EC’s EUCO30 scenario (see section 3.3.2).
Scenario 1: Increasing the share of renewables until 2030
For each MS, we simulate a policy mix which aims at increasing the
share of renewables in residential heating (%RE) by at least 10p.p.
until 2030. This policy objective is loosely based on the EC’s recent
RES directive proposal (European Commission, 2016b), which aims at
a higher penetration of renewable heating in all MS. The policy instru-
ments for reaching the target can be flexibly chosen by each country.
%RE is defined here as the share of renewable heating technologies (so-
lar thermal, biomass and heat pumps) in a MS’s final energy demand
for residential heating, excluding electricity (both in the numerator and
the denominator).2
For each MS which is not projected to reach the 2030 objective in the
current trends scenario, we impose one or more of the policies below.
These were identified as being relevant in discussions with policy-
analysts from the EC,3 based on what already exists and is described
in the literature (Cansino et al., 2011; Connor et al., 2013; European
Commission, 2014):
1. A new carbon tax of 50 e/tCO2 on the residential use of coal,
oil and gas is introduced from 2018 onwards. The value is well
within the range of carbon price estimates for 2020 in IPCC-AR5
scenarios for limiting CO2 concentrations to 450 ppm (Clarke et
al., 2014), and similar to residential carbon taxes in place to date.4
In each year until 2030, the tax increases linearly by 10% (by +5
2The definition is based on, but not identical to the renewable heating and cooling
share (RES H&C) as calculated by Eurostat (2015) (which also covers cooling, and
accounts for renewable components in the supply of gas, oil and district heat). In
the case of heat pumps, only the renewable component in the form of ambient heat
(and not the electricity input) is counted.
3FTT:Heat was developed as part of a project for the EC, Directorate-General for En-
ergy (DG ENER). The simulated policies and scenarios were hence identified and
discussed during multiple meetings with policy-analysts from DG ENER, based
on the policies’ expected relevance within the European context.
4Such as in France, where the residential carbon tax rate is set to be 44.6 e/tCO2 in
2018, linearly increasing to 100 e/tCO2 in 2030 (Republique Francaise, 2015).
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e/tCO2). In scenario 1, the tax is discontinued from 2030 on-
wards (in order to analyze which long-term impacts the policy
may induce post-2030).
2. A 30% upfront capital subsidy on renewable heating technologies.
Between 2018 until 2030, the purchase and installation of solar
thermal, modern biomass and heat pump systems is subsidized
by 30% of the mean pre-subsidy cost. In scenario 1, the subsidy
ends in 2030.
3. ‘Kick start’ procurement policies for renewables-based heating tech-
nologies are introduced in MS in which such technologies cur-
rently have very low market shares (or are entirely absent). It
is assumed that for a period of five years (2018-2022), each year
the government (local or national) in the respective country re-
places between 0.25–1p.p. of the dominant technology’s market
share by a mix of renewables.5 The policy targets the tendency
that a new technology’s take-up tends to be faster when its cur-
rent market share is larger (see section 3.2.3), and thus nucleates a
diffusion process by promoting the expansion of a whole supply
chain (e.g. local dealers, maintenance firms), itself improving the
availability of these technologies where previously unavailable.
Importantly, each MS has different market conditions and technology
compositions. Therefore, different country-specific mixes of policy in-
struments can be necessary to reach the same objective in different MS,
in line with local conditions. Accordingly, not all policies are applied
in the same way to all MS. Instead, we assign each country to one of
four groups (A to D), following a stepwise procedure:
1. Group A: MS which the model projects to meet the target under
current technology diffusion trends, without any additional poli-
cies.
2. Group B: MS which the model projects to meet the target when
introducing the carbon tax as the only new policy.
3. Group C: MS which the model projects to meet the target when
combining the carbon tax with upfront subsidies.
5An example would be the purchase and installation of heat pumps or solar thermal
systems in publicly owned residential buildings, initiated by city councils.
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4. Group D: MS which the model projects to stay below the
2030 target, even when combining the carbon tax with
upfront subsidies. To increase the availability of renewable
heating technologies in such countries, we introduce ‘kick
start’/procurement policies as an additional instrument.
Scenario 2: deep decarbonisation by 2050
The policy objective is an almost-complete decarbonisation of
residential heating in the EU, achieving near-zero on-site CO2
emissions by 2050, as envisioned in the EU’s ‘Clean Energy for All
Europeans’ package (European Commission, 2017a). Until 2030, the
policies are identical to scenario 1. From 2030 onwards, both the
carbon tax and the upfront capital subsidies are extended to all MS.
The carbon tax is set to 110 e/tCO2 in 2030, eventually reaching 210
e/tCO2 by 2050. The subsidy rate linearly decreases to zero in 2040.
Scenario 3: EU-wide carbon tax
We simulate an EU-wide carbon tax on the residential use of fossil fu-
els as the only new policy instrument in this scenario, in order to con-
trast other scenarios with policy mixes. In all MS, the tax starts at 50
e/tCO2, and linearly increases by +5 e/tCO2, eventually reaching 210
e/tCO2 by 2050. There is no particular policy objective. Instead, the
focus is on the comparative analysis of effects.
3.3.2 Assumptions
All assumptions are chosen to be consistent with the EU’s current
climate policy objectives. Future trends of useful heat demand per MS
(UDtot) are taken from the EC’s EUCO30 scenario (E3mlab/NTUA
and IIASA, 2016), which models pathways for achieving the EU’s
2030 climate and energy targets. The scenario provides estimates
for annual levels of residential heat demand up to 2050 (see
Supplementary-Figures 3.3–3.8 for the trends per MS), which we use
as an input. On average, the projected reduction of UDtot is around
-1% in 2030, and -30% in 2050, foremost due to improved levels of
thermal insulation. We also use the EUCO30 scenario projections for
future trends in EU fuel prices (depicted in Supplementary-Figure 3.1),
which are applied to historical fuel prices in each MS. Because future
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fuel prices are particularly uncertain in a context of decarbonisation
policies, we assume constant prices between 2030-2050, without
further increases.
Note that the EUCO30 scenario results from long-run economic projec-
tions with the GEM-E3 model and estimates of energy balances using
the PRIMES model, which are partly based on different modelling as-
sumptions than the E3ME model (Mercure et al., 2016b). However,
both GEM-E3 and E3ME are typically used in tandem for energy pol-
icy assessment in the EU, and both were also used for the assessment
of the EUCO scenarios. For this, the models are calibrated to generate a
consistent baseline, and are thus consistent in their data inputs (Pollitt
et al., 2017). This calibration does not influence endogenous model dy-
namics, and does not cover the FTT models of technology diffusion.
In all scenarios, we model a regulatory phase-out of lower-efficiency
oil and gas boilers, reflecting the EU energy efficiency regulations.6 For
the electricity sector, we model a decarbonisation trajectory consistent
with the EU’s Energy Roadmap 2050 (European Commission, 2011):
an absolute emission reduction of -70% by 2030, and -90% by 2050 (rel-
ative to 1990), simulated by FTT:Power (Mercure et al., 2014).
For all MS, the discount rate is set to 10%. For premature replacements
of heating systems, the mean payback threshold is set to three years,
with a standard deviation of one year (Olsthoorn et al., 2017).
Following Kranzl et al. (2013), we assume that households would not
opt for heating systems with a significantly lower comfort level than
their existing system, and would therefore only choose coal or low-
efficiency biomass stoves if either of the two is their currently used
technology.
Because solar heating is dominantly used for water heating (and only
as a supplementary source for space heating), we exogenously restrict
its market share in each MS to the share of water heating in its total
heat demand.
In E3ME, we specify that new carbon tax revenues are first used to
finance the subsidies for renewable heating (within the respective MS).
A potential surplus is used to reduce the employers’ contribution to
social security payments.
6https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-efficiency/
energy-efficient-products/heaters
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3.3.3 Results
Identification of country groups
Table 3.1 shows the projections for the share of renewable residential
heating (%RE) in all MS, both under current trends, and when intro-
ducing additional policies. Figure 3.1 provides examples of technol-
ogy diffusion and heating emissions trends for five countries (two from
group A, and one each from groups C-D), which together account for
around two-third of current EU-wide residential heat demand.
In the projection under current trends of technology diffusion, we find
that in eight MS, the technology trajectory may lead to an increase in
their renewable heating share (%RE ) by at least 10p.p. until 2030, with-
out implementing new policies: Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Portu-
gal, Estonia, Cyprus, and Malta. The projected increases result from
the ongoing uptake of renewables in these countries, as reflected in the
historical data (see Figure 3.1). These MS together form country group
A. The reason for these countries to reach the objective without new
policies is as follows.
In Greece, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus and Malta, the model projects fur-
ther increases in heat generation by solar thermal, which benefits from
relatively high levels of solar irradiation in these five MS. Until 2030,
the technology is projected to grow by 7-15p.p. without additional
policy support, starting from market shares between 3% (in Spain)
and 32% (in Cyprus) at the begin of the model simulation. In France7
and Estonia, meanwhile, the model projects a further diffusion of heat
pumps, which have relatively large (and growing) market shares in
both countries (around 15%). In Ireland, the projected growth in re-
newable heating can be explained by an ongoing substitution of coal
and oil-based systems by modern biomass systems, and some growth
of heat pumps and solar thermal.
Belgium, Italy, Czech Republic, Poland and Bulgaria constitute country
group B. Due to the ongoing diffusion trajectory of certain technolo-
gies, the five countries would already undergo some decarbonisation
under current trends, increasing their projected %RE between 6p.p. (in
7Consistent with this analysis, the French government has recently adapted its re-
newable heating target to an increase by 20 p.p. until 2030 (instead of 10 p.p.)
(Republique Francaise, 2018).
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Table 3.1: Residential heat demand (UD, in TWh) and shares of renewables in
residential heating (%RE) by MS. Last historical observation for %RE (2014)
and projected increases between 2018-2030 (in p.p.), in the FTT:Heat current
trends projection and in policy scenarios 1-3.
Group Country Heat
demand
%RE Projected increase in %RE
2014
(TWhth)
2014 Current
trends
Scenario
1
Scenario
3
A Cyprus 2 59% +15p.p. +15p.p. +19p.p.
Estonia 8 52% +10p.p. +10p.p. +11p.p.
no new Ireland 21 5% +11p.p. +11p.p. +19p.p.
policies France 309 33% +12p.p. +12p.p. +17p.p.
Greece 30 42% +22p.p. +22p.p. +26p.p.
Malta 0,4 25% +30p.p. +31p.p. +39p.p.
Portugal 11 58% +21p.p. +21p.p. +23p.p.
Spain 83 34% +15p.p. +15p.p. +23p.p.
B Belgium 64 9% +6p.p. +10p.p. +9p.p.
Bulgaria 16 59% +9p.p. +10p.p. +10p.p.
carbon tax Czech Republic 49 29% +8p.p. +13p.p. +13p.p.
Italy 210 34% +9p.p. +15p.p. +14p.p.
Poland 131 18% +9p.p. +27p.p. +27p.p.
C Austria 52 49% +6p.p. +14p.p. +8p.p.
Denmark 38 31% +4p.p. +10p.p. +5p.p.
cabon tax Finland 49 49% +7p.p. +13p.p. +7p.p.
+ subsidies Germany 460 16% +4p.p. +13p.p. +7p.p.
Hungary 39 19% +4p.p. +13p.p. +8p.p.
Latvia 11 55% +3p.p. +10p.p. +4p.p.
Lithuania 11 48% +4p.p. +10p.p. +6p.p.
Sweden 66 45% +5p.p. +13p.p. +5p.p.
D Croatia 17 60% +1p.p. +11p.p. +2p.p.
Luxembourg 2 1% +2p.p. +11p.p. +3p.p.
carbon tax Netherlands 87 6% +2p.p. +11p.p. +3p.p.
+ subsidies Romania 43 61% 0p.p. +12p.p. +1p.p.
+ ’kick start’ Slovakia 17 3% +2p.p. +13p.p. +3p.p.
Slovenia 9 63% +2p.p. +10p.p. +4p.p.
UK 309 6% +1p.p. +12p.p. +2p.p.
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Figure 3.1: Annual heat generation by technology and direct CO2 emissions
for five countries, which together account for around two-third of current
EU-wide residential heat demand. The left panels show the current trends
projections, the right panels the model simulations for scenario 2 (policies for
deep decarbonisation). Projections by FTT:Heat start in 2015. Future levels
of useful heat demand are an exogenous model input (from the EUCO30 sce-
nario), and include improved levels of future building insulation.
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Belgium) and 9p.p. (in Italy). For achieving a 10p.p. increase, introduc-
ing the new carbon tax in 2018 is therefore projected to be a sufficient
policy instrument.
Denmark, Germany, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania and
Hungary constitute country group C. For different reasons, the carbon
tax is projected to be insufficient for reaching the 2030 %RE objective
on its own. In MS with strong dominance of fossil fuel technologies
(such as Germany and Hungary), their market position is so dominant
that additional incentives are needed to break their current ‘lock-in’.
In most of Scandinavia and the Balticum, fossil fuel technologies only
have small shares in the decentralised heating market, which explains
the limited potential effect of residential carbon taxes. Effectively, de-
centralised renewables can only grow in those countries at the cost of
district heating, the decarbonisation of which could be a viable alter-
native (which is not simulated here8). The combination of the carbon
tax with subsidies for renewable heating, however, is able to alter the
diffusion trajectory, such that all eight MS are projected to achieve the
%RE objective.
In the seven MS of group D, even the combination of price-based poli-
cies would be insufficient for reaching the %RE target, according to
the model projections: Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK, Slovenia, Slo-
vakia, Romania and Croatia. Apart from traditional biomass, renew-
able heating technologies have only had very low historical market
shares in those countries. This hurdle could be overcome by ‘kick
start’/procurement policies (as ‘technology push policies’, in order to
make these technologies more widely available), in order to supple-
ment taxes and subsidies (as ‘market pull policies’, in order to make
these technologies economically competitive): by nucleating an ini-
tial market by means of procurement schemes (e.g., installing systems
in publicly owned residential houses), they help to create the neces-
sary awareness and experience in households, industry and the entire
supply-chain (they help to develop the entire socio-technical system
surrounding these technologies), thereby making price-based policies
more effective.
The case of group D points to the relevance of policy interactions.
On paper, the combination of a carbon tax and subsidy would be
8An accurate representation of technological change within district heating networks
would require a separate model of district heat plants, similar to simulating tech-
nological change in electricity generation, which is beyond the scope of this model.
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sufficient to make renewables sufficiently attractive from a financial
perspective. Still, even if all households should hypothetically prefer
renewable heating technologies in a direct comparison, not all
households would immediately choose them — both due to imperfect
information (not all households know the new technology, since they
have a small market share,), and limited availability due to supply
constraints (capacity for technology production and set-up cannot be
scaled up instantaneously). Therefore, it is projected that price-based
policies could only have limited short-term impacts in countries with
small initial market shares of renewables.
Impacts on heating sector and emissions
Figure 3.2 illustrates the EU-wide model projections for the technol-
ogy composition, fuel use, CO2 emissions, capacity additions, and ad-
ditional household spending on heating systems, both under current
trends and all three policy scenarios. Appendix-Table 2 shows the un-
derlying market shares of heating technologies over time. Projected
trends for all individual MS can be found in the Supplementary Mate-
rial (Figures 3.3–3.8). Projections for scenarios 1 and 2 only differ for
the period 2030-2050.
Under current trends, the model projects that the market share of gas
would remain stable around 40% until 2030, before decreasing to 30%
by 2050. Oil and coal would gradually vanish from the technology mix
until 2050. Meanwhile, heat pumps and solar thermal are projected
to continue their ongoing growth: both technologies would roughly
double their market shares until 2030.
In scenarios 1-3, the introduced policies are projected to impact house-
hold choices, thereby gradually changing the overall technology com-
position. In scenario 1, all renewable technologies are projected to
increase their respective market shares in 2030, compared to current
trends (in brackets): 18% for heat pumps (compared to 13%), 3% for
solar thermal (compared to 2%), and an additional 3p.p. for modern
biomass systems. These technologies increasingly replace fossil fuels,
whose market shares would decrease, relative to current trends.
Due to the long technological lifetimes of heating systems and the char-
acteristic non-linear growth patterns of technology diffusion, the in-
duced transition towards renewable heating would not occur instanta-
neously. Substantial changes can only be expected after several years,
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Figure 3.2: EU-wide heat generation by technology, fuel use, CO2 emissions,
newly installed heating capacity, and additional household expenditure on
heating systems (compared to the ‘current trends’ scenario). Model projec-
tions for current technology trends and policy scenarios 1-3. Projections by
FTT:Heat start in 2015. Numbers show changes in 2050, relative to 2014 (the
last historical data point). Future levels of useful heat demand are an exoge-
nous model input (from the EUCO30 scenario), and include improved levels
of future building insulation.
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or even decades. When monetary incentives are introduced in coun-
tries with a small initial market for modern renewables, their poten-
tial effect is constrained by the limited local availability of knowledge,
first-hand experience and industry know-how with such technologies
(see section 3.2.3).
The bottom panels of Figure 3.2 illustrate the underlying dynamics, in
form of annual installations of heating capacity by households. Under
current trends, the share of renewables in the newly installed capacity
is projected to increase from 33% in 2015 to 53% in 2030. In scenario
1, renewables would increase their share to almost 80% of the newly
added capacity in 2030. In scenarios 2 and 3, where policies are con-
tinued post-2030, households would not buy any new fossil fuel based
systems after 2040. Fossil fuel demand for heating is projected to de-
crease by -19% under current trends, and -35% in scenario 1. Accord-
ingly, direct CO2 emissions in 2030 would be lower by -22% (current
trends) and -39% (scenario 1), relative to 2014.
In scenario 1, the implemented policies are projected to have long-
lasting impacts even beyond their assumed end-date in 2030. The
reason is the momentum and path-dependence in technology uptake:
when something new starts to dominate, it becomes increasingly diffi-
cult to buy the older systems that are disappearing, since the expertise
is disappearing, while new systems become more competitive. There-
fore, from 2030 onwards, capacity additions of renewable heating sys-
tems only partially revert to their ‘current trends’ level.9 Despite the
discontinuation of policies, renewables are projected to keep a rela-
tively stronger position in sales, enabling a -83% reduction in on-site
CO2 emissions by 2050 (partly due to reduced heat demand after 2030).
In scenario 2, the policy continuation post-2030 (plus their extension to
all MS) would lead to the deep decarbonisation of residential heating,
reducing on-site emissions by -98% in 2050. In scenario 3, where the
carbon tax is simulated as the only policy, the projected emission re-
duction is 5p.p. lower.
The corresponding changes in residential fuel use and sectoral CO2
emissions are shown in Figure 3.3, relative to current trends. Due to
the policy-induced demand reductions for fossil fuels in all scenarios
(up to -100% for coal, -90% for oil, and -80% for gas), on-site CO2
9The projected technology uptake remains relatively close to ‘current trends’ from
2030 onwards, which explains the sudden decrease in ‘additional heating invest-
ments’ relative to ‘current trends’.
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rent trends projection.
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emissions in the residential sector would be reduced by up to -150
MtCO2/y, relative to ‘current trends’. At the same time, the partial
electrification of heating would lead to additional electricity demand
of +60-120 TWh/y by 2050. If the power sector is decarbonised in
line with EU policy targets (see section 3.3.2), the resulting indirect
emission increases would not exceed +15 MtCO2/y at any time,
allowing substantial net-reductions on an economy-wide level.
Impacts on heating costs and expenditures
On average, the induced technology substitutions would slightly
reduce the EU’s system-wide levelised cost of residential heating
(weighted by technology shares) relative to current technology trends,
as can be seen in the left panel of Figure 3.4 (country-level results
are provided in Supplementary-Figures 3.9–3.12). The bare, average
levelised cost of heating (net of carbon taxes and subsidy payments)
would be -1% lower than under current trends by 2030, and between
-4% and -8% lower by 2050. In case of scenario 3, system-wide costs
would initially increase, before falling below their current trend
projection in the 2040s.
Households, however, do not face the bare technological cost. They
would also need to pay the newly introduced carbon tax, while ben-
efiting from subsidies on renewables (see Supplementary-Figure 3.2).
Even when policies drastically change the relative cost differences be-
tween technologies, many households can be ‘locked’ into using their
old heating systems for a long time. During this transition period,
the average cost increase faced by households would be between +5-
10%, relative to current trends (see right panel of Figure 3.4), and up to
20% in individual MS (and can be much higher than national averages
for households which are stuck with fossil fuel systems). Households
would not benefit from effective cost reductions before 2030 in scenario
1, and not before 2040 in scenario 2, on average. In scenario 3, the
average household would face increased heating costs until 2050 (see
Supplementary-Figure 3.13 for the underlying shifts in households’ ex-
penditures and employment). The carbon tax revenues can be redis-
tributed to households, for example via income tax reductions. Nev-
ertheless, many households would likely face increases in their direct
heating expenses, until they replace their heating system.
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3.4 Conclusion and Policy Implications
We introduced FTT:Heat as a new model for simulating technologi-
cal change and policy instruments in residential heating. By includ-
ing a bottom-up representation of statistically distributed household
decisions, endogenous growth dynamics and technological learning,
model simulations allow to reproduce the typical non-linear dynamics
of technology transitions, which makes the model well-suited for an
ex-ante impact assessment of policies.
We demonstrated the model by simulating several policies and sce-
narios, inspired by the EU policy objective to increase the share of
renewable heating by 10p.p. in each MS until 2030. In our projec-
tion under current trends of technology uptake, it became evident that
large differences exist between countries’ current trajectories. In eight
MS, the renewable heating target could potentially be met without ad-
ditional policy instruments, due to the continued diffusion of renew-
ables. Meanwhile, other MS would hardly see any changes without
new policies. Different degrees of policy effort are required to reach
the same policy objective in different places, depending on the national
context.
We find that under current trends, without any additional policies, the
EU-wide market share of gas would remain relatively stable around
40% until 2030, before decreasing to 30% by 2050. Meanwhile, oil and
coal heating systems would gradually vanish from the technology mix.
On the other side, heat pumps and solar thermal are projected to con-
tinue their ongoing growth: both technologies would roughly double
their 2015 market shares until 2030. In the policy simulations, policy
mixes of varying stringency would allow all Member States to increase
their renewable heating share by at least ten percentage points until
2030, which is projected to reduce on-site CO2 emissions by residen-
tial heating by -39% in 2030 (compared to -22% in the baseline un-
der current trends). Continuing the policies in all Member States after
2030 could eliminate direct emissions almost entirely, according to the
model estimates.
Still, even if households should hypothetically prefer renewable heat-
ing technologies in a direct comparison (from an outside engineer-
ing perspective), not all households would immediately choose them
(from their individual perspective) — both due to imperfect informa-
tion, and limited availability due to supply constraints. Therefore, it is
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projected that price-based policies could only have limited short-term
impacts in countries with small initial market shares of renewables. In
seven countries, price-based policies on their own are therefore pro-
jected to be insufficient for reaching the 2030 renewable heating tar-
get, and would need to be supplemented by ‘kick start’/procurement
policies, which are aimed at nucleating a market for new technolo-
gies. Overall, the results indicate that more policy effort is required to
change the technology trajectory in countries with initially low market
shares of renewables.
Because of the long technological lifetimes of heating systems and the
inherent inertia of technological change, a transition towards renew-
ables cannot occur instantaneously. Substantial changes in the tech-
nology composition can only be expected several years after the in-
troduction of decarbonisation policies, and may take decades in many
cases. One a technology transition has gained sufficient momentum,
however, the path-dependence in technology uptake also implies that
policies can have long-lasting impacts even beyond their assumed end-
date.
Due to the long timespans involved, policies in the heating sector can
have strong distributional impacts: even when relative costs change
dramatically (such as under a high carbon tax), many households
could be ‘locked’ into using their existing heating systems (and paying
carbon taxes) for a considerable time. The political acceptability of a
residential carbon tax may therefore depend on the way in which its
revenues are redistributed, and if an increase in energy poverty can be
avoided.
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Abstract
Whole-economy scenarios for limiting global warming to 1.5°C sug-
gest that direct carbon emissions in the buildings sector should de-
crease to almost zero by 2050, but leave unanswered the question
how this could be achieved by real-world policies. We simulate
which policy measures could induce an almost-complete decarboni-
sation of residential heating, the by far largest source of direct emis-
sions in residential buildings. Under which assumptions is it pos-
sible, and how long would it take? We use the non-equilibrium
bottom-up model FTT:Heat to simulate policies for a transition to-
wards low-carbon heating in a context of inertia and bounded ratio-
nality, focusing on the uptake of heating systems. Our results indi-
cate that the near-zero decarbonisation is achievable by 2050, but re-
quires substantial policy efforts. We find that policy mixes are more
effective for incentivising the uptake of fuel-efficient low-carbon
technologies, compared to a residential carbon tax as the only policy.
In combination with subsidies and procurement policies for renew-
ables, near-complete decarbonisation could be achieved with a tax
of 50-200 e/tCO2. Without being complimented by additional poli-
cies, carbon taxes show a decreasing marginal impact on total emis-
sion reductions, thus remaining insufficient for deep decarbonisa-
tion. In all scenarios, the decarbonisation of heating would increase
projected heating costs faced by households initially, but could lead
to cost reductions in most world regions in the medium term. We
show that the potential impacts of policies highly depend on be-
havioural decision-making by households, especially in a context of
deep decarbonisation and rapid transformation.
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4.1 Introduction
Final energy demand in residential buildings was estimated to be 24
PWh/y in 2010, causing direct on-site emissions of 2,18 GtCO2/y and
indirect emissions from electricity use of 3,5 GtCO2/y (Lucon et al.,
2014). At the same time, plenty of unexploited mitigation options ex-
ist in buildings, many at low (or even negative)1 cost (U¨rge-Vorsatz
et al., 2012b). For limiting global warming to 2°C, all transformation
pathways reviewed in IPCC-AR5 therefore suggest substantial reduc-
tions of the buildings sector’s direct carbon emissions: around 50-75%
until 2050, and up to 100% by 2100 (Clarke et al., 2014). Limiting
global warming to 1.5°C implies a lower remaining budget for cumu-
lative economy-wide emissions (730-880 GtCO2 from 2015-2100, Millar
et al., 2017), and therefore requires to reach net-zero carbon emissions
as early as mid-century (Rogelj et al., 2015). Because remaining decar-
bonisation options compared to 2°C pathways are limited, scenarios
for reaching the 1.5°C target rely much more strongly on rapid emis-
sion reductions in the buildings sector: around 85-95% by 2050, relative
to their current level (Rogelj et al., 2015). While such pathways indicate
what may be optimal from a social planning perspective, they strongly
focus on the supply side of the energy system, leaving open the ques-
tion how such a deep decarbonisation could be achieved by real-world
demand-side policies, and which timescale would be realistic.
It is estimated that 56% of final energy in residential building is used
for space and water heating, of which 55% is generated by fossil
fuels, around 30% by biomass, and 15% by electricity and district
heating systems (IEA, 2013b). Heating is thus by far the largest energy
end-use in households, and responsible for most of residential on-site
CO2 emissions. Despite that, it only receives relatively limited policy
attention compared to the electricity and transport sectors (IEA, 2014).
While the theoretical emission reduction potential is well-known
(U¨rge-Vorsatz et al., 2012a), it remains unclear which real world policy
instruments could reduce the sector’s CO2 emissions to near-zero
sufficiently fast.
There is a consensus that the global demand for heating can be fulfilled
much more energy-efficiently, thereby reducing fuel use and emissions
without reducing comfort (Lucon et al., 2014). Heating loads can be
1Cost is potentially negative when mitigation options do not only reduce emissions,
but also the underlying energy use, which may lead to savings on energy expenses
in excess of the necessary investment.
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reduced by an improved thermal insulation of houses, and the remain-
ing heat demand can be serviced by renewable and energy-efficient
technologies. Through their integrated application, building energy
use can be reduced by up to 90% compared to conventional buildings
(U¨rge-Vorsatz et al., 2012b, 2013). Given that 50% of the current build-
ing stock will still be in use by 2050 (75% in OECD countries) (IEA,
2013a), levels of building efficiency in the next decades strongly de-
pend on building shell retrofits of existing houses (U¨rge-Vorsatz et al.,
2012a, 2015).
Aside from space heating, over 40% of global heat demand is for
water heating, which is less impacted by insulation (Connolly et al.,
2014), but likely to rise with growing income in many world regions
(Daioglou, Ruijven, and Vuuren, 2012). Near-zero-emissions are thus
unachievable as long as the remaining heat demand is not provided
by renewable and efficient electricity-based technologies. Available
alternatives to fossil fuel heating systems rely on the use of biomass
(traditional or in modern boilers), electricity (e.g., electric resistance or
immersion heating), ambient heat (heat pumps) or solar energy (solar
thermal panels) (for an overview, see IEA, 2014). While the operation
of solar and biomass systems can potentially be carbon-neutral
(abstracting from life-cycle considerations2), heating with electricity
can be a renewable technology once electricity generation is
decarbonised, otherwise, electricity-related emissions must be
accounted for. A much more efficient use of electricity can be achieved
by heat pumps, which upgrade the ambient low-temperature energy
of an air, water or ground source into higher-temperature heat
for space and water heating, effectively achieving efficiencies of
200-400% (average ratio of heat output to electricity input) (for an
overview, see IEA/ETSAP, 2012). The cost-competitiveness of these
capital intensive renewable technologies, with respect to incumbent
fossil fuel technologies, strongly depends on a combination of
local circumstances (such as local electricity and fuel prices, solar
irradiation), generally not achieved in most countries.
The potential of modern renewable heating technologies remains
largely unexploited: their combined use (excluding heat pumps)
accounted for less than 5% of global heat generation in 2012 (for a
2Woody biomass can be considered as emission neutral assuming that plants grow to
compensate the carbon emitted as they are combusted, so that the stock of forests
(and carbon therein) does not decline as a result of biomass combustion. For dis-
cussions, see Zanchi, Pena, and Bird (2012) and Lamers and Junginger (2013).
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market overview, see IEA, 2014). Some countries have introduced
policy instruments and market and institutional conditions for
incentivising their uptake, most commonly in the form of capital
subsidies (e.g. in Austria and China), carbon taxes (e.g. in Northern
Europe), and use obligations (e.g. in Germany and Spain) (Connor
et al., 2013; U¨rge-Vorsatz et al., 2015). Due to such policy support, an
increased diffusion of renewables can be observed in some places
(such as solar thermal heating in China): from 2010-14, their combined
market share grew by 8% (IEA, 2017c). While progress of the observed
extent can improve the energy efficiency of heating incrementally, it is
insufficient for achieving large absolute reductions in CO2 emissions,
which thus require more ambitious policy approaches (Jotzo et al.,
2012; Mundaca and Markandya, 2016; Mundaca, Markandya, and
Nørgaard, 2013; Wilhite and Norgard, 2004).
Planning for a technological transition in the heating sector requires in-
formation on policy strategies that can generate the right level of incen-
tive to achieve the required changes in consumer choices. In this paper,
we focus on analysing the diffusion of renewable and efficient heating
technologies in terms of various possible choices of realistic composite
policy packages, in 59 regions of the world. Which policy mixes could
induce a sufficiently fast transition towards renewable heating, under
which conditions and behavioural assumptions, and how long would
it take? In a first step, we use the IMAGE-REMG model (Daioglou, Rui-
jven, and Vuuren, 2012; Isaac and Van Vuuren, 2009) to project trends
of residential heating demand until 2050. Our focus, however, is on
the future technology portfolio, which depends on the choice of heat-
ing technologies by households.
We project household choices of heating technologies using the ‘Future
Technology Transformations’ model FTT:Heat (Knobloch et al., 2017).
It is a bottom-up simulation model of technology diffusion, aiming to
project how the technology composition of residential heating systems
in 59 world regions may develop until 2050 under the chosen assump-
tions on heat demand and choice behaviour. Based on projected pref-
erences and decisions, the model simulates which technologies supply
which share of the heating market, and estimates the resulting levels of
fuel use and emissions. It is designed to simulate the potential impact
of various sets of possible policy strategies.
The paper is structured as follows. In section ‘Background and litera-
ture’, we review the literature, and in section ‘Methods and data’, we
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present our model and data. Policy scenarios and results of the model
simulations are presented and discussed in section ‘Results’. Section
‘Discussion and conclusion’ concludes.
4.2 Background and literature
Residential heat generation is overwhelmingly small scale and dis-
tributed, taking place on site within homes. The uptake of new heating
equipment depends on the individual decision-making by heteroge-
neous households, each with subjective preferences and perceptions,
and only limited information, time and cognitive capacities to evalu-
ate alternative options. At the system level, the sum of such decisions
inevitably deviates from the least-cost optimum as it would be deter-
mined by models that assume a single, fully rational agent or social
planner (Kirman, 1992), leading to the criticism that many bottom-up
energy-models are based an unrealistic representations of real tech-
nology choice-making (for reviews, see Mundaca et al., 2010; Wilson
and Dowlatabadi, 2007; Worrell, Ramesohl, and Boyd, 2004). Avoiding
costly policy-design failures requires an upfront simulation of policy
effects, based on an analysis that better represents people’s actual be-
haviour under bounded rationality and limited information, and ac-
counting for nonlinear diffusion dynamics (Mercure et al., 2016a; Rai
and Henry, 2016). A behavioural modelling of decision-making is par-
ticularly relevant for policies aiming at a premature replacement of ex-
isting systems, which will likely be necessary for deep decarbonisation
(Geels et al., 2017a). For instance, in such decisions, households are
found to apply very strict payback thresholds (Newell and Siikama¨ki,
2015; Olsthoorn et al., 2017), reflected in high implicit discount rates
as estimated from consumer choices (Hausman, 1979; Schleich et al.,
2016; Sutherland, 1991; Train, 1985). In this section, we review the
aspects relevant to building a simulation-based diffusion model that
takes into account known behavioural features of decision-making.
4.2.1 Household decision making
Applied behavioural research shows that household decisions
between different heating systems are driven by a diverse set of
individual preferences and behavioural characteristics (for a review,
see Kastner and Stern, 2015). Multiple studies find that main
determinants of investments in heating systems are related to costs
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(Achtnicht and Madlener, 2014; Lillemo et al., 2013; Sopha, Klo¨ckner,
and Hertwich, 2011). Other significant factors are the influence by
social norms, and social comparisons with peers (Hecher et al.,
2017; Sopha et al., 2010). Michelsen and Madlener (2012) find that
preferences depend on socio-demographic (e.g. age, education),
spatial (e.g. urban/rural) and home characteristics (e.g. home type,
size). Wilson, Crane, and Chryssochoidis (2015) point out that energy
efficiency investments should not be seen in isolation, but as processes
that emerge from social practices. Psychological and sociological
research points to the behavioural relevance of norms, attitudes,
values, motivation and social influence, all of which can impact
technology choice (Abrahamse and Steg, 2009; Abrahamse et al., 2005;
Clayton et al., 2015; Dietz et al., 2009; Steg, 2008; Stern, 1986; Wilson
and Dowlatabadi, 2007).
The heterogeneity of household characteristics and perceptions may
partly explain the ‘energy efficiency gap’ (Allcott and Greenstone,
2012; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994) between a hypothetical optimum as seen
from an outside economics-engineering perspective and observed
household decisions, which seem to undervalue future energy savings
relative to upfront investment costs, resulting in a typically lower
than expected uptake of energy-efficient technologies (reflected in
high empirical estimates of implicit discount rates, as reviewed by
Hausman, 1979; Train, 1985). Various explanations are discussed in the
literature (for a review, see Gillingham and Palmer, 2014), which can
be grouped into market barriers (e.g., hidden costs), market failures
(e.g., asymmetric or imperfect information, split incentives) and
systematic behavioural biases, as described by behavioural economics
(e.g., loss aversion, suboptimal decision heuristics, status-quo bias,
saliency, procrastination) (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010; Bager and
Mundaca, 2017; Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’donoghue, 2002;
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Lillemo, 2014; Shogren and Taylor,
2008; Simon, 1955).
The cumulative effect of household heterogeneity, imperfect informa-
tion and social influence implies that the diffusion of new technologies
does not happen instantaneously once they become economically at-
tractive, but typically follows an S-shaped trajectory (Rogers, 2010):
a slow initial growth is driven by a small group of early adopters,
eventually followed by the large majority and, finally, laggards. The
process is further amplified by learning-based gradual cost decreases
once a technology grows in market share (Weiss et al., 2010), the na-
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ture and scale of transaction costs (Mundaca et al., 2013), and indus-
trial dynamics (e.g. capacity constraints, see Wilson, 2012). For en-
ergy technologies, these up-scaling dynamics have been extensively
studied (Gru¨bler, Nakic´enovic´, and Victor, 1999; Wilson and Grubler,
2011), emphasising the significance of formative phases and path de-
pendence. The resulting technology transitions usually take decades
rather than years, being accompanied by changes in regulation, infras-
tructure, user practices and culture (Geels, 2002). Hence, policies aim-
ing at transitions must be designed with an understanding of how new
technologies slowly diffuse out of niches, and of households’ diverse
motivations to adopt and use them.
4.2.2 Modelling of the diffusion of heating systems
Various types of energy end-use models exists, which can be grouped
into various categories, such as accounting-based, optimisation,
agent-based or bottom-up (Mundaca et al., 2010; Worrell, Ramesohl,
and Boyd, 2004), each with different (or sometimes no) representations
of decision-making (Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 2007). Many
national or global level energy-economy models (such as Integrated
Assessment Models) are of normative nature, used for analysing the
cost-effectiveness (e.g., TIMES, MESSAGE) or cost-benefit ratio (e.g.,
FUND, PAGE, DICE) of technology pathways from a social planning
perspective (Li, Trutnevyte, and Strachan, 2015).3 While such an
approach can be insightful for exploring cost-effective technology
pathways, optimization models mostly neglect behavioural, social and
industrial dynamics, effectively assuming that a single representative
agent with perfect information and foresight is taking the decisions.
The analysis of how (and if) a scenario can be achieved with which
types of incentives requires simulation models that better capture
some of the complex interactions between heterogeneous agents
(Mercure et al., 2016a), and some of the salient behavioural features
involved in real decision-making, a need which is also highlighted in
IPCC-AR5 (Kolstad et al., 2014).
For the heating sector, some attempts have been made to introduce
a representation of household behaviour into optimization bottom-up
models of technology uptake. Cayla and Maı¨zi (2015) extended the
3Under the incorrect assumption that the sum of individual cost-optimisers corre-
sponds to a cost-optimising social planner, optimisation is often seen as descrip-
tive, otherwise optimisation is always normative (Mercure, 2018).
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TIMES-Households model for France by including different household
categories. Also for France, Giraudet, Guivarch, and Quirion (2012) in-
troduce consumer heterogeneity and intangible costs into a bottom-up
sub-module of IMACLIM-R. Li (2017) presents an optimization model
with heterogeneous decision-making which covers heating in the UK.
However, most of these studies feature a relatively low resolution of
technology types for heating, and are restricted to one (or mostly a few)
countries. Furthermore, the behaviour represented typically comes in
the form of frictions or externalities (e.g., using higher discount rates)
introduced to prevent the models from reaching their otherwise nor-
mative optimal technological configurations.
As an alternative to optimization, several authors have developed
agent-based models (ABMs) of heating system uptake, such as
Sopha, Klo¨ckner, and Hertwich (2011) for wood-pellet heating in
Norway. While the approach allows the simulation of heterogeneous
households, non-standard decision making and social influences,
the calibration of ABMs requires a rich set of socio-economic data,
usually generated by household surveys and interviews, which
implies challenging requirements for their application on a larger
scale (Rai and Henry, 2016). A more qualitative approach of analysis
is taken in the ‘Energy Efficiency in Buildings’ model, which provides
a replicable methodology for local market analysis (WBCSD, 2016).
A modelling approach of intermediate complexity is the use
of discrete choice models with multinomial logit structures for
representing household diversity, such as the CIMS model for energy
demand in Canada (Rivers and Jaccard, 2005), the Invert/EE-Lab
model for building-related energy demand in selected European
countries (Kranzl et al., 2013; Stadler et al., 2007), and the bottom-up
models of household energy use by Ruijven et al. (2011) and Daioglou,
Ruijven, and Vuuren (2012) (together forming the REMG model
component of IMAGE, see section 4.3.1), differentiating for urban
and rural households and including income distributions. Some
of these models are technology-rich and coupled with detailed
building-physics models of the housing stock (e.g., Invert), which
increases their degree of realism from an engineering perspective. At
the same time, the data requirements are immense, so that models
either tend to focus on a limited set of countries (CIMS and Invert), or
only have limited technology representation (IMAGE-REMG).
Modelling the global scale is crucial in questions related to climate tar-
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gets, as it is the only way to calculate global emissions required to esti-
mate climate change. We acknowledge the difficulties to include (and
parameterise) behavioural dynamics and diversity with only limited
data available at the global scale, given that such behavioural features
must vary by country. In FTT:Heat, we therefore choose a compromise:
heterogeneous decision-making and social dynamics are represented
in a stylised but tractable way. To the best of our knowledge, there
exists so far no similar simulation model for the diffusion of heating
systems at the global scale. This enables FTT:Heat to be made into a
component of a new type of integrated assessment model, E3ME-FTT-
GENIE (Mercure et al., 2018a).
4.3 Methods and data
4.3.1 Simulating future heat demand with IMAGE-REMG
First, we use the IMAGE-REMG model to project future changes in
heat demand (UEtot), directly after the methodology described in Isaac
and Van Vuuren (2009) and Daioglou, Ruijven, and Vuuren (2012). De-
mand levels are projected for (i) a baseline scenario, (ii) a mitigation
scenario consistent with limiting radiative forcing to 1.9 W/m2 (1.5°C
target), involving increased efficiency of new buildings, and (iii) a vari-
ant of the mitigation scenario which additionally assumes increased
retrofitting of existing houses.
IMAGE-REMG projects UEtot as the sum of demand for space and wa-
ter heating. For water heating, future demand per person is modelled
as a function of income, converging to a maximum saturation value
which depends on heating degree days (HDD) (Daioglou, Ruijven,
and Vuuren, 2012). For space heating, demand is modelled as a func-
tion of population, floor space per person (m2/cap), heating degree
days (HDD), and the useful energy heating intensity (UE/m2/HDD)
(Isaac and Van Vuuren, 2009):
UEspace = Population ∗m2/cap ∗HDD ∗ UE/m2/HDD (4.1)
Future changes in population, climate and income are exogenous
drivers, based on the SSP (Shared Socioeconomic Pathway) 2 (‘middle
of the road’) (see Riahi et al., 2017). The mitigation scenario (SSP2-1.9)
projects reductions in heating intensity which would be consistent
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with achieving the 1.5°C target, which implies an improved thermal
insulation of houses (e.g., by means of building standards and
retrofits). Floor space is an intermediate driver, calculated as a
function of income and population density. HDD are derived from
monthly mean temperatures, taking into account future levels of
global warming. All relevant data is publicly available via the IMAGE
website (including future trends in m2/cap, HDD and UEspace) (PBL,
2018).
Heating intensity foremost depends on heating practices and levels
of building insulation, with current values ranging from 50-150
kJUE/m2/HDD. The IMAGE-REMG model treats residential energy
demand on aggregate, not specifically modelling building stocks,
retrofitting or specific technology/efficiency standards. Instead,
the heating demand is exogenously driven based on scenario
assumptions, not attached to specific actions. In the SSP2 scenario,
the heating intensity of all houses is assumed to decrease towards
an average of 90 kJUE/m2/HDD by 2100 in all world regions (from
100-150 kJUE/m2/HDD by 2015), or remain at the current level if
this is lower, meant to reflect the improvement of worst performing
buildings with a convergence towards current average intensities.
In the SSP2-1.9 scenario, it is assumed that the heating intensity
decreases to 60 kJUE/m2/HDD by 2100 (corresponding roughly to the
‘sub-optimal’ scenario in the GEA, see U¨rge-Vorsatz et al., 2012b),
consistent with the assumption that aggregate insulation efficiency
increases (e.g., in reaction to more stringent building regulations).
Last but not least, the retrofitting scenario assumes that the heating
intensity decreases towards 45 kJ/m2/HDD by 2050. This would
be consistent with rapid insulation improvements of the existing
building stock.4
4.3.2 Simulating technology uptake with FTT:Heat
The core of FTT:Heat is a simulation of technology diffusion, in which
individual heating technologies (e.g., gas boilers, heat pumps) compete
4The Passive House standard requires a maximum space heating energy demand of
15 kWh/m2 (PHI, 2018). This roughly translates to a maximum useful heating
intensity of 20 kJ/m2/HDD. As we model aggregate heating intensity, reducing
global heating intensity from 50-200 to 45 kJ/m2/HDD over a 30-year period is
very ambitious, and implies a large portion of households adopting passive house
properties.
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Figure 4.1: An illustration of technology substitution over time in FTT:Heat.
(1) Each period, in each region, some households decide between heating sys-
tems, based on the distributed generalised cost of heating of different tech-
nologies (GCOH , here abbreviated as C). (2) All available technologies are
compared with each other, and resulting household preferences stored in
the matrix F . (3) The dynamic shares equation simulates the resulting net
changes in each technology’s market shares (Si).
for market shares of the total heat demand. Importantly, the model
does not minimise or maximise some objective function, such as sys-
tem cost or intertemporal utility. Instead, it simulates the decision-
making of households: under given behavioural assumptions and lev-
els of heat demand, which heating technologies would they choose,
and how fast can new technologies grow within the market? Initial
market shares of individual technologies i, Si(t), are calculated from
historic data on heat generation by technology i, UEi(t), as:
Si(t) =
UEi(t)
UEtot(t)
,
∑
i
Si(t) = 1 (4.2)
At every time step t of the simulation (set to 1/4 year), FTT:Heat mod-
els the change in future market shares based on three central elements
(further described below):
(i) Decision-making by diverse households
(ii) Dynamic growth of technologies
(iii) Learning by doing
From the resulting shares, the model projects the new levels of useful
energy demand per technology, UEi(t).
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UEi can change when the total demand for heating (UEtot) changes
(e.g., due to improved levels of thermal insulation), and/or when the
technology composition (Si) changes (e.g., due to ongoing trends in
technology uptake or due to the introduction of new policies). Final
energy demand, fuel use and capacities are then estimated based
on technology-specific conversion efficiencies and capacity factors
(also depending on the climate). Negative changes in a technology’s
capacity correspond to decommissions that are not replaced. Finally,
on-site CO2 emissions are calculated from projected fuel use, based on
the respective carbon content.
Decision-making by diverse households
In each simulation period (set to 1/4 year), a fraction of households
decides between heating systems: either for replacing existing systems
that come to the end of their lifetime (or became so expensive to oper-
ate that they are replaced ahead of that), or to satisfy new demand.
For systems coming to the end of their lifetime, FTT:Heat simulates a
pairwise comparison of all available heating technologies by heteroge-
neous households, based on distributed costs and preferences. These
are represented as the generalised cost of heating, GCOHi:
GCOHi = LCOHi + γi (4.3)
GCOHi consists of two parts: an engineering-based annualised lev-
elised cost calculation (LCOHi), and an empirical estimate of tech-
nology characteristics which are valued by households (based on ob-
served technology uptake), γi. Levelised costs are calculated for all
technologies, as:
LCOHi =
∑
t
ICi,t
CFi
+
MRi,t
CFi
+
FCi,t
CEi
(1 + r)t
/∑
t
1
(1 + r)t
(4.4)
ICi,t, MRi,t and FCi,t are upfront investment costs, maintenance-
repair costs, and the fuel price respectively. CFi is the capacity
factor (depending on a region’s heating degree days), and CEi the
technological conversion efficiency (output of useful heat, relative to
input of fuel). t is the time period, and r is the discount rate. It is
meant to describe how households value future relative to present
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costs, using a rate of 9%, based on Jaccard and Dennis, 2006 (a
sensitivity analysis is given in Table 4.2).5 In addition, policies can be
imposed, such as a carbon tax or a capital subsidy.
As a representation of household diversity, ICi,t, MRi,t and FCi,t are
all distributed around their mean values. Such diversity originates
from different individual characteristics of the household, the technol-
ogy or the dwelling. Accordingly, LCOHi is not treated as a unique
value, but as a frequency distribution with a mean and a standard de-
viation (illustrated in the left panel of 4.1), combined using standard
error propagation:
dLCOHi =
√
dIC2i
CF 2i
+
dMR2i
CF 2i
+
dFC2i
CE2i
(4.5)
Many additional aspects may be valued by households which remain
unspecified in the LCOHi, such as the perceived inconvenience of a
technology (e.g., for pellet heating, see Sopha et al., 2010), possible
co-benefits (e.g., using a heat pump for cooling purposes), or existing
policies. We refer to such aspects as ‘intangibles’, the value of which
is represented in the technology- and region-specific empirical param-
eter γi. It is derived using a calibration with historical diffusion data:
we search for the set that makes the rate of diffusion continuous at
the cross-over between historical and simulation periods, in each re-
gion (a description of the methodology is given in the Appendix). The
values of ‘intangibles’ may change over time. However, we cannot
estimate their future values before new data on technology uptake be-
comes available. We therefore assume that ‘intangibles’ remain con-
stant throughout the simulation period. For a population of hetero-
geneous households, the comparison of two technologies is then per-
formed by comparing the frequency distributions of their generalised
cost:
5Ideally, we would have similar (and recent) empirical studies for all world regions.
Unfortunately, those are not available. In their absence, some value needs to be
chosen as a discount rate, so using results from the cited study on Canada is in our
opinion an imperfect, but feasible solution.
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Fij(∆Cij) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Fj(C)fi(C −∆Cij)dC,
∆Cij = GCOHi −GCOHj
(4.6)
F (C) and f(C) are the cumulative cost distribution function and the
cost distribution density, respectively. Fij denotes the fraction of
households preferring technology i over technology j. It is calculated
as the fraction of households for which the GCOH with technology i
is less than with technology j (i.e., the model calculates a binary logit).
For example, if Fij = 0.7, 70% of households in this region would
prefer technology i over j, while 30% have the reverse preference.
The comparison is performed for all possible pairs of available
technologies, resulting in a complete order of distributed household
preferences, summarised in the matrix F (which is endogenously
calculated for all regions, and updated in each simulation period).
The diversity of choices implies a differentiation of the market, in
which households take different decisions at different points in time
for different reasons, as described by diffusion theory (Rogers, 2010).
Technology diffusion dynamics
Once preferences are estimated, the change in technology shares is sim-
ulated (Mercure, 2012, 2015). First, we derive the substitution of mar-
ket shares from heating technology j to i in period ∆t, as:
∆Sji = SjFijτ
−1
j Si∆t (4.7)
Substitutions from j to i depend on the fraction of households who
would prefer technology i over j (the preference matrix Fij , which is
newly estimated in each period), the previous market shares of both
technologies (Si and Sj), and the fraction of technology j which needs
to be replaced (estimated as the inverse of its average technological
lifetime, τj).6
6We assume homogenous age distributions because we do not have data over the age
structure of heating systems worldwide. The assumption implies that if a fleet of
heating systems of a particular technology has been widely adopted in a country
in a very short time, it would mean that they would need replacement in a rela-
tively restricted range of years, which would break our assumption. It does not
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Since preferences are diverse, another fraction of households may have
the reverse preference, and would choose technology j over i. We thus
calculate the net substitution from technology j to technology i. Fi-
nally, the sum of all such pair-wise comparisons over all competing
technologies j yields the cumulative net change in market shares of
technology i:
∆Si =
∑
j
SiSj
(
Fijτ
−1
j − Fjiτ−1i
)
∆t (4.8)
Formula 4.8 is the non-linear dynamic shares equation, conceptually
similar to the modelling of imitation dynamics in evolutionary game
theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), originating in the description of
evolutionary competition between different species. Each single flow
from a technology j to an alternative technology i is determined by
three interacting elements:
• Preferences (Fij): which fraction of households would prefer
which technology, given that they were to buy a heating system
within period ∆t?
• Replacement needs (Sjτ−1j ): how many heating systems of technol-
ogy j need replacement in period ∆t?
• Dynamic constraints (Si): given preferences and replacement
needs, which fraction of substitutions can be realised?
Substitutions are dynamically constrained, as a stylised representation
of (a) limited capacities to produce and install new technologies, and
(b) limited information and behavioural decision-making on part of
households. Psychological research reports that households typically
don’t optimise, but tend to stick to the status quo, are impacted by
prevalent social norms, or follow the behaviour of others (Abrahamse
imply, however, that new innovative systems could be replaced instantaneously;
these would nevertheless wait until the end of their average expected lifetime to
be replaced (unless households would replace prematurely). The constraint of not
considering the exact age distribution is furthermore relaxed by the fact that sys-
tems have a probability of end of life that is distributed over time (not all systems
of the same type end up with the exact same lifetime). Note that if for any tech-
nology i, Fij ¡ 50% for every other technology j, then the shares of i are going to
decline over time. However, it doesn’t mean that nobody is buying technology i.
It simply means that more people are buying alternative technologies. As a result,
the population of technology i declines gradually.
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and Steg, 2013; Frederiks, Stenner, and Hobman, 2015). For heating
systems, the main information sources are interpersonal sources and
installers (Mahapatra and Gustavsson, 2008). For the diffusion of inno-
vations, industrial and social dynamics are self-reinforcing, and both
make it more likely that households choose dominant technologies.
We represent these dynamics by constraining a technology’s growth
by its market share (Si), based on Mercure (2015, 2018).
As a central implication, technology transitions in the model are
subject to inertia, as technological trajectories cannot change direction
rapidly, and resembles s-shapes diffusion curves. While undoubtedly
remaining a stylised representation of underlying behavioural, social
and industrial dynamics, it is an improvement in comparison to
exogenous growth constraints in standard optimization models, since
here the constraint is fully endogenous.
Substitutions can be further constrained to account for behavioural and
technical plausibility/feasibility. We follow Kranzl et al. (2013) and
assume that households would not switch back to technologies with a
much lower comfort level, i.e. that households with modern heating
systems (such as district heat, gas, electricity) would not go back to
coal or traditional biomass.
Finally, new levels of heat generation per technology (UEi) are
obtained by multiplying their new shares by a region’s total heat
demand (UEtot) (modelled by IMAGE-REMG).
Premature replacements
Formula 4.8 would suggest that households replace heating devices
only at the end of their lifetime. However, in reality, households may
consider to replace functioning heating systems ahead of that, based
on economic considerations. For a household with perfect information
and without risk-aversion, this would be beneficial once the marginal
running costs of operating the current system exceed the full levelised
costs of buying and operating an alternative technology. In practice, it
is known that households apply much stricter criteria, and only con-
sider a premature replacement if the potential savings exceed the initial
investment in a limited period of time - the so-called payback threshold
(Gillingham and Palmer, 2014).
Thus, in the model, premature replacements are only considered as
sufficiently attractive if (and only if) the savings (due to reduced op-
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erating costs, MCi) exceed the investment costs of another technology
(ICj , inclusive of an eventual subsidy) within the considered payback
time (b), so if:
MCi > MCj + ICj/b (4.9)
Given costs, decisions strongly depend on the assumed value of b. In
choice experiments Olsthoorn et al. (2017) find that the mean payback
threshold for a premature replacement of space heating systems is as
low as 3+/-1 years, while Newell and Siikama¨ki (2015) report a mean
threshold of 3-5 years. Assuming that this applies to all regions, we
use 3+/-1 years. A sensitivity for b is given in section 4.4.4.
Learning by doing
We endogenously model cost reductions in upfront investment costs
over time, ICi(t), which occur due to the accumulation of knowledge
and experience (‘learning by doing’), leading to the empirically
well-described phenomenon of learning curves. Endogenous cost
reductions increases path dependence in technology diffusion
(Arthur, 1989), leading to increasing returns to scale for growing
technologies.
In each period, updated investment costs are calculated as a function
of the increase in cumulative global capacity of a technology, based
on technology-specific learning rates: they describe the relative cost
reduction that is expected for every additional doubling of the global
capacity. We use learning rates from a review of empirical evidence by
Weiss et al. (2010) (given in the Appendix).
Economic feedbacks
FTT:Heat is hard-linked to the macroeconometric global simulation
model E3ME (Cambridge Econometrics, 2014), most importantly via
variables for fuel use and household expenditures. Policies which
are primarily targeted at the heating sector can lead to changes in
households’ demand for different fuels, or to higher expenses for
heating systems. For each year of the simulation, E3ME projects the
wider macroeconomic impacts of such effects, and allows to analyse
the implications for other economic sectors. We focus on the impact
on electricity generation: policies for household heating can lead
110
to changes in a region’s electricity demand and thereby impact the
power sector, leading to changes in its fuel use and CO2 emissions.
Such effects are endogenously simulated by FTT:Power, which is
hard-linked to FTT:Heat via the E3ME model (Mercure et al., 2014,
2018a).
Energy demand
Only limited data is available on the specific demand for residential
heating, the related fuel consumption and technology composition
(IEA, 2014; Lucon et al., 2014). We combine data on fuel use and
technology diffusion from various sources, and provide the resulting
database as Supplementary Material.
Final energy demand for heating in EU countries is taken from the
ODYSSEE database (Enerdata, 2017), which contains annual data for
space and water heating in all 28 member states. For non-EU regions,
the IEA energy statistics report final residential energy demand by
fuel type, but do not differentiate by end use application (IEA, 2017d).
The share of heating in household energy demand strongly depends
on climatic conditions and levels of building insulation, ranging from
10% India to 87% in Russia, with water heating being of dominant im-
portance in warmer climates (IEA, 2013b). We calculate the shares of
heating for ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, South Africa
and the USA based on estimates in IEA (2013b) and country-specific
sources (Daioglou, Ruijven, and Vuuren, 2012; Eom et al., 2012; Wang
and Jiang, 2017). For Sub-Saharan Africa, we adjust the fuel use data
to bottom-up estimates of heat demand by the IMAGE-REMG model.
For remaining world regions, the heating share is estimated based on
heating degree days, assuming a comparable heating intensity as in
world regions with a similar climate.
Residential heat generation by solar thermal installations for most
world regions is available in the IEA energy statistics, which we
amended by data from the IEA Solar Heating Programme (Mauthner,
Weiss, and Spo¨rk-Du¨r, 2016). No standardised global data exists on
heat generation by heat pumps. For most EU countries and Norway,
time series were available from the European Heat Pump Association
(EHPA) (2016), which was amended by data from EurObserv’ER
(2017). For other world regions, the heat generation by ground-source
heat pumps is taken from Lund, Freeston, and Boyd (2016). Data
on the use of air-source heat pumps is taken from country-specific
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sources where available (China Heat Pump Committee (2015) for
China, EIA (2017) for USA, Japan Refrigeration and Air Conditioning
Industry Association (2017) for Japan, Kegel et al. (2014) for Canada,
Lapsa et al. (2017) for the USA).
In the model, data on final energy demand (Ei) is transformed into use-
ful energy demand (UEi) according to technology-specific conversion
efficiencies (CEi) (see Appendix-Table 5), so that:
UEi(t) = Ei(t) ∗ CEi (4.10)
The resulting top-down estimate of heat demand has to be seen as a
simplification, owing to the absence of reliable information on residen-
tial energy end-use in most world regions, and is subject to the uncer-
tainty of underlying data and assumed efficiencies.
We estimate that in 2014, global final energy demand for residential
space and water heating was around 12 PWh, useful energy demand
9,6 PWh, direct onsite CO2 emissions 1,5 GtCO2/y (around 70%
of reported direct residential building sector emissions in 2010,
Lucon et al., 2014), and indirect emissions in the electricity sector 0,5
GtCO2/y.
Technology data
Cost and performance data for the 13 different kinds of heating
technologies is summarised in Appendix-Table 5. Country-specific
investment costs (incl. of installation) for EU countries are taken from
Fleiter, Steinbach, and Ragwitz (2016) and Connolly et al. (2014).
For other world regions, we estimated the relative differences in
investment costs from levels of real available household income. A
standard deviation equivalent to 1/3 of the mean cost is assumed for
all technologies (Danish Energy Agency, 2013, 2016) (based on cost
ranges by National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2016). Residential
fuel prices are taken from the IEA (2016a), with an assumed standard
deviation of 15% (30% for biomass, based on National Renewable
Energy Laboratory, 2016). More details and the data are given in the
Appendix.
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4.3.3 Scenario definition
We created ten model scenarios (labeled a-j) aiming at a decarbonisa-
tion of residential heating until 2050, all of which use a different set of
policies, implemented from 2020 onwards. Scenario a is our baseline
projection, without improved insulation of the building stock (SSP2).
It includes a continuation of current policies, the effect of which is im-
plicitly included in the γi parameters. Scenario b assumes increased
levels of thermal insulation for new houses (SSP2-1.9), which often is
the prerequisite for an effective use of renewables. In scenario c, we
simulate the additional effects of having more ambitious retrofitting
of existing buildings, leading to further demand reductions. In addi-
tion to the improved insulation levels of scenario c, scenarios d-i ex-
plores policy instruments which are aimed at the uptake of heating
technologies: a residential carbon tax, technology subsidies, and ‘kick
start’ schemes for new technologies. These policies were chosen based
on their successful previous implementation in at least some countries
(for an overview, see Connor et al., 2013; IEA, 2014), as well as from
advice from policy analysts at the European Commission. Scenario j
explores complete electrification. We assume the political acceptabil-
ity of the simulated policies for the purpose of our analysis. The gap
between the modelled carbon tax levels and levels observed in reality
reflects the political economy of carbon pricing mechanisms.
1. The (sectoral) carbon tax is specified as an absolute increase in
the household price of fossil fuels, relative to their respective car-
bon content (we do not assume an inclusion of households into
emissions trading).7 We simulate carbon taxes of 50e/tCO2 (sce-
nario d) and 100 e/tCO2 (scenario e). From 2020-2050, the tax is
assumed to linearly increase by +10% per year, relative to its re-
spective starting value (reaching 200 e/tCO2 and 400e/tCO2 in
2050). The 50 e/tCO2 tax is equivalent to fuel price increases of
around +0.01 e/kWh for gas, +0.013 e/kWh for oil, and +0.018
e/kWh for coal. In practice, such a tax may also take the form
of subsidy removal in countries where household fuel use is cur-
rently subsidised (e.g., in form of reduced VAT rates, such as on
domestic fuel use in the UK8).
7The specific carbon tax is only applied to the residential sector, and not assumed to
be linked to other sectors, such as the power sector, which is subject to a separate
set of policies.
8https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/vat-notice-70119-fuel-and-
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2. Technology subsidies are defined as a relative reduction in a renew-
able heating technology’s mean upfront investment cost. Eligible
are solar thermal, heat pumps, and modern biomass. Two sub-
sidy rates are simulated: -25% (scenario f) and -50% (scenario
g). We assume that subsidy rates remain constant from 2020 un-
til 2030, and are linearly phased out afterwards, reaching zero in
2050.
3. A ‘kick start’ policy is not market-based, but represents a policy
measure that introduces a new technology by means of a pro-
curement scheme, use obligation in building codes, or other reg-
ulation. Such a policy is useful for driving initial markets in
countries where a new technology’s uptake is very limited or
absent so far, thereby limiting the spread of relevant first-hand
experiences between households, and preventing the build-up of
necessary expertise and capacity in the building and heating in-
dustries. Precedents for such policies can be found in Spain and
Germany, amongst others (Connor et al., 2013). In the model, we
represent such a policy for limited time periods (5-10 years) by
assuming that in each year, one percentage point of the domi-
nant fossil fuel technology’s market share is replaced by a mix of
renewable alternatives.
Scenarios d-g focus on single policy instruments, while policy mixes
involving two or more policies are simulated in scenarios h-j.
For all scenarios, we assume constant energy prices, for two reasons:
first, future energy prices are highly uncertain, especially in a context
of global deep decarbonisation. Effectively, this makes constant prices
as likely as any other scenario. Second, it allows for a clearer identifi-
cation of policy effects, which may otherwise be convoluted with the
effects of a change in energy prices. A sensitivity analysis shows that
our results do not substantially differ under increasing and decreasing
future energy prices and other parameters (see Table 4.2).
In all scenarios, solar thermal is limited to the demand of water heating
in each country (as it is mainly used for water heating, and only as a
supplementary source for space heating). District heating is only an
option in those regions where it already exists (we do not assume the
construction of new heat networks, which could well be an alternative
to decentralised renewable heating in some regions).
power/vat-notice-70119-fuel-and-power
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Heat demand
We first estimate future residential demand for space and water
heating under different assumptions on future building efficiency
and retrofitting, by applying projected demand trends from
IMAGE-REMG to the historically estimated heat demand in 2014.
Figure 4.2 depicts the resulting baseline demand trends by world
region (SSP2, in which heating intensity globally converges to 90
kJ/m2/HDD by 2100), a scenario of improved efficiency of newly
built houses (SSP2-1.9, in which heating intensity globally converges
to 60 kJ/m2/HDD by 2100), and a scenario which additionally
assumes increased levels of retrofitting of the existing building stock
(assuming a decrease to a heating intensity of 45 kJ/m2/HDD by
2050). It becomes evident that changes in future global demand
strongly depend on China, which currently still shows very low levels
of average heating intensity. Large demand increases are projected
with continuously rising income, which may still be limited by
improved building efficiency of newly built housing stock. Projected
increases in warmer world regions mainly reflect growing demand
for water heating, which empirically depends on income, and is
unaffected by our assumptions on housing insulation. Estimated
effects of retrofitting are largest in Western Europe and North
America, where heat demand remains high, but is largely saturated.
4.4.2 Environmental effectiveness of policies
The main results for policy scenarios a-j are illustrated by Figure 4.3,
which shows the projected global technology composition (left) and
CO2 emissions (right) until 2050. Indirect CO2 emissions from electric-
ity use are projected by FTT:Power, assuming a power sector decar-
bonisation scenario that is consistent with limiting global warming to
1.5°C (the projected emission intensities on the global level are shown
in the Appendix, and are reported for all regions in the Supplemen-
tary Material). In addition, dashed lines show the total emission lev-
els under current trends of power sector decarbonisation. Table 4.1
presents the cumulative changes in CO2 emissions from 2020-2050. In
the Appendix, we show the underlying projected changes in the fuel
mix, as well as the induced technology diffusion for five major world
regions.
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Figure 4.2: Projections of future residential heat demand (space+water) by
world region, for (a) a baseline scenario in which heating intensity converges
to 90 kJ/m2/HDD by 2100 (SSP2), (b) a scenario of improved building insu-
lation of new houses in the context of climate policy, in which the heating
intensity converges to 60 kJ/m2/HDD by 2100 (SSP2-1.9), and (c) a scenario
which additionally assumes rapid thermal retrofitting of the existing building
stock, so that the heating intensity converges to 45 kJ/m2/HDD by 2050.
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Figure 4.3: Global technology composition and CO2 emissions (direct on-site
and indirect emissions from electricity use) in the residential heating sector,
under current trends (a), improved building insulation (b), improved insu-
lation and retrofitting (c), and seven policy scenarios aimed at technology
uptake (d-j, based on improved levels of insulation from scenario c). Model
simulations by FTT:Heat start in 2015 (indicated by vertical dashed lines).
Horizontal dashed lines represent 2014 levels.
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Values from 1995-2014 are estimates based on historical data, while the
model simulation starts in 2015 (indicated by the dashed vertical line).
2014 values for total heat demand and emissions are represented as
horizontal dashed lines. In plots for scenarios b-j, solid curves indicate
the baseline demand trend (from scenario a). Percentage values refer
to changes in demand and total annual CO2 emissions by 2050, relative
to 2014. Values in brackets refer to the respective changes in direct CO2
emissions.
In our baseline projection under current policies and diffusion trends
(scenario a), annual direct CO2 would peak by 2030, before returning
to their 2014 level by 2050. Given the projected increase in heat de-
mand of +46%, this suggests a decrease in the direct emission intensity
by around 30%. Importantly, these changes in our baseline do not re-
sult from any exogenous efficiency change, but from the endogenous
continuation of current technology diffusion trends: the model projects
a continuously increasing market share of heat pumps, solar thermal
heating and modern biomass systems. Their combined share would
grow from 9p.p. (percentage points) of heat production in 2014, to
30p.p. in 2050. An uptake of more efficient gas heating systems and
a gradual replacement of coal and oil based systems leads to further
emission reductions. Still, fossil fuel systems are projected to supply
a more or less constant amount of heat, and keep a combined market
share of 40p.p. by 2050, down from 50p.p. in 2014. Total emissions are
projected to decrease by -18% by 2050, given that the power sector is
decarbonised.
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In scenario b, improved insulation of houses would reduce overall heat
demand in 2050 by 20% (relative to baseline scenario a), indicating the
untapped potential of increased building efficiency. In combination
with a continued diffusion of renewables, this could lead to a 31% re-
duction of total emission levels, although absolute heat demand would
still be 18% larger than in 2014. Compared to baseline, the increased
thermal efficiency of new houses would reduce cumulative total CO2
emissions by 9 GtCO2 between 2020-50.
In scenario c, we assume that all houses converge to an average heat-
ing intensity of 45 kJ/m2/HDD until 2050, which implies that a large
fraction of existing buildings would be retrofitted with improved in-
sulation. As can be seen in Figure 4.2, this would foremost lead to
additional demand reductions in North America, Europe and the For-
mer Soviet Union (by 15-20% in 2050, relative to demand in SSP2-1.9).
Compared to scenario b, total global heat demand by 2050 would be
9% lower than in 2014, leading to projected additional reductions of
direct emission of a similar magnitude.
Other than for scenarios b and c, the resulting impacts of technology
policies in scenarios d-j are not imposed by assumption (e.g., by
assuming stricter building codes), but are subject to the simulated
decision-making by households. The resulting technology transitions
therefore depend on the behavioural characteristics of simulated
decisions.
In scenario d, an (increasing) carbon tax of 50-200 e/tCO2 is intro-
duced in 2020. Due to bounded rationality and limited information on
part of households, the projected changes in technology uptake would
only unfold very gradually, showing considerable inertia: households
would still install new oil systems until 2035, and new gas systems
even up to 2050. As households learn about the new technologies,
and industry capacities expand, renewables would increasingly grow
in market shares. Compared to scenario c, annual heat generation in
2050 by heat pumps would be 90% larger, solar thermal by 18%, and
modern biomass by 50% (reaching a combined market share of 45p.p.
by 2050). The resulting decrease in annual total emissions would be
77% in 2050.
In scenario e, an (increasing) carbon tax of 100-400 e/tCO2 is pro-
jected to bring down direct emissions by 95%, and total emissions by
84%. Relative to the lower carbon price in scenario d, the 2050 market
shares of heat pumps and modern biomass would increase by +13%
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and +11%, while shares of solar remain virtually unaffected. This in-
dicates a decreasing marginal impact of carbon taxes on household
decisions: although moderate tax levels can be sufficient for slowly
steering household choices for regular replacements and new instal-
lations away from fossil fuel technologies, slow turnover rates limit
the resulting pace of change in the technology composition. Further-
more, households tend to discount future fuel savings which can be
achieved by adopting highly efficient, but capital-intensive modern re-
newables. Such technologies are disadvantaged by their higher up-
front costs, which have a more than proportional impact on house-
holds’ decision-making. Instead, the carbon price would induce a shift
towards (less efficient) direct electric heating (which would grow by
30%, relative to scenario d), resulting in indirect emission increases.
Subsidy schemes are simulated in scenarios f and g. The projected de-
crease in annual total CO2 emissions by 2050 is 49% for a 25% subsidy,
and 62% for a 50% subsidy. Results suggest a clear shift of household
choices towards more capital-intensive and efficient technologies, in
comparison to the carbon tax: solar thermal and ground-source heat
pumps show the largest increases in uptake (up to +100% and +200%
relative to scenario c, respectively). Accordingly, electricity use for
heating is around 50% lower than in the carbon tax scenarios, mak-
ing the technology portfolio much more robust against potential indi-
rect emission increases in the power sector. Still, results suggest that
on their own, even large subsidies could not motivate many house-
holds to replace functioning systems prematurely. Even if scrapping
would look beneficial from an outside perspective, households tend
to apply strict behavioural payback criteria for such decisions, which
makes scrapping unattractive from their subjective perspectives (see
section ).
In scenario h, the 50% subsidy on renewables is combined with the
50-200 e/tCO2 carbon tax. From a behavioural perspective, the pol-
icy mix impacts households’ decision-making like ‘carrot and stick’:
the tax enacts a steadily increasing economic pressure on households,
strong enough so that a growing proportion of them may eventually
want to reconsider their preference for fossil fuel technologies. In par-
allel, the subsidy has an over-proportional impact on costs as they are
perceived by households, in particular in case of premature replace-
ments (see Figure 4.6), thereby benefiting modern renewables. Accord-
ing to the model projections, the policy mix could thus induce a wave
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of premature replacements. As a result, annual total emissions by 2050
could be reduced by 85%.
While the policy mix of scenario h is projected to incentivise a decar-
bonisation pathway in most world regions, results suggest that the
policies would be relatively ineffective in the Middle East and Russia,
where two-third of remaining emissions would occur by 2050. In both
regions, the diffusion of renewables is not just constrained by compa-
rably low fossil fuel prices, but also by the practical absence of such
technologies in the present technology mix, which implies limited lo-
cal knowledge and experience. Scenario i therefore adds ‘kick start’
policies for driving the initial market for renewables in Russia and
OPEC states, e.g. in form of procurement schemes (see section 4.3.3).
Once households and local industry learn about the new technologies,
a diffusion process is nucleated, and the financial incentives can have a
much larger impact. Overall, the policy mix is projected to reduce total
emissions by 90% (direct emissions by 95%), the largest total reduction
in all scenarios.
Results of scenarios h and i imply that mixing policies enables to im-
pose a lower carbon price and reduce costs to households (see section
4.4.3), in contrast to common model assumptions in which all poli-
cies are assumed to have a ‘carbon price equivalent’. In a diffusion
model, policy interacts, and the behavioural details of the policy mix
(and how it impacts household decisions) matters. Compared to a car-
bon price on its own (scenario e), our results suggest that the transition
to renewables could take place with more efficient (albeit more capital
intensive) technologies: although leading to similar direct emission re-
ductions, the carbon tax on its own would lead to much higher electric-
ity use, leading to larger expenses on electricity and indirect emission
increases in the power sector.
In all scenarios, an increased electrification of residential heating has
direct implications for the power sector. Annual electricity demand
for residential heating in 2014 was around 1 PWh/y (or 4% of global
electricity demand), causing indirect emissions of 0,5 GtCO2/y. In our
baseline projection, it would increase to 2 PWh/y in 2050. Without de-
carbonisation of the power sector, indirect emission could then reach
1,1 GtCO2/y. Net reductions in cumulative 2015-2050 CO2 emissions
thus strongly depend on a parallel decarbonisation of electricity gen-
eration (see Table 4.1). Indirect emission increases cancel out 5-20%
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of direct emission savings when assuming a rapid power sector de-
carbonisation, but up to 55% when the sector continues on its current
trajectory. Net savings are much more sensitive to induced power sec-
tor emissions in scenarios which only rely on a carbon tax, due to their
relatively higher levels of electricity demand. Despite this, residen-
tial emission reductions in scenarios c-i would always exceed potential
emission increases in the power sector.
In scenario j, we explore the extreme case of complete electrification.
In addition to the 100-400 e/tCO2 carbon tax from scenario e, we as-
sume that electricity use for heating is subsidised by 0,05 e/kWh, and
the purchase of all electricity-based systems by 30%. Because elec-
tric heaters are a readily available and well-known technology in most
world regions, also being clean and convenient in use, our model sug-
gests a relatively rapid uptake once costs are favourable: direct electric
heating alone would gain a 75% market share by 2050, reducing on-
site emissions by as much as 99%. However, resulting electricity de-
mand would reach 9 PWh/y, requiring 2.000-2.400 GW of additional
generation capacity (almost half of the currently installed global ca-
pacity). Indirect emissions would cancel out 80% of direct CO2 reduc-
tions even under power sector decarbonisation, and could reach up to
6 GtCO2/y otherwise. This makes a direct electrification of heating an
overall rather ineffective (or even counterproductive) mitigation strat-
egy, particularly given the availability of much more efficient alterna-
tives.
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Table 4.2 presents the sensitivity of our scenario results with respect to
key parameters (for the sensitivity with respect to scrapping assump-
tions, see section 4.4.4). It becomes evident that results are relatively
robust to changes in cost parameters: under alternative assumptions
on fuel price trends, learning rates and discount rates, cumulative di-
rect CO2 emissions do not change by more than 7% in any scenario.
The largest emission increases can be seen for changes in ‘intangible’
cost components: if they are reduced by 50%, cumulative emissions are
up to 12% higher (even 25% in case of the complete electrification sce-
nario, because electric heating would become less attractive). This is
partly due to the fact that large ‘intangible’ costs are attributed to coal,
the reduction of which would lead to the uptake of emission-intensive
coal heating systems. Apart from cost parameters, results are sensitive
to the assumptions on technology lifetimes: in case of shorter lifetimes,
technological change can take place more quickly, reducing cumulative
emissions. The reverse effect can be observed for longer lifetimes, al-
beit being less pronounced (as more households would be projected to
replace their heating systems prematurely, which would partly offset
the effect of longer technological lifetimes).
4.4.3 Cost-effectiveness of policies
From a public policy perspective, the decarbonisation of heating could
not only be beneficial for climate change mitigation, but potentially
also enable a more efficient provision of heat in monetary terms. The
cumulative projected costs and savings from the induced technology
transitions (in scenarios d-j) are presented in Table 4.3 and illustrated
by Figure 4.4, relative to scenario c (with improved insulation, but
without technology policies). Figure 4.5 exemplarily shows the under-
lying changes over time per world region in case of four scenarios.
As illustrated by Figure 4.4, our results suggest that a carbon tax would
induce emission reductions at relatively lower additional investments
per t/CO2, compared to policy mixes which involve subsidies. How-
ever, high carbon taxes show a decreasing marginal impact on total
emissions, and could therefore only reduce them up to a certain extent
(-84% in our simulations). While a carbon tax on its own would set the
stage for making renewables more cost-competitive, larger emission
reductions could be achieved by richer policy mixes, which are pro-
jected to trigger more fuel efficient pathways of technological change
(see Appendix-Figure 2). Albeit being more capital-intensive (reflected
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Figure 4.4: Projected changes in expenses on heating systems (red) and energy
expenses for heating (green) (in e(’15)/tCO2, per ton of net reduction in total
CO2 emissions, relative to scenario c without policies targeted at technology
uptake), versus the projected changes in total CO2 emissions in 2050 (relative
to 2014, direct on-site and indirect emissions from electricity use). Scenarios
are shown in the order of induced emission reductions, and identified by the
bold characters.
in higher additional investments per t/CO2), such policy mixes could
also lead to larger fuel savings (reflected in higher savings in energy
expenses per t/CO2).
In all scenarios, cumulative expenses on heating systems are projected
to increase between 10-36%. Subsidies would lead to relatively larger
increases (compared to carbon taxes) in terms ofe/tCO2 net reduction,
as they incentivise the purchase of more capital-intensive technolo-
gies. At the same time, the new technologies are much more energy-
efficient, thus enabling substantial reductions in energy expenses for
heating, which range between 5-21%. As for expenses on heating sys-
tems, policy mixes which involve subsidies are also projected to result
in larger energy savings, as they lead to the adoption of more energy-
efficient technology portfolios.
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In all scenarios, projected savings from energy expenses exceed the ad-
ditional costs for the purchase of new heating systems (assuming con-
stant energy prices), leading to reductions in overall expenses on heat-
ing by up to 8%. The notable exemption is scenario j, in case of which
the transition to (relatively inefficient) electric resistance heating would
increase overall expenses by more than 20%. Projected net savings are
largest for policy mixes which involve both taxes and subsidies (h and
i). While they show the largest increases in expenses on heating sys-
tems, those would also enable the largest energy savings and emission
reductions.
Households, however, do not directly face the changes in net costs.
They also need to pay for the carbon taxes, while potentially benefit-
ing from purchase subsidies. When taxes are used as the only policy
instrument, tax payments would by far exceed the achievable savings
in real costs. Net benefits for households would then depend on the
way in which tax revenues are redistributed. In case of policy mixes,
part of the tax revenues would be recycled into purchase subsidies.
Savings in real costs would then exceed the net burden from policies
to households (tax payments minus subsidy payments) by a factor of
3-7.
Importantly, costs and savings would not occur simultaneously (see
Figure 4.5). In most world regions, additional expenses on heating
systems would peak around 2030. Meanwhile, resulting changes in
energy expenses only gradually increase over time, not reaching their
full extent before 2050. In most world regions, substantial net savings
are thus not projected before 2040. This type of temporal trade-off im-
plies that while overall net savings may be large from a public policy
perspective, specific technology choices may still remain unattractive
from the perspective of individual households (which tend to discount
future savings), if they are not incentivised by policies.
Furthermore, costs and savings are not equally distributed between
world regions. While most regions show a similar profile of relative
changes in expenses over time, some regions are projected to realise
much larger net savings (e.g., in China), while others could face net
cost increases for longer periods of time (e.g., in North America).
The largest relative cost increases could occur in Russia and North
Africa/Middle East, where current fossil fuel prices are considerably
lower than in other world regions. The addition of ‘kick start’ policies
for those regions, however, is projected to reduce those cost increases
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considerably, as it would incentivise the diffusion of more efficient
alternative technologies.
4.4.4 Dynamics in an exemplary decarbonisation scenario
We here analyse the dynamics of decarbonising residential heating, fo-
cusing on scenario i. The cost dynamics underlying the technology
transition are illustrated in Figure 4.6, and the resulting impacts on
technological change in Figure 4.7, under different assumption regard-
ing household behaviour.
The left panel of Figure 4.6 shows global averages for the generalised
cost per technology as seen by households, including policies and ‘in-
tangibles’. Without new policies and at current prices, heat pumps
are not yet competitive with gas heating, but on par with oil. Solar
thermal is already competitive on average, which mainly reflects low
costs in China, where 66% of the global capacity was installed in 2014.
Biomass is competitive with fossil fuels in most world regions, but up-
take is often less influenced by prices than by households’ preferences,
which tend to regard biomass as less convenient. When introducing
new policies in 2020, the carbon tax increases the cost of fossil fuel
heating, while subsidies decrease the cost of renewables, making them
competitive with gas. The gradual phase-out of subsidies after 2030
is largely compensated by learning-induced decreases in investment
costs, keeping levelised costs of renewables relatively stable until 2050.
Induced by large capacity increases, investment costs for solar thermal
and ground-source heat pumps are projected to decrease by -20% and
-45% until 2030 (relative to 2014), respectively, with further reductions
until 2050 (overall -30% and -66%, respectively). For comparison: the
IEA (2016b) expects the costs of solar thermal to decrease by around
-40% until 2030.
The right panel shows the marginal running costs of fossil fuel heating,
compared to full payback costs for renewable technologies (assuming a
payback period of three years). Choice experiments on the behavioural
decision-making of households indicate that as long as the former do
not exceed the latter, households would not consider a premature re-
placement, even if it would be highly profitable from an outside per-
spective (Newell and Siikama¨ki, 2015; Olsthoorn et al., 2017). The com-
bined effect of the 50-200 e/tCO2 fuel and 50% subsidy on renewables
is just large enough (despite translating into much larger differences
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Figure 4.5: Changes in expenses on residential heating (in %) per world re-
gion, for exemplary policy scenarios (aiming at uptake of low-carbon tech-
nologies), relative to scenario c (improved insulation and retrofitting, without
technology policies). Monetary values show the cumulative global changes
in each panel (in constant 2015-Euros), summed over 2020-2050.
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Figure 4.6: Technology cost dynamics in case of decarbonisation policy sce-
nario i. Left: generalised cost of heating per technology, incl. policies, which
are the basis of regular replacement decisions by households. Right: marginal
running costs of fossil fuel systems compared to payback based costs of re-
newables (for a three-year payback period), the comparison of which forms
the basis for modelled scrapping decisions.
in levelised costs): after 2020, the fuel savings from replacing an oil or
gas system by renewables increasingly exceeds the necessary invest-
ment in less than three years, potentially incentivizing the scrapping
of fossil fuel capacities before they reach the end of their rated techno-
logical lifetime.
The resulting dynamics in technological change can be seen in Figure
4.7, which shows projections for the total global heating capacity, ca-
pacity built per year, and capacity scrapped per year, under different
behavioural assumptions. Under the modelled mean payback thresh-
old of 3 years (middle panels), scrapping happens rarely before 2020:
less than 20 GW (0,3%) of the global capacity would be replaced prema-
turely each year, while total capacity additions are around 400 GW/y
(6,6%). After 2020, scrapping would gradually increase, peaking at 115
GW/y (around 1,8%) in the 2030s. While small on an annual basis,
the model suggests that households would scrap a total capacity of
2.700 GW from 2020-50, which is around 45% of the installed capacity
in 2020. The induced dynamics are self-reinforcing, allowing a faster
growth of households’ experience and industry know-how regarding
renewable heating technologies, and eventually an almost complete
phase-out of fossil fuel systems by 2050.
The importance of household behaviour and related uncertainty
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becomes evident in comparison with the upper and lower panels of
Figure 4.7, which depict the same dynamics for hypothetical mean
payback thresholds of 15 years and 1 year. Applying a threshold of
15 years is equivalent to a discount rate of 3% (given a technical life
expectancy of 20 years), implying the optimistic assumption that
household decisions take into account potential future savings to
almost full extent. If households were indeed acting in that way, the
model suggests that they should scrap around 130 GW/y (2,4%)
even before policies get introduced in 2020, and up to 200 GW/y
(3,6%) immediately afterwards. Households would also favour more
capital-intensive technologies, as evidenced by the rapid uptake of
solar thermal and ground-source heat pumps. In a world of such
forward-looking households, heating could be largely decarbonised
by 2035, around 15 years earlier than in scenario i.
The opposite result is projected if households were to apply an average
payback threshold of 1 year. In this case, they would only replace their
heating system once expected savings exceed the upfront cost within
one year. Scrapping would then be virtually non-existent before 2020
(8 GW/y), and not exceed 50 GW/y (0,8%) in the 2030s. While renew-
ables could still grow to service additional demand (such as in China),
the decarbonisation of the existing building stock would largely de-
pend on regular replacements. Given average technical lifetime of 20
years and the implemented model assumptions on diffusion dynamics
(in which growth is correlated to current market shares), our projec-
tions suggest that a complete transition is then not achievable until
2050, at least not under the simulated policies: fossil fuel capacities in
2050 would remain at 40% of their current level.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Our results suggest that an almost-complete decarbonisation of resi-
dential heating is possible until 2050, based on a combination of im-
proved building insulation and existing technologies, but unlikely to
happen without stringent policy instruments. We find that a carbon tax
on its own could drive an initial decarbonisation (up to -84% by 2050),
but shows a decreasing marginal impact on total emission reductions.
A more ambitious decarbonisation (up to -90%) at lower tax rates can
be achieved when the carbon tax is supplemented by subsidies and
procurement policies for renewables. Such policy mixes are projected
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to be more effective for driving the market of low-carbon technologies,
resulting in lower cumulative net emissions and reduced cost burdens
for households, compared to a carbon tax on its own. From a societal
perspective, emission reductions may be achieved at low or even neg-
ative cost: initially higher capital expenses could lead to permanently
decreased energy expenses in most world regions.
The simulated technology transitions in residential heating would
need decades rather than years, in parts simply due to long
average lifetimes of heating equipment. Given such time-scales, our
model projections suggest that a complete decarbonisation until
2050 does not only require an immediate ramp-up of low-carbon
investments, but also that households replace (or ‘scrap’) a substantial
share of inefficient heating systems prematurely. Therefore, the
simulated effectiveness of policies inevitably depends on behavioural
assumptions on ‘scrapping’ decisions. Overall, there remains a
considerable degree of uncertainty regarding behaviour, data and
the future development of technology characteristics, under which
the true long-term effect of any policy is hard to estimate a priori.
Representing all relevant behavioural factors in a quantitative global
energy model may remain an unachievable benchmark, given that
no model can ever be more than a stylised representation of reality.
We thus chose a midway compromise, integrating in a stylised
form available knowledge on technology diffusion and household
decision-making into a bottom-up simulation model of technology
choice. While it remains limited in its degree of realism, we argue that
it provides a clear improvement on incumbent optimisation models,
shedding light on important diffusion dynamics and behavioural
uncertainties.
Our results show that such uncertainties are particularly relevant in
the context of limiting global warming to 1.5°C, which requires poli-
cies aiming at rapid deep decarbonisation, and are outside of what has
so far been implemented in most parts of the world. Due to our inclu-
sion of behavioural features, however, our projections are potentially
more valuable to policy-makers for carrying out impact assessments of
possible sets of policies, in comparison to standard optimization mod-
els that assume perfect information and rationality. Due to their use of
unrealistic behavioural assumptions, the latter could potentially mis-
lead policy-makers towards excessively simplistic policy strategies for
incentivising the decarbonisation of households.
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Other aspects of household decision-making are likely relevant, but
still remain unspecified in our modelling - such as split incentives (e.g.
in case of rented property), or a limited access to finance (which is one
possible reason explaining low required payback times). The value
of ‘intangibles’, which we estimate from historical diffusion trends,
are not necessarily constant over decades, but may change over time.
Some behavioural uncertainties remain impossible to simulate, so that
our results may still be considered as optimistic.
While our modelling achieves the target with our set of assumed be-
havioural features, it can only indicate the potential of behaviourally-
oriented policies. Much remains unknown on how to specifically de-
sign and implement such policies, which must take into account as
much additional behavioural knowledge as possible, and can benefit
substantially from psychological and sociological research. While the
evidence base remains relatively thin, there is little time to spare, and
therefore further research in the direction of behavioural science and
modelling will need to be carried out in conjunction to the introduc-
tion of policies.
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Chapter 5. Modelling loss aversion by consumers
Abstract
Reliable decarbonisation policies can only be developed with a
thorough understanding of how consumers choose between energy
technologies. Current energy models assume optimal consumer de-
cisions which may result in expectations of the effectiveness of cli-
mate policies that are far too optimistic. Prospect Theory, on the
other hand, aims to model real-life choices, based on empirical ob-
servations that losses have a relatively larger influence on decisions
than gains, relative to a reference point. Here, we show for the first
time how loss aversion can be included into a global energy model,
using heating technology uptake as a case study. We find that ignor-
ing the implications of loss aversion overestimates the global mar-
ket uptake of renewables. As a consequence, loss aversion results
in higher projected CO2 emissions by households, and the need for
much stronger policy instruments for achieving decarbonisation tar-
gets. In the case of residential heating, a carbon tax of 200 e/tCO2
is projected to reduce overall emission levels to a similar extent than
a carbon tax of 100 e/tCO2 without the consideration of loss aver-
sion. Even for similar degrees of decarbonisation, accounting for
loss aversion implies substantial changes in the underlying technol-
ogy composition: technology choices become subject to a ‘conserva-
tive shift’ towards low-carbon technologies which are relatively less
efficient, but already more established in local markets.
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5.1 Introduction
The Paris Agreement aims at limiting global warming to well below
2°C, which requires a rapid decarbonisation of the energy system
worldwide (Rogelj et al., 2018a). Decarbonisation scenarios and
policies aimed at the uptake of low-carbon technologies are usually
analysed by means of energy models, either on their own or as part of
larger ensembles (e.g., integrated assessment models) (Clarke et al.,
2014). At their core, they describe how the technology composition of
the energy system might change over time, and project the resulting
influence on energy use and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
Large-scale energy models are typically based on optimisation algo-
rithms, which aim at identifying feasible pathways at the lowest over-
all system cost (given the specified constraints, such as a carbon bud-
get) (Kriegler et al., 2015). Underlying such algorithms are the as-
sumptions of rational decision-making, in form of cost minimisation or
utility maximisation, at the whole system level (Pettifor et al., 2017a).
Such a method is arguably useful in a normative frame, as it enables
to identify desirable and feasible system configurations. However, in
a positive descriptive sense, it implies a view in which energy tech-
nologies are solely rationally chosen based on cost and performance
characteristics by a social planner or representative agent, which is not
how society works. In reality, technological change depends on the
uncoordinated decisions of millions of people, who act according to
their different individual needs and perceptions, and different types of
biases compared to the normative frame (Mercure et al., 2016a).
In particular, behavioural research shows, with substantial amounts of
empirics, that human decision-making systematically deviates from
the rational choice assumptions as defined by classical economics
(Henrich et al., 2001; Kahneman, 2003; Simon, 1955; Thaler, 1980).
This implies that the real-world impacts of decarbonisation policies
on technology choices could be very different from what would
be expected based on rational decision-making (Gillingham and
Palmer, 2014; Knobloch and Mercure, 2016; Shogren and Taylor, 2008).
Where this matters most is in policy-making: how to ensure that
technological change policy is successful, and that emissions targets
are met? This is particularly relevant for policies aimed at energy
end-use sectors, such as road transport or residential heating, where
most decisions are made by consumers, whose behaviour is furthest
from classical rational choice theory (Grubb, Hourcade, and Neuhoff,
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2014). One of the key questions to be solved is how a more realistic
representation of human behaviour in large-scale quantitative energy
models can be achieved, to better inform a roll-out of successful GHG
emission mitigation policies (Kolstad et al., 2014; Li, 2017; Rai and
Henry, 2016; Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 2007).
A well-established alternative to the prevalent assumptions of rational
choice theory is Prospect Theory, which offers an empirically validated
framework for describing how individuals make decisions in reality,
independently of normative considerations of optimality (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, 1992). For choices
between consumption goods, the central element of Prospect Theory
is loss aversion, which describes the observation that losses have a rel-
atively larger impact on observed decisions than gains, relative to a
subjective reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1991, 1992). On average, the impact of losses is found to be
around twice as strong, compared to equally seized gains (Neumann
and Bo¨ckenholt, 2014). Following the classical experiments on loss
aversion in product choice by Knetsch (1989) and Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler (1990), this behavioural pattern was reported for consumer
choices ranging from eggs (Putler, 1992) to real estate (Genesove and
Mayer, 2001).
Loss aversion has not only been observed in human adults, but also
for children (Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund, 2001), and even for
capuchin monkeys (Chen, Lakshminarayanan, and Santos, 2006; Lak-
shminaryanan, Chen, and Santos, 2008). Given its pervasiveness, this
suggests that loss aversion might be an evolutionarily evolved cogni-
tive strategy, and hence part of our neurological inheritance. Indeed,
Tom et al. (2007) described that the measured activity in involved brain
regions is more sensitive to losses than to gains. One potential expla-
nation is an evolutionary adaption to survival-related challenges, re-
sulting in an increased sensitivity to negative emotions such as fear
and anxiety, and hence a bias against losses (Griskevicius and Kenrick,
2013; Tom et al., 2007). This points towards an evolutionarily hard-
wired property of human behaviour, with critical importance for the
effective design of energy and climate policies (Gillingham, Newell,
and Palmer, 2009; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014).
In the domain of energy, choice experiments in the USA and eight
European countries indicate that loss-averse decision-makers are less
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likely to buy energy efficient technologies, such as alternative fuel ve-
hicles and energy-efficient light bulbs (Heutel, 2017; Schleich et al.,
2018). The reason is that higher upfront costs are often evaluated as
losses, which therefore have a relatively stronger impact on decisions
than future energy savings (which are evaluated as gains). Similar ef-
fects of loss aversion on consumer preferences are reported for time-
of-use electricity tariffs (Mahmoodi et al., 2018; Nicolson, Huebner,
and Shipworth, 2017), gasoline demand (Wadud, 2017), cars (Greene,
Evans, and Hiestand, 2013), and renewables (Kim, Park, and Lee, 2018;
Klein and Deissenroth, 2017). Closest to our work, Safarzyn´ska and
van den Bergh (2018) included loss aversion into a regression-based
model of passenger car uptake in Germany, and showed that loss-
averse consumers buy on average less fuel-efficient cars than rational
agents. Knobloch and Mercure (2016) suggested how loss aversion
could be integrated into a basic choice model for energy technology
uptake, and that this can predict more accurately observed energy ef-
ficiency investments by firms.
Still, despite the overwhelming empirical evidence, loss aversion has
not yet been considered in any global energy model. Here, we show
how loss aversion can be included into a simulation model of heating
technology uptake at the global scale, and analyse to which extent it
influences model projections of technological change and the effective-
ness of climate policies. We thereby contribute to the ongoing discus-
sion on how to increase the behavioural realism of global energy and
integrated assessment models (Edelenbosch et al., 2018; McCollum et
al., 2017; McCollum et al., 2018; Pettifor et al., 2017b), which has so far
neglected the possible influence of loss aversion.
5.2 Methods
5.2.1 Loss aversion as part of Prospect Theory
The concept of loss aversion originates in the seminal work by Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979). Their research presents empirical evidence
for systematic violations of classical utility theory in decision-making
of people, and proposes Prospect Theory as a descriptive framework
which is consistent with such observations (for a comprehensive re-
view, see Barberis, 2013). As a positive theory of choice, it aims at
describing how people actually behave (as observed empirically). This
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Figure 5.1: Reference-dependence and loss aversion in product choice. (a)
In a riskless choice between two consumption goods (options X and Y), losses
and gains correspond to differences in their individual attributes (dimensions
1 and 2), relative to the reference point. Switching from optionX to Y implies
a loss in dimension 1 (−∆d, shown in red), and a parallel gain in dimension
2 (+∆d, shown in green). (b) Losses and gains are evaluated according to the
empirically derived Prospect Theory value function. In case of loss aversion,
losses are assigned a larger subjective decision value than gains. Even if both
are equal in absolute objective magnitude (e.g., monetary value), switching
to the alternative option would thus be perceived as unattractive.
theory contrasts with the standard normative nature of utility and ra-
tional choice theory, which describe how people ought to behave, if
they were acting according to a set of pre-defined theoretical axioms
(constituting the ‘economic man’ of economic analysis) (Mas-Colell,
Whinston, and Green, 1995).
While the initial formulation of Prospect Theory focused on describing
risky choices between probabilistic payoffs (such as playing the lottery)
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the framework was soon extended to
choices between consumption goods which differ in attributes (Thaler,
1980; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Centrally, such choices are found
to be reference-dependent and subject to loss aversion, relative to the
decision-maker’s subjective reference point.
Reference dependence reflects experimental evidence that people do not
derive utility from absolute levels of wealth or pleasure (as in classical
utility theory), but from changes relative to a reference point (usually
the status quo). As illustrated in Figure 5.1 , positive changes are eval-
uated as gains, and negative changes as losses. The fundamental rea-
soning behind reference dependence is derived from the psychology
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of sensual perceptions (such as seeing or feeling), which are more sen-
sitive towards changes in the external environment (such as in bright-
ness or temperature) than towards their absolute levels (Kahneman,
2003). For example, most people can only identify relative differences
in sound frequencies, and are unable to name absolute sound frequen-
cies without external reference (Levitin and Rogers, 2005).
Loss aversion describes the empirical observation that peoples’ choices
are more sensitive to losses than to gains, relative to their subjective
reference points. Even when both are of the same absolute magnitude
(e.g., in monetary terms), they are perceived and valued differently
in the process of subjective decision-making. In early experiments,
it was estimated that the relative impact of losses on choices is 2.25
times stronger, which is taken as an empirical measure of the degree
of loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In an experiment on
car choice, Gaechter, Johnson, and Herrmann (2007) estimate that 88%
of participants are loss-averse, with an interquartile range for the loss
aversion coefficient of 1.3–3.0.
Due to reference-dependent loss aversion, a move away from the
reference point towards an alternative is perceived as relatively
unattractive, even if gains are two times larger in objective magnitude
than losses. As a result, people perceive deviations from their current
situation as less attractive than what rational choice theory would
imply, and therefore show stronger than expected preferences for
the status quo and their current entitlements — referred to as ‘status
quo bias’ and ‘endowment effect’ (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988;
Thaler, 1980). Importantly, the asymmetric effect of loss aversion is
conceptually different from behavioural time preferences (discount
rates), which may lead to a systematic undervaluation of future cost
savings: discount rates are applied to all losses and gains, irrespective
of any reference point.1
1Although loss aversion and discounting are conceptually different, they can thus
lead to similar patterns in empirical data on decision-making, such as the typ-
ically observed relatively larger impact of upfront costs on energy technology
choices. When loss aversion is not considered, empirically estimated discount
rates are therefore likely to be biased upwards, as they also capture the (reference-
dependent) effect of loss aversion. Disentangling empirical estimates of time pref-
erences/discount rates from the influence of loss aversion is possible, but requires
richer datasets (for an example, see Schleich et al., 2018).
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5.2.2 Modelling loss aversion in heating technology choice
The starting point of our work is the generalised reference-dependent
model of consumer choice by Tversky and Kahneman (1991), which we
adapt to energy technology choices by consumers. Conceptually, our
model considers a choice between two technology options (i and j) that
differ on two or more valued dimensions (d) (see Figure 5.1a). When
comparing technologies i and j, we denote the implied difference on
each dimension relative to the reference point as ∆dx,i→j = dx,j − dx,i,
where x is the dimension, i the reference point and j the alternative op-
tion. Each difference is evaluated as a loss or gain (i.e., as a relative dis-
advantage or advantage), relative to the reference point. The value of
each loss or gain, v(∆dx,i→j), is determined by a two-part value func-
tion of the form
v(∆dx,i→j) =
{
∆dx,i→j if ∆dx,i→j ≥ 0
∆dx,i→j ∗ λ if ∆dx,i→j < 0 (5.1)
where λ is the coefficient of loss aversion. We denote the overall eval-
uation of choice option j from reference point i as v(i → j), which
equals the sum of evaluated differences over all dimensions x (such as
upfront costs and energy costs):
v(i→ j) =
∑
x
v(∆dx,i→j) (5.2)
For λ = 1, the model yields the classical rational choice model of eco-
nomic theory. For λ > 1, however, the evaluation of choice options
becomes asymmetric: due to loss aversion, any difference on a dimen-
sion has a greater impact on choices when it is evaluated as a loss,
and a shift in the reference point can lead to a reversal of preferences
(as losses can turn into gains). For the loss aversion specification of
the model, we use a default parameterisation of λ = 2.25 (based on
the original experiments by Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), and anal-
yse the sensitivity of results for a range of λ between 1–3 (based on
Gaechter, Johnson, and Herrmann, 2007).
As an example, suppose that a person needs to replace a heating sys-
tem, and that preferences for this choice are determined by two dimen-
sions (d1 and d2): upfront capital cost (i.e., the purchase price and even-
tual installation costs), and the (discounted) total operating costs dur-
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ing a technology’s lifetime.2 Without loss aversion (λ = 1), choices are
straightforward: When one technology has lower total costs, it should
be strictly preferred. When total costs of both technology options are
identical, any objective decision-maker should be indifferent between
both options. Preferences should not depend on the technology which
is being replaced.
With loss aversion (λ > 1), preferences depend on the decision-
maker’s subjective reference point, which is potentially ambiguous
(and remains uninterpreted in Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). We
adopt here the interpretation of the current endowment hypothesis,
which intuitively assumes that an individual’s reference point is
their currently owned bundle of goods (Starmer et al., 2004), so
the currently owned technology in our specific case. Due to loss
aversion, relative disadvantages of an option (losses) now loom larger
than relative advantages (gains). This suggests a relatively stronger
preference for the status quo technology, compared to preferences
without loss aversion — even if both technologies are identical
in overall costs. It is sufficient if they differ in their underlying
dimensions.
Technology adoption within a larger population depends on the dis-
tributed decisions of heterogenous people, who act in different con-
texts and can have different perceptions of the available options. Sim-
ilarly, technologies and their cost dimensions are subject to variation.
For example, when considering the choice between a gas-fired heat-
ing system and an electric heat pump, both technology options exist
in various different configurations, and may have different cost char-
acteristics in different contexts (such as different climatic or building
conditions). For representing such diversity, we extend the model to
the case of a heterogenous population, making technology choices over
time (based on Knobloch and Mercure, 2016; Knobloch et al., 2019b).
Within each simulation period t, we calculate the fraction of the pop-
ulation which would prefer technology j over technology i. This frac-
tion is denoted as Fi→j,t, and equals
2Note that it remains debated in the literature whether loss aversion applies to price
and quality dimensions in the same way (Starmer et al., 2004). For the case of
product choices, a review by Neumann and Bo¨ckenholt (2014) finds no evidence
that consumers show lower loss aversion for price dimensions, relative to quality
dimensions (based on a meta-analysis of 109 effect observations).
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Fi→j,t = Si,t−1 ∗ P [vt(i→ j) > 0]. (5.3)
Si,t−1 is the market share of technology i in the previous period, which
is taken as a proxy for the share of the population for which technology
i is their current reference point. P [vt(i→ j) > 0] is the probability that
switching from technology i to j is seen as attractive in the current pe-
riod, based on the distributions of evaluated differences in technology
dimensions.
5.2.3 Modelling heating technology choices at the global scale
As a case study, we proceed by implementing the reference-dependent
model of technology choice into a bottom-up model of technology dif-
fusion in the residential heating sector, FTT:Heat (for a full model de-
scription and further details, see Knobloch et al., 2017, 2019b). The
sector is well-suited for studying the impact of loss aversion on tech-
nology uptake: Decisions are (overwhelmingly) made by consumers,
but not predominantly influenced by other interfering cultural factors
(such as status consideration in mobility) (Kastner and Stern, 2015;
Michelsen and Madlener, 2012).3 At the same time, together with pas-
senger road transport, the sector accounts for the largest share of direct
GHG emissions by households (IEA, 2017a).
FTT:Heat simulates the uptake and replacement of 13 different heat-
ing technologies in 59 world regions covering the globe, up until 2050,
from a bottom-up perspective: under given behavioural assumptions,
which technologies would households prefer, and how fast can new
technologies grow within the market? As part of the integrated as-
sessment model E3ME-FTT-GENIE, it is linked to models of the power
sector, wider economy and climate (Mercure et al., 2018a,c).
Technology choices in FTT:Heat are determined by a pairwise compar-
ison of all available technology options, based on distributed costs pa-
rameters. Formally, pairwise comparisons take the form of binary log-
its in which the relative frequency of choices happening is weighted by
their existing level of popularity, which generates S-shaped evolution-
ary diffusion curves endogenously (Mercure, 2015, 2018). In the origi-
nal model specification, these options are compared to each other with-
3This is not supposed to imply that technology choices in residential heating are
unrelated to social or cultural factors.
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out consideration of a reference point, simply be evaluating symmetric
cost distributions. For the inclusion of loss aversion, we have replaced
this original decision-making core with the reference-dependent model
from section 5.2.2, extending it to 13 choice options which are com-
pared to each other on three dimensions. If the coefficient of loss-
aversion is set to 1, the new decision-making core yields the same re-
sults as its original version, in which the comparison of considered
options remains tied to the assumptions of (bounded) rationality. This
allows an easy comparison of model results under alternative assump-
tions on decision-making.
First, in each simulation step (set to 1/4 year) and for each region, the
model estimates the distributions of evaluated losses and gains from
technology switching, v(∆dx,i→j), for any possible pair of heating tech-
nologies, by means of a Monte Carlo simulation.4 Losses and gains
can result from three dimensions: upfront investment costs, operating
costs (energy costs plus maintenance-repair costs), and an empirically
calibrated ‘intangible’ cost component. The latter represents technol-
ogy characteristics which are valued by households (such as conve-
nience or co-benefits), but not captured by the engineering-based cost
data. As a representation of heterogeneity, investment and operating
costs are distributed around their mean values (for the detailed data,
see Knobloch et al., 2017, 2019b). All cost values are normalised to the
generation of one unit of useful heat, and future operating costs are dis-
counted (by a rate of 9%, based on Jaccard and Dennis, 2006). Upfront
investment costs are subject to endogenous future cost decreases, as a
function of each technology’s cumulatively installed capacity (‘learn-
ing by doing’, with cost reductions between 10-30% for every addi-
tional doubling of the cumulative capacity, based on Weiss et al., 2010),
which makes the model highly path-dependent.
Second, choice preferences Fi→j,t are estimated for each possible com-
bination of technologies, based on formula 5.3 and the distributions
of evaluated losses and gains. The distribution of reference points is
taken to be the market shares of technologies in the previous period
(Si,t−1), in each respective region.
4Due to the asymmetric nature of reference-dependent loss aversion, the sampling of
choice distributions by means of numerical Monte Carlo simulations is conceptu-
ally more straightforward than to find an analytical representation of probability
distributions.
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Third, we derive the substitution of market shares from heating tech-
nology i to j in period ∆t, as:
∆Si→j = Fi→j,tτ−1i Si,t−1Sj,t−1∆t (5.4)
τi is the average expected lifetime of technology i. Combined with the
market share of i in the previous period (Si,t−1), it is used to approxi-
mate the fraction of technology i which needs to be replaced. The rate
of substitutions is dynamically constrained by technology j’s market
share in the previous period, as a stylised representation of limited pro-
duction capacities on part of industry and limited information on part
of households (Mercure, 2012, 2015). In addition, it is assumed that
households do not switch back to technologies with a much lower com-
fort level, i.e. that households with modern heating systems (such as
district heat, gas, electricity) do not choose coal or traditional biomass
(following Kranzl et al., 2013).
Since preferences are diverse, we calculate substitutions in both direc-
tions, to determine the net substitution from technology i to technol-
ogy j. The sum of all such pair-wise comparisons over all technologies
yields the cumulative net change in market shares of technology j:
∆Sj,t =
∑
i
Si,t−1Sj,t−1
(
Fi→jτ−1i − Fj→iτ−1j
)
∆t (5.5)
Formula 5.5 is the non-linear dynamic shares equation, conceptually
similar to the modelling of imitation dynamics in evolutionary game
theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998).
In addition to regular end-of-lifetime replacements, households have
the option to replace their existing functioning heating system prema-
turely. Based on economic considerations, this can be beneficial if the
marginal running costs of operating the current system exceed the full
costs of buying and operating an alternative technology. It is known
that empirically, households only consider such a premature replace-
ment if the potential savings exceed the initial investment in a limited
period of time, usually around three years (Olsthoorn et al., 2017). The
original model specification of FTT:Heat is therefore based on such a
behavioural payback threshold, as an approximation of observed real-
world choices. However, such behaviour may at least partly be at-
tributable to loss aversion. Therefore, here we assume that households
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apply the same type of rationality as for regular replacements, and
apply the same discount rate (assuming a rate of 9%, the equivalent
payback threshold is around 9 years). This means that the inclusion
of loss aversion makes the model representation of premature replace-
ments simpler (compared to the original specification), as a separate
behavioural payback threshold is not needed any longer.
5.2.4 Policy scenarios
For demonstrating the modified version of FTT:Heat and the relevance
of loss aversion, we simulate as an example a current trends scenario
and four policy scenarios, all aiming at a decarbonisation of residential
heating (based on previous work, see Knobloch et al., 2019b):
• Scenario a projects the current technological trajectory into the fu-
ture. It implicitly considers existing policies (the impact of which
on technology preferences is implicitly captured by the ‘intangi-
ble’ cost components, which were empirically derived from re-
cent diffusion data), but does not introduce new policies.
• Scenarios b and c simulate a residential carbon tax of 100 e/tCO2
and 200 e/tCO2, respectively, which is added to the household
price of fossil fuels from 2020 onwards.
• Scenario d simulates a technology subsidy of 50%, which is paid
on the upfront investment costs of heat pumps, solar thermal and
modern biomass systems from 2020 onwards.
• Scenario e simulates the combined effect of the 100 e/tCO2 car-
bon tax and the technology subsidy.
In the ‘current technological trajectory’ and all policy scenarios, we as-
sume a parallel decarbonisation of the power sector which is consis-
tent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C, as described in Knobloch
et al. (2019b) and Holden et al. (2018). This reduces the projected indi-
rect emissions of heating with electricity-based technologies, indepen-
dently of any developments in the residential heating sector.
When a carbon tax is introduced, the tax increases the energy costs of
fossil fuel technologies. According on local energy prices, the policy
is designed to make renewables competitive in terms of overall costs.
However, parity in total costs does not change the fact that both tech-
nology groups can have reversed cost dimensions: while the carbon
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tax further increases the relative advantage of low-carbon technolo-
gies in terms of operating costs, the policy does not reduce their rel-
ative disadvantage in terms of higher upfront investment costs. Be-
cause losses loom larger than gains for loss-averse decision-makers,
a relatively stronger change in relative energy costs should be neces-
sary for obtaining the same effect on technology uptake as it would
be projected without loss aversion. If the coefficient of loss aversion
is around two (as in our assumptions), it should therefore be expected
that the carbon tax under loss aversion would need to be around twice
as high, for obtaining the same impact on technology diffusion as un-
der rational decision-making without loss aversion. For the same rea-
son, upfront subsidies should be relatively more effective in impacting
technology choices than a carbon tax: a carbon tax increases the size
of relative gains from switching to renewables (in form of energy cost
reductions), while the subsidy reduces the size of relative losses, which
are valued by the loss aversion coefficient.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Simulation results at the global level
Figure 5.2 shows the projected global heat generation by technology
type and resulting CO2 emissions (direct emissions plus indirect
emissions from electricity generation) for scenarios a-e, with and
without loss aversion. The corresponding differences in technology
market shares can be seen in Figure 5.3, for 2015 (the start of the
simulation) and 2050. Figure 5.4 shows these differences for a range
of loss aversion coefficients, in comparison to the effect of different
discount rates.
In all scenarios, the projected diffusion of renewable and highly
efficient heating technologies (solar thermal, modern biomass
and heat pumps; renewables from hereon) is much faster under
decision-making without accounting for loss aversion, compared
to the model specification with loss aversion. At the start of the
simulation in 2015, renewables have a global market share of 9%.
Until 2050, under the current technological trajectory without
additional policies, this share is projected to autonomously increase
to 39% without loss aversion (for details, see Knobloch et al., 2019b),
but this declines to 22% when loss aversion is included. In other
words, not considering loss aversion in the behavioural assumptions
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Figure 5.2: Global heat generation by technology and resulting CO2 emis-
sions. Direct and indirect CO2 emissions (from electricity generation) from
2005-2050, under the current technological trajectory (a) and in three policy
scenarios (b-e), as simulated by FTT:Heat. Panels on the left show the simu-
lation results for decision-making which is subject to loss aversion, panels on
the right for decision-making without loss aversion. Vertical lines indicate the
start of the model simulation in 2015. Percentage values refer to the change in
total CO2 emissions in 2050, relative to their level in 2015 (values in brackets
refer to direct CO2 emissions only). In the right panels, dashed lines indicate
the level of CO2 emissions as simulated under loss aversion.
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Figure 5.3: Projected differences in global market shares of heating tech-
nologies. Stacked bars show the differences in market shares (measured in
percentage points, p.p.) that would result from loss aversion in the model, rel-
ative to the model specification without loss aversion. Differences are shown
for 2030 and 2050, under the current technological trajectory (a) and in four
policy scenarios (b-e).
overestimates the baseline uptake of renewables by around 80% on
the global level.
In both model specifications, the carbon tax and the subsidy are pro-
jected to increase the uptake of renewables, relative to current trends.
However, not considering loss aversion in the model overestimates the
policy impact considerably: projected global market shares of renew-
ables in 2050 are around 6-18 percentage points higher, compared to
the model specification with loss aversion (see Figure 5.3). Consistent
with our expectations, differences in the projected uptake of renew-
ables are smaller for more stringent policy scenarios. While the model
specification without loss aversion would project a 56% larger diffu-
sion of renewables for a carbon tax of 100 e/tCO2, the relative gap
is reduced to 33% for a carbon tax of 200 e/tCO2, and to 21% for an
upfront subsidy for renewables. This suggests that subsidies are in-
deed a more effective way for bridging the gap between the technol-
ogy compositions with and without loss aversion (see Figure 5.3). In
case of very strong policy incentives, the resulting cost differences be-
tween technologies become so large that they eventually start to dom-
inate the influence of loss aversion on choices, and households prefer
the cheapest option despite their bias towards status-quo technologies.
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When the carbon tax is combined with upfront subsidies, for example,
the relative gap between the projected market shares of renewables in
both model specifications is reduced to 12%.
The projected differences in technology uptake directly impact levels
of CO2 emissions by residential heating (see Figure 5.2). Under current
trends, including decarbonisation of the power sector, annual emis-
sions are projected to decrease by 25% until 2050 when assuming loss
aversion in the decision-making, compared to 46% without loss aver-
sion. With loss aversion, a carbon tax of 200 e/tCO2 leads to simi-
lar reductions in total emission levels (-76%) than a carbon tax of 100
e/tCO2 without loss aversion (-74%). From that perspective, it ap-
pears indeed to be an approximately correct rule of thumb that in this
model, when the coefficient of loss aversion is around two, the same re-
ductions in overall emissions are obtained with policy incentives twice
as stringent. Similar as for the underlying trends of technology diffu-
sion, the difference between both model specifications decreases with
the stringency of the policy instruments. For example, the 200 e/tCO2
carbon tax leads to comparable reductions in total emission levels with
and without loss aversion (-76% and -77%, see Figure 5.2).5
Even when the resulting emission reductions are almost identical (like
in scenarios c and e), the underlying technology mix remains substan-
tially different in its composition, as different types of low-carbon tech-
nologies are preferred with and without the model representation of
loss aversion in the decision-making (see Figure 5.3). In case of the
200 e/tCO2 carbon tax, for example, both model specifications result
in very similar overall market shares of fossil fuel technologies in 2050.
However, even given a similar degree of decarbonisation, there remain
large differences in low-carbon technology market shares. With loss
aversion, there is a much larger reliance on low-carbon technologies
with larger market shares at the start of the simulation, such as tra-
ditional biomass, district heating, or direct electric heating. Without
loss aversion, in contrast, there is a relatively larger market penetra-
tion of relatively newer technologies such as heat pumps and solar,
which only have small market shares in 2015. As these technologies
also tend to be relatively more efficient, the model specification with-
out loss aversion underestimates global annual net expenses on heat-
5Note that beyond a certain level, the marginal impact of additional policy incen-
tives on technology diffusion is limited by the inertia of the technological system,
foremost the physical turnover rate of heating systems (which have an average
assumed technical lifetime of 20 years)
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Figure 5.4: Sensitivity of market shares in 2050 towards loss aversion and
discounting. Stacked bars show the differences in projected market shares for
2050 in the ‘current technological trajectory’ (measured in percentage points,
p.p.) that would result from different degrees of loss aversion (A), and differ-
ent discount rates (B). All differences are relative to the model specification
without loss aversion (λ = 1) and a discount rate of 9%.
ing (upfront plus running costs, excluding carbon tax payments) in
2050 by around 13% (in scenario c), compared to the projections with-
out loss aversion.
The projected changes in technology choices due to loss aversion are
substantially different from the changes that result from an adjustment
of the discount rate in the model, as can be seen in Figure 5.4. When
the discount rate is increased, the relative importance of future energy
costs decreases, which implies a shift of household choices towards
technologies with relatively lower upfront costs. Higher degrees of
loss aversion, on the other hand, imply a ‘conservative shift’ of house-
hold choices towards technologies with relatively larger market shares,
independently of the relative importance of upfront and future energy
costs. For example, increasing the loss aversion coefficient leads to
a higher market penetration of biomass and fossil-fuel based heating
systems (including oil and coal), at the expense of all types of low-
carbon technologies. Increasing the discount rate, on the other hand,
leads to a shift of market shares within the group of renewables, to-
wards relatively less capital-intensive low-carbon technologies (e.g.,
air-source heat pumps instead of solar thermal systems).
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5.3.2 Simulation results for selected countries
The effects of loss aversion on projected technology uptake is further
illustrated at the example of individual countries, as shown in Figure
5.5 for the cases of Germany, Ireland, Korea, Spain, and the USA. These
five countries were chosen to represent different historical technology
compositions in the residential heating sector, which allows to analyse
the influence of loss aversion under different regional contexts.
In Germany and the USA, the overall shares of fossil and renewable
technologies are more or less the same under both model specifica-
tions. Despite this, there remain substantial differences in terms of in-
dividual technology shares. Within the group of fossil technologies,
advanced (i.e., more efficient) variants of gas and oil boilers diffuse
faster without loss aversion. Similarly, within the group of renew-
able technologies, not considering loss aversion results in a larger pro-
jected uptake of (relatively more efficient) ground-source and (rela-
tively more expensive) air-water heat pumps, relative to the cheaper
variant of air-air heat pumps (and also larger shares of direct electric
heating).
Differences under the ‘current technological trajectory’ are more obvi-
ous in case of Ireland, Korea and Spain. In Ireland, coal keeps playing
an important role in the heating market until 2050 with loss aversion,
while it is largely replaced by advanced biomass systems without loss
aversion. Both in Ireland and Korea, renewables hardly see any growth
with loss aversion, but are projected to replace substantial capacities of
oil heating systems without loss aversion. In Spain, the market share
of solar thermal is projected to increase substantially in both model
specifications, but is more than twice as large without loss aversion.
Importantly, in all cases the model projections are almost identical to
each other at the beginning of the simulation: it is only over time that
the differences from loss aversion gain a visible impact, eventually ac-
cumulate and become path-dependent.
The pattern of differences between model specifications with and with-
out loss aversion persists when the effect of a carbon tax (100 e/tCO2)
is simulated. In both cases the policy increases the share of renew-
ables in all five countries, relative to the ‘current technological trajec-
tory’. However, as on the global level, the projected share of renew-
ables is larger in the model specification without loss aversion. Also,
the model projections differ substantially with regard to the degree of
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Figure 5.5: Simulated heat generation by technology in five exemplarily
chosen countries. Heat generation between 2005-2050, with and without con-
sideration of loss aversion in the model. Panels on the left show the simula-
tion results for the current technological trajectory, panels on the right for a
carbon tax of 100 e/tCO2. Vertical lines indicate the start of the model simu-
lation in 2015.
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decarbonisation, and the technology pathway that leads to this decar-
bonisation: In all five countries, market shares of fossil technologies
in 2050 are projected to be lower without loss aversion. Furthermore,
more efficient and capital-intensive variants of renewable technologies
tend to be chosen when loss aversion is not considered. The latter
is perhaps most striking in case of Spain, where the portfolio of re-
newables becomes dominated by (relatively cheap) air-air heat pumps
under decision-making with loss aversion, and by (relatively capital-
intensive) solar thermal installations without loss aversion.
5.4 Discussion
5.4.1 Impact of loss aversion on technology uptake
The different projections of technology uptake with and without loss
aversion can be traced back to the asymmetric valuation of losses and
gains under reference-dependent decision-making. Based on the tech-
nology assumptions in FTT:Heat, renewable heating technologies have
relatively higher upfront costs (compared to fossil fuel-based systems),
but also a relatively higher degree of energy efficiency. Prospect The-
ory suggests that due to loss aversion, the relative disadvantage (loss)
of higher upfront costs has a relatively stronger impact on decisions
than the advantage in energy costs (gain), when evaluated from the ref-
erence point of fossil-fuel technologies. Importantly, the effect of loss
aversion on choices is asymmetric, as the classification of gains and
losses always depends on the reference point. For example, switching
from a gas boiler to a heat pump is evaluated differently than switch-
ing from a heat pump to a gas boiler. Both situations imply different
perspectives on what is perceived as gains and losses, and hence dif-
ferent evaluations of technology switching.
The expected influence of loss aversion on technology uptake can be
interpreted as a manifestation of the ‘status quo’ (Samuelson and Zeck-
hauser, 1988): People tend to prefer technologies which are already
familiar to them, which increases the likelihood of choosing the ‘sta-
tus quo’ option – even if it should, rationally, result in higher overall
monetary costs from an engineering perspective. Accordingly, the pro-
jected trajectory of technology diffusion becomes subject to a ‘conser-
vative shift’, in which future technology choices are more dependent
on current market shares. This is reflected in the observation that tech-
nologies that have low market shares at the start of the simulation have
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a disadvantage, which happen to be the same technologies that have
higher upfront costs (low-carbon technologies are capital-intensive).
5.4.2 Implications for the design of policies
In the context of climate change mitigation, policy incentives such as
taxes and subsidies are typically meant to ensure that low-carbon tech-
nologies can financially compete with fossil-fuel technologies. How-
ever, loss aversion implies that competitiveness in overall costs is not
always sufficient for achieving a market diffusion of new technologies,
as perceived losses can have a relatively stronger impact on decisions.
This implies that policies may need to become much more stringent to
overcome the loss aversion effect, and that it may prove more effective
for policies to aim at reducing relative disadvantages (losses, such as
higher upfront costs via the payment of subsidies), than aiming at fur-
ther increasing relative advantages (gains, such as lower energy costs).
Furthermore, given the reported heterogeneity of loss version between
people, policies could in principle be designed differently for different
target groups, for example based on age or income (Heutel, 2017). This
was not simulated here, and requires further research.
From the perspective of economic welfare analysis, loss aversion im-
plies that technology choices of individual households can become in-
consistent with their own long-term preferences, which can justify pol-
icy intervention (Gillingham and Palmer, 2014). Ideally, interventions
should contribute to reduce the effect of loss aversion by providing
information to people how it influences their decision-making. How-
ever, given that it is likely a deeply-wired pattern in human behaviour,
it could be hard or even impossible to overcome on a fundamental cog-
nitive level (Griskevicius and Kenrick, 2013). Most likely, it is therefore
not possible to directly influence the degree of loss aversion of indi-
viduals. As an alternative, the design of information policies could
take into account the influence of loss aversion on decision-making.
For example, information campaigns could be framed in a way that
not investing in renewable technologies becomes perceived as a loss,
which households want to avoid. However, while this could be ef-
fective in theory, Nicolson, Huebner, and Shipworth (2017) report that
loss-framed messages were not effective in the case of choosing elec-
tricity tariffs.
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5.4.3 Implications for modelling
From the perspective of modelling, it is important to underline that
the influence of loss aversion does not simply correspond to an un-
dervaluation of future energy savings, as they would be captured by
(behaviourally estimated) time preferences or discount rates. In both
model specifications, discounting is applied to all gains and losses in
the exact same way, depending on the year in which they occur. In
contrast, loss aversion is only applied to subjectively perceived losses,
depending on the reference point. A representation of loss aversion by
an adjustment of cost attributes or discount rates would thus be inaccu-
rate: it would ignore the dependence of choices on the current technol-
ogy stock, and would instead lead to an overly simplistic preference-
shift towards less capital-intensive technologies (as illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.4).
Instead, loss aversion requires a different model representation of
decision-making — not only for our example of heating systems, but
potentially for all technology choices made by individuals (e.g., cars
or electric appliances). Ideally, such representations are not limited
to loss aversion, but could also include further empirical findings on
decision-making, behavioural biases and their possible interactions
(Shogren and Taylor, 2008 point out that 25 biases are relevant to
economic decision-making, which implies 125 possible interaction
effects between biases).
5.4.4 Limitations and uncertainties
Including loss aversion in models is a significant step forward in the
context of positive modelling methods to appraise possible policy
strategies. However, it remains unclear so far what causes loss
aversion on a fundamental cognitive level. While the estimated loss
aversion coefficient is around two on average, there is evidence for a
considerable variation between product types and individuals. For
example, relatively stronger loss aversion is found for durable product
categories (for a meta-analysis, see Neumann and Bo¨ckenholt, 2014).
Gaechter, Johnson, and Herrmann (2007) found that loss aversion
increases with an individual’s age, income and wealth, while higher
education decreases loss aversion. It therefore remains uncertain
what is the exact degree of loss aversion for the choice of different
types of energy technologies, to which extent it differs between
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different consumers and countries, and how it depends on the context
of decision-making. While we have assumed that loss aversion is
identical around the globe, further research could also account for
variations in loss aversion between countries and cultures (Henrich,
Heine, and Norenzayan, 2010; Henrich et al., 2001).
More generally, one has to be careful with the generalisation
of Prospect Theory to societal contexts that differ from those
under which experiments were made. In particular, although loss
aversion has been observed in a variety of contexts for individual
decision-making, it remains unclear to which extent it also applies
to groups of people, which is of interest for energy models and
policy-making. It is arguably an oversimplifying generalisation that
the group behaves like an individual, an assumption commonly made
in economics with the use of the representative agent (Kirman, 1992).
In reality, it is not clear that all agents evaluate choice options using
similar reasoning, and to which degree agents influence each other
(Douglas and Isherwood, 1979; Mercure, 2018). While agents may
exhibit loss aversion when facing choices individually, this effect
could be weaker or stronger in social contexts.
From an anthropological perspective, decision-making can be seen
under three different theoretical lenses (Wilk and Cliggett, 2007):
(1) the self-interested (utilitarian) model, used in microeconomics, in
which choices are directed by individual utility; (2) the social model in
which decisions are made by social groups, and (3) the moral model
in which agents make decisions according to beliefs, values, culture
and tradition. The loss aversion concept belongs to the utilitarian
paradigm, and makes no reference to group or cultural dynamics,
which could in principle be stronger than individual utilitarian biases.
Nevertheless, our results suggest clearly that despite omitting other
possible group-related dynamics or cultural influences, the ex-ante
evaluation of policy strategies could be much better informed if loss
aversion is included in policy analyses.
5.5 Conclusion
We started from the question how loss aversion can be included into a
global energy model, and to which extent it influences model projec-
tions of technological change and the effectiveness of climate policies.
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We find that the model representation of loss aversion is not only fea-
sible, but also relevant. Its consideration substantially reduces the pro-
jected uptake of renewable and energy-efficient technologies, as well
as the projected impact of market-based policy instruments.
On the level of individual decision-making, we have shown that loss
aversion leads to stronger preferences for technologies that are already
established in the market, and are therefore likely perceived as the sub-
jective reference points of individual consumers. When comparing two
technology options from a subjective reference point, loss aversion im-
plies that relative disadvantages (losses) have a larger impact on deci-
sions than relative advantages (gains). If consumers see higher upfront
investment costs as a loss and future energy savings as a gain, this re-
sults in a relatively lower valuation of renewable and energy-efficient
technologies. Even if they are seen as overall more attractive than fossil
fuel technologies from an outside engineering perspective, consumers
are more likely to stick with their current technology.
In our example of global heating technology uptake, not considering
loss aversion overestimates the market shares of renewables in 2050 by
up to 80% and underestimates future levels of residential CO2 emis-
sions by around 30%, compared to the improved model specification
with loss aversion. Accordingly, loss aversion implies the need for
much stronger policy instruments for achieving decarbonisation tar-
gets for residential heating: A carbon tax of 200 e/tCO2 is projected
to reduce overall emission levels to a similar extent than a carbon tax
of 100 e/tCO2 without the consideration of loss aversion. The differ-
ences are thus so large that the loss aversion effect influences outcome
as much as the policies, and policies may need to become around twice
as stringent to overcome the loss aversion effect.
In conclusion, our findings suggest that loss aversion has major impli-
cations for the modelling of energy technology uptake, as well as for
the planning and ex-ante evaluation of policies, and warrant substan-
tial further investigation.
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Abstract
Electrification of passenger road transport and household heating
features prominently in current and planned policy frameworks to
achieve emissions reduction targets. However, since electricity gen-
eration involves using fossil fuels, it is not definitely established
where and when electric cars and heat pumps can effectively re-
duce overall greenhouse gas emissions. Could electrification pol-
icy backfire by promoting their diffusion before electricity is decar-
bonised? Here, we analyse the detailed current and future region-
specific emissions trade-offs in 59 world regions with heterogeneous
households, by combining forward-looking simulations from an in-
tegrated assessment model with bottom-up life-cycle assessment.
We show that already under current carbon intensities of electricity
generation, existing electric cars and heat pumps are less emission-
intensive than fossil-fuel-based technologies in regions accounting
for 95% of global demand. Even if end-use electrification is not
matched by rapid future power sector decarbonisation, it almost cer-
tainly reduces emissions in almost all world regions.
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6.1 Introduction
Policy-makers widely consider electrification a key process for decar-
bonizing road transport and household heating which, combined, gen-
erate 24% of global fuel-combustion emissions and are the two ma-
jor sources of direct carbon emissions by households (Clarke et al.,
2014; de Coninck et al., 2018; IEA, 2017b; Kennedy, 2015; Rogelj et
al., 2018a). For passenger road transport, plug-in battery electric vehi-
cles (‘EVs’) are usually expected to gradually replace petrol and diesel
vehicles (‘petrol cars’). For heating, heat pumps (‘HPs’) could replace
gas, oil and coal heating systems (‘fossil boilers’). Recent policy exam-
ples aimed at such end-use electrification include announced bans of
petrol car sales, financial incentives for EV purchases, planned phase-
outs of gas heating, and the inclusion of HPs into the European Union’s
renewable heating targets (Council of the European Union, 2018; de
Coninck et al., 2018; IEA, 2017b,c; Ministry of Economic Affairs of the
Netherlands, 2017).
The use of EVs and HPs eliminates fossil fuel use and tailpipe/on-
site greenhouse gas emissions (‘emissions’), but causes emissions from
electricity generation. Emission intensities in the power sector widely
differ across the globe and will change over time (Clarke et al., 2014).
Additionally, producing and recycling EVs and HPs involves higher
emissions than producing petrol cars and fossil boilers, due to battery
production for EVs, and refrigerant liquid use for HPs (Cox et al., 2018;
Mattinen et al., 2014). The question thus arises as to where and when
the electrification of energy end-use could, under a failure to decar-
bonise electricity generation, increase overall emissions (Lesser, 2018;
McGee, 2017).
Multi-sectoral mitigation scenarios (such as those reviewed by the
IPCC) have identified electrification as a robust policy strategy,
but typically assume that it comes alongside rapid power sector
decarbonisation (Clarke et al., 2014; Rogelj et al., 2018a). However,
sector-specific policies and self-reinforcing social and industrial
dynamics could as well lead to real-world trajectories in which
end-use electrification and power sector decarbonisation take place at
completely different rates (Mercure et al., 2016a). In such a context,
could end-use electrification turn into a counterproductive policy
strategy for reducing emissions?
The answer requires a comprehensive and dynamic life-cycle assess-
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ment of all relevant production and use-phase emissions in different
world regions, of current technology in its full heterogeneity, now and
in the future. Time and location-specific differences stem not only from
the power sector fuel mix, but also from individual preferences and
decision-making by millions of people: Which models of fossil fuel
technologies are likely to be replaced by which type of EV or HP? This
requires a comparison not only of generic (representative) technology
types, but of technology ranges (market segments), based on empiri-
cally observed sales in each region.
This is different to existing life-cycle studies of EVs and HPs, which
are limited to the present situation, and mostly focus on a few re-
gions or global averages (see Archsmith, Kendall, and Rapson, 2015;
Bauer et al., 2015; Hawkins, Gausen, and Strømman, 2012; Jochem,
Babrowski, and Fichtner, 2015; Miotti et al., 2016; Onat, Kucukvar, and
Tatari, 2015; Thiel, Perujo, and Mercier, 2010; Woo, Choi, and Ahn,
2017; Wu et al., 2012 for studies on EVs, and Kikuchi, Bristow, and
Kennedy, 2009; Mattinen et al., 2014; Saner et al., 2010 on HPs). For the
case of EVs, only two studies extend the analysis into the future (Cox
et al., 2018; Mendoza Beltran et al., 2018). However, they do not con-
sider regional differences around the globe, heterogeneous technology
choices by consumers or the electrification of heating, and thus cannot
adequately and comprehensively inform policy-making processes on
the national level.
Our study is the first to consistently investigate the full life-cycle emis-
sion trade-offs from electric cars and heat pumps over time in a region-
ally highly disaggregated way, based on forward-looking simulations
of heterogeneous consumer choices, while explicitly investigating pos-
sible temporal mismatches between end-use electrification and power
sector decarbonisation.
6.2 Scenarios of technology diffusion
We simulate future technology diffusion and resulting emissions
in power generation, passenger road transport and household
heating for 59 regions covering the world (Supplementary Table 1),
using the integrated assessment model E3ME-FTT-GENIE (Mercure
et al., 2018a,c). This model’s representation of technology uptake in
transport and heating is strongly empirical, based on detailed regional
datasets on consumer markets, and simulates technology diffusion
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profiles consistent with historical observations (see Methods)
(Knobloch et al., 2019b; Mercure and Lam, 2015; Mercure et al.,
2018b). We combine scenario projections with bottom-up estimates
of life-cycle emissions from producing different technologies and
their fuels (Cox et al., 2018; Mattinen et al., 2014), in order to analyse
emissions trade-offs and net changes from end-use electrification
under three scenarios:
1. A scenario projecting existing observed technological trajectories
into the future (‘current technological trajectory’),
2. A scenario of detailed sectoral climate policies with 75% proba-
bility of achieving the 2°C climate target (‘2°C scenario’), and
3. A scenario of mismatched policies (‘end-use without power poli-
cies’), in which climate policies are only applied to transport and
heating.
Figure 6.1 shows the simulated future diffusion of electricity-
generation technologies in the power sector, passenger cars in the
road transport sector, and heating technologies in the household
sector, building on previous detailed modelling studies (Holden et al.,
2018; Knobloch et al., 2019b; Mercure et al., 2018a,b,c).
Under the current technology trajectory, future technology uptake is as-
sumed to follow current technological diffusion trajectories in each
sector, as can be observed in market data (such as the diffusion of re-
newables, a shift towards more efficient petrol cars and an increasing
uptake of EVs and HPs). We model the underlying decision-making
by investors and consumers until 2050, using a simulation-based algo-
rithm (Methods). The scenario includes only existing policies (such as
the EU-ETS), but excludes policies that are not implemented yet (such
as announced phase-outs of petrol cars). The model does not optimise
the technological configuration, and therefore does not prevent end-
use electrification where it would lead to emission increases or higher
overall system costs.
In the 2°C scenario, we impose bundles of additional policies on all
three sectors from 2020 onwards (Holden et al., 2018; Knobloch et al.,
2019b; Mercure et al., 2018a,b,c) (Methods). The policies are chosen
based on what has already been implemented in at least some coun-
tries, and could therefore also be politically feasible in other countries.
This includes carbon pricing and feed-in-tariffs for power generation,
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Figure 6.1: Projections of future technology diffusion in power generation,
passenger road transport and household heating. Technology mix in power
generation (in PWh per year; a-c), road transport by passenger cars (in tril-
lion person kilometre per year; d-f), and residential space and water heating
(in PWh thermal per year; g-i). Projections under the ‘current technological tra-
jectory’ (left), the ‘2°C policy scenario’ (middle), and a scenario in which the
2°C policies are applied to transport and heating, but power generation fol-
lows its current trajectory (‘End-use without power policies’; right). Dashed lines
show the total demand in the ‘current technological trajectory’ (a), for compari-
son. Relative to this trajectory, global electricity demand in 2050 is around 3%
larger in c.
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along with fuel taxes and technology-specific subsidies for transport
and heating. The policy mixes induce demand reductions and a more
rapid uptake of low-carbon technologies, compared to the current tra-
jectory – not only of EVs and HPs, but also of higher-efficiency petrol
cars and heating systems.
In the end-use without power policies scenario, we apply the full set of
climate policies from the 2°C scenario to transport and heating, but not
to the power and other sectors, which are assumed to follow their cur-
rent technological trajectory. While such a combination of policies is per-
haps unlikely in reality, the scenario’s purpose is a worst-case anal-
ysis: What impact would an increased uptake of EVs and HPs have
on overall emissions, if the carbon intensity of electricity generation
worldwide should follow its current trajectory?
Under the current technological trajectory, the global mean intensity of
electricity generation (direct plus indirect emissions per kWh) is pro-
jected to decrease 10% by 2030 and 16% by 2050 (relative to a 2015 aver-
age of 740 gCO2eq/kWh), with considerable variation between coun-
tries (Supplementary Table 6.2). EVs are projected to account for 19% of
global passenger road transport in 2050 (1% in 2030), and HPs for 16%
of global residential heat demand (7% in 2030) (Mercure et al., 2018c),
also with considerable variation between regions (Supplementary Ta-
bles 6.3 and 6.4). In the 2°C scenario, the power sector’s carbon intensity
decreases 44% by 2030, and 74% by 2050 (relative to 2015). The poli-
cies will take some time to change substantially the technology mix in
transport and heating, but they eventually increase the market share of
EVs to 50% by 2050 (1% in 2030), and of HPs to 35% by 2050 (12% in
2030).
6.3 Current emission intensities in transport and
heating
Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 illustrate how the life-cycle emission inten-
sities from driving EVs and heating with HPs compare to new petrol
cars and fossil boilers being sold in the market, both under the current
technological trajectory and the 2°C scenario, for the ten countries with
the largest passenger road transport and residential heating demand in
2015. Figure 6.4 gives a global overview over where and when electri-
fication would reduce emissions. All estimates include production and
end-of-life-emissions (of cars, batteries and heating systems), upstream
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emissions from the extraction and processing of fossil fuels, and the
equivalent indirect emissions from electricity generation (Methods).
For EVs, the range of emission intensities reflects higher and lower
energy use of different electric car models and sizes which are cur-
rently available in the market. The central estimates within different
regions refer to an average efficiency model with an energy use of 19
kWh electricity per 100 vehicle-kilometre in 2015, subject to future im-
provements (17 kWh/100 v-km in 2030, and 14 kWh/100 v-km in 2050)
(Cox et al., 2018) (Methods). For petrol cars, the distribution of intensi-
ties refers to empirically measured and projected sales of all petrol and
diesel cars (incl. non-plug-in hybrids) in the respective year and coun-
try, according to market data and projections by E3ME-FTT (Mercure
and Lam, 2015; Mercure et al., 2018b) (Methods). For HPs, the range
of emission intensities reflects higher and lower conversion efficien-
cies of different HP models and under different operating conditions.
The central estimates in each respective region correspond to an av-
erage efficiency system with a realised conversion efficiency of 300%
in 2015 (390% in 2030, and 420% in 2050) (IEA/ETSAP and IRENA,
2013). For fossil boilers, distributions indicate the intensities of newly
sold heating systems within a given year and region (oil, gas and coal),
also based on empirical data and model projections (Knobloch et al.,
2019b).
Given current conversion efficiencies and production processes, we
find that in 2015 driving an average EV had a lower life-cycle emission
intensity than average new petrol cars if the electricity grid’s emis-
sion intensity was below between 700 gCO2eq/kWh (in Brazil) and
1500 gCO2eq/kWh (in the USA or Canada) (Figure 6.2), depending
on the region-specific mix of new petrol cars. For heating, the thresh-
old emission intensity for average HPs was between 800 gCO2eq/kWh
(in Sweden or the Netherlands) and 1400 gCO2eq/kWh (in Poland or
South Africa), depending on the region-specific mix of fossil boilers
that HPs could replace (Figure 6.3). From a global perspective, the
mean threshold below which electrification reduces overall emissions
is around 1,050 gCO2eq/kWh for HPs and 1,150 gCO2eq/kWh for
EVs (weighted by regional service demand). This roughly corresponds
to the emission intensity of older coal power plants (Schlo¨mer et al.,
2014), and is higher than the estimated life-cycle emission intensity of
more than 90% of global electricity generation in 2015 (Supplementary
Table 6.2).
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Figure 6.2: GHG emission intensities of passenger cars. Current (in 2015; a)
and projected (in 2030 and 2050; b-e) GHG emission intensities (in gCO2eq
per vehicle-kilometre) from driving battery electric cars, for the ten countries
with the highest passenger car transport demand (share in global demand
equivalent to width of bars). Projections under the ‘current technological trajec-
tory’ (b-c) and the ‘2°C policy scenario’ (d-e). Height of vertical bars shows an
average electric car’s estimated GHG emission intensity, given the power sec-
tor’s emission intensity in each country (results from this study). The range
of the GHG emission intensity reflects higher and lower use-phase energy
requirements of different available electric car models and sizes. For com-
parison, grey boxplots show the distribution of GHG emission intensities of
newly sold fossil fuel cars in each country (mean, 50% and 90% ranges)
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Figure 6.3: GHG emission intensities in household heating. Current (in 2015;
a) and projected (in 2030 and 2050; b-e) GHG emission intensities (in gCO2eq
per kWh of heat) from heating with heat pumps, for the ten countries with
the highest residential heat demand (share in global demand equivalent to
width of bars). Projections under the ‘current technological trajectory’ (b-c) and
the ‘2°C policy scenario’ (d-e). Height of vertical bars shows an average heat
pump’s estimated GHG emission intensity, given the power sector’s emission
intensity in each country. The range of the GHG emission intensity reflects
higher and lower conversion efficiencies of different heat pump models and
operating conditions. For comparison, grey boxplots show the distribution of
GHG emission intensities of newly sold fossil-based heating systems in each
country (mean, 50% and 90% ranges).
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Figure 6.4: Relative GHG emission intensities of electric cars and heat pumps
around the world. World regions in which electric cars (a) / heat pumps (b)
have lower projected life-cycle GHG emissions than new petrol cars / fossil
boilers in almost all cases (green) or on average (yellow), or are more GHG
emission intensive on average (red). Projections for 2030 and 2050 (c-d) under
the ‘current technological trajectory’ and the ‘2°C policy scenario’.
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Accordingly, we find that the use of current models of EVs and HPs
instead of current new petrol cars and fossil boilers reduces life-cycle
emissions in 54 of 59 world regions, accounting for 95% of global
road transport demand and 96% of global heat demand in 2015
(Supplementary Figure 6.1). Relative differences range from EVs being
around 70% less emission intensive per vehicle-kilometre (in largely
renewable- and nuclear-powered Iceland, Switzerland and Sweden),
to being 47% more emission intensive (in oil shale-dependent
Estonia) (Supplementary Table 6.6). On global average, EVs result
in 32% lower emissions per vehicle-kilometre (standard deviation:
19 percentage points, weighted by regional transport demand). For
HPs, relative differences in life-cycle emissions per kWh of useful
heat are between -90% (Switzerland) and +112% (Estonia), with a
mean difference of -37% (standard deviation: 25 percentage points,
weighted by regional heat demand) (Supplementary Table 6.6).
While EVs and HPs generally cause less emissions than fossil-fuel
based technologies in most of the world, this may not always be
true when comparing specific pairs of technologies. Markets are
highly diverse, due to varying preferences, incomes, household
characteristics, and attraction to energy-intense luxury items (Mercure
and Lam, 2015). In many regions, this empirical diversity results
in significant overlap between the observed emission intensity
distributions of petrol cars and fossil boilers on one side, and the
likely emission intensity ranges of available EVs and HPs on the
other side. Efficient new petrol cars can cause less emissions than
average EVs, and efficient new gas boilers can outperform average
HPs (indicated in yellow in Figures 6.2-6.4). In 2015, this happens in
regions accounting for 42% of global demand in road transport (22
regions), and 80% in household heating (29 regions).
Region-wide emission increases are only likely where the average
emission intensity of EVs or HPs is higher than for the majority of
new petrol cars or fossil boilers (indicated in red in Figure 6.2-6.4).
As of 2015, this applies to 5% of global road transport demand (5
regions) and 4% of global heating demand (5 regions) (Figure 6.4). In
the most favourable case (indicated in green), even very inefficient
electrification (equivalent to the upper end of their ranges) is less
emission intensive than using the most efficient new petrol cars
or fossil boilers instead (equivalent to the lower bounds of their
respective distributions). EVs or HPs can then reduce net emissions
in almost all situations. This is the case in regions accounting for
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53% of global demand for passenger road transport (32 regions), and
in regions with 16% of global demand for household heating (25
regions).
In 2015, very inefficient EVs would be less emission intensive than very
efficient new petrol cars (‘green’ cases) if the electricity grid’s emission
intensity was below between 330 gCO2eq/kWh (in Japan) and 1000
gCO2eq/kWh (in Canada). For heating, very inefficient HPs would
have lower emission intensities than very efficient fossil boilers when
the grid’s carbon intensity was below around 500 gCO2eq/kWh. From
a global perspective, the mean thresholds are 680 gCO2eq/kWh in case
of inefficient EVs, and 540 gCO2eq/kWh for inefficient HPs (weighted
by service demand). These thresholds roughly correspond to the emis-
sion intensity of gas power plants (Schlo¨mer et al., 2014), and are lower
than the average emission intensity of global electricity generation in
2015 (around 740 gCO2eq/kWh, Supplementary Table 6.2).
6.4 Future emission intensities in transport and
heating
Since technology continuously evolves in any policy regime, the emis-
sions trade-offs change over time. Under the current technological tra-
jectory, in many regions an ongoing reduction in the power sector’s
emissions intensity gradually decreases indirect emission intensities
of using EVs and HPs (also the electricity-related emissions from pro-
ducing them). In addition, technological progress gradually improves
their energy efficiency (Methods). Due to a combination of both effects,
mean emission intensities of EVs are projected to be 17% lower in 2030
(relative to 2015), and 32% lower in 2050 (weighted by transport de-
mand in 2015). Mean intensities of HPs are projected to decrease 31%
below their 2015 value by 2030, and 43% by 2050 (weighted by heat
demand in 2015).
Meanwhile, in most regions more efficient variants of fossil-fuel based
technologies will increase their market shares, such as hybrid cars or
condensing gas boilers, partially reducing the emission abatement po-
tential from electrification (Supplementary Tables 6.4 and 6.5). Aver-
aged over all regions, new petrol cars in 2050 will emit 19% less emis-
sions per vehicle-kilometre than in 2015, and new fossil boiler will be
15% less emissions intensive (weighted by service demand in 2015),
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with large variations between regions. The largest changes are pro-
jected for countries where petrol cars or boilers are currently still rela-
tively inefficient. For example, based on current trends, we project that
the 2050 emission intensities of new petrol cars in the USA and new
fossil boilers in China will be around 30% below their 2015 levels.
In 2030, under the current technological trajectory, resulting average
emission intensities of EVs and HPs do not exceed those of fossil-fuel
based alternatives in any major world region, even without additional
decarbonisation policies in the power sector (Figure 6.2b and Figure
6.3b). The only exception is road transport in Japan: Due to the
unique combination of very efficient petrol cars (with a growing
share of hybrids) and a power sector that is not highly decarbonised,
EVs could lead to slightly higher emissions. By 2045 and 2035,
respectively, EVs and HPs are on average less emission intensive than
fossil alternatives in all world regions (Supplementary Figure 6.1).
This means that electrification will reduce region-wide emissions as
a whole, which is most relevant for policy-making. Note, however,
that the diversity of technology choices implies that in some regions
(indicated in yellow in Figure 6.2-6.4), some consumers may still buy
EVs or HPs which cause higher emissions than efficient new petrol
cars or gas boilers. Meanwhile, in the ‘green’ regions, electrification
will reduce emissions in almost any conceivable case.
Possible overlaps between technology categories are much rarer in the
2°C scenario, with its much faster power sector decarbonisation. In all
world regions, EVs and HPs are on average less emission intensive
than fossil-fuel alternatives from 2024 and 2027 onwards, respectively
(Figure 6.4c-d). This is despite increased average efficiencies of new
petrol cars and fossil boilers, relative to the current technological trajec-
tory (Supplementary Table 6.7). By 2030, even inefficient EVs or HPs
have lower emission intensities than very efficient new fossil-based al-
ternatives in regions accounting for 96% of global transport demand
(55 regions), and 89% of global heat demand (51 regions). This implies
that in the medium term, in almost all cases the more effective policy
strategy for reducing transport and heating emissions is to push EVs
and HPs, instead of supporting the uptake of more efficient fossil-fuel-
based technologies.
In the end-use without power policies scenario, future intensities follow
the 2°C policy trend for petrol cars and fossil boilers, but remain identi-
cal to the current trajectory for EVs and HPs (Supplementary Table 6.8).
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Between 2020 and 2050, there is thus a relatively larger share of global
demand for which future emission intensities will partially overlap in
both transport and heating (‘yellow regions’), compared to the cur-
rent trajectory. Although this reduces the potential magnitude of net
emission reductions from electrification relative to the ‘2°C scenario’,
the risk of region-wide emission increases (‘red regions’) remains lim-
ited: The share of transport and heat demand for which electrification
would increase average emissions never exceeds 6%.
6.5 Net changes in total emissions
Finally, we project how EVs and HPs could change future
economy-wide emissions. For each region, we estimate the life-cycle
emissions from using and producing EVs and HPs, and subtract
avoided emissions from the alternative use and production of new
petrol cars and fossil boilers (Methods). We find that both EVs and
HPs reduce global emissions in all scenarios and at all times (Figure
6.5), and also in 54 of 59 regions (Supplementary Table 6.9). Even
without further power sector decarbonisation, temporary emission
increases from EVs are only projected for Japan and OPEC countries,
together accounting for around 6% of current global transport
demand. Temporary emission increases from HPs are projected in
Australia, Czech Republic, Estonia and in OPEC countries, together
accounting for around 4% of current global heat demand.
Figure 6.6 shows the absolute levels of global use-phase and produc-
tion emissions. As EVs and HPs replace fossil-based technologies over
time, production emissions are projected to grow from around 21% of
total road transport emissions in 2015 to 32-39% in 2050, and from 3%
of total heating emissions in 2015 to 4-7% in 2050. This is due to (i)
reduced use-phase emissions and (ii) increased production emissions,
which are currently around 30% higher for EVs than for petrol cars,
and 250% higher for HPs than for fossil boilers. A full decarbonisa-
tion of household energy use therefore remains infeasible without also
reducing the embodied emissions from producing technologies and re-
quired materials (such as steel), beyond the decarbonisation of the elec-
tricity input. In particular for the production and recycling of EVs and
their batteries, electricity requirements and embodied GHG emissions
remain relatively uncertain, depending on factors such as the future
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Figure 6.5: Changes in global GHG emissions from electric cars and heat
pumps. Indirect GHG emissions from use-phase electricity generation (yel-
low); compared to avoided direct GHG emissions from fossil fuel combustion
(dark purple) and indirect GHG emissions from fossil fuel production (light
purple) that would result if the same demand would be fulfilled with average
new fossil fuel-based cars and heating systems. The GHG emissions from pro-
ducing cars and heating systems are shown in dark blue (battery production
in light blue). Grey dots indicate the overall net change in global GHG emis-
sions from using electric cars and heat pumps, respectively. Ranges around
the median estimate illustrate the possible range of net changes under lower
and higher average use-phase efficiencies of electric cars and heat pumps.
Number in italics show the global market share of electric cars/heat pumps.
Projections under the ‘current technological trajectory’ (a-b), the ‘2°C policy sce-
nario’ (c-d), and under a scenario in which the ‘2°C policies are applied to
transport and heating, but power generation follows the ‘current technological
trajectory’ (‘end-use without power policies’; e-f).
180
02
4
6
GH
G 
em
iss
ion
s [
Gt
CO
2e
q]
0
50
100
150
200
Cu
m
ula
tiv
e 
GH
G 
[G
tC
O2
eq
]
0
2
4
6
GH
G 
em
iss
ion
s [
Gt
CO
2e
q]
0
50
100
150
200
Cu
m
ula
tiv
e 
GH
G 
[G
tC
O2
eq
]
0
2
4
6
GH
G 
em
iss
ion
s [
Gt
CO
2e
q]
0
50
100
150
200
Cu
m
ula
tiv
e 
GH
G 
[G
tC
O2
eq
]
0
2
4
6
201
0
202
0
203
0
204
0
205
0
GH
G 
em
iss
ion
s [
Gt
CO
2e
q]
0
50
100
150
200
Cu
m
ula
tiv
e 
GH
G 
[G
tC
O2
eq
]
0
2
4
6
201
0
202
0
203
0
204
0
205
0
GH
G 
em
iss
ion
s [
Gt
CO
2e
q]
0
50
100
150
200
Cu
m
ula
tiv
e 
GH
G 
[G
tC
O2
eq
]
0
2
4
6
201
0
202
0
203
0
204
0
205
0
GH
G 
em
iss
ion
s [
Gt
CO
2e
q]
0
50
100
150
200
Cu
m
ula
tiv
e 
GH
G 
[G
tC
O2
eq
]
2015-
2050
2015-
2050
2015-
2050
Current technological trajectory End-use without power policies 2C policy scenario
Pa
ss
en
ge
r c
ar
s
Ho
us
eh
ol
d 
he
at
in
g
Car / heating  
system production
Battery 
production
Fossil fuel 
combustion
Fuel 
production
Use-phase 
electricity
Total emissions without
net savings from use of
electric cars/heat pumps
GHG emissions from:
a c e
b d f
Figure 6.6: Projections of global GHG emissions from passenger cars and
household heating. Direct GHG emissions from fossil fuel combustion (dark
purple), indirect GHG emissions from fuel production (light purple) and use-
phase electricity generation (yellow), and GHG emissions from the produc-
tion of cars and heating systems (dark blue, batteries for electric cars in light
blue). Red dashed lines indicate hypothetical levels of total GHG emissions
without the net changes from using electric cars/heat pumps, as shown in
Figure 6.5. Projections under the ‘current technological trajectory’ (a-b), the ‘2°C
policy scenario’ (c-d), and under a scenario in which the 2°C policies are ap-
plied to transport and heating, but power generation follows the ‘current tech-
nological trajectory’ (‘end-use without power policies’; e-f).
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sizes and energy densities of batteries (Ciez and Whitacre, 2019; Cox
et al., 2018).
182
6.6 Discussion
Overall, we find that current and future life-cycle emissions from EVs
and HPs are on average lower than those of new petrol cars and fossil
boilers in almost all countries. Over time, in more and more regions
even very inefficient EVs or HPs are less emission intensive than us-
ing the most efficient new petrol cars or fossil boilers instead. Impor-
tantly for policy-making on the national level, we find that EVs and
HPs can reduce net emissions not just on the global aggregate, but
also in most individual countries. In almost all regions, even a com-
plete lack of policy coordination would very unlikely lead to emission
increases. Given that the alignment of policy-making across depart-
ments is highly complex and not necessarily always successful (Jordan
and Lenschow, 2010; Liu et al., 2015; Sterner et al., 2019), this consider-
ably reduces the risk of implementing incoherent decarbonisation poli-
cies.
Different net emission changes from electrification in different world
regions not only depend on the current and future carbon intensities of
their respective electricity sector, but also on technology choices made
by people. Based on distributions of technology sales, we approxi-
mated what the markets for fossil-fuel-based technologies will most
likely look like in different countries, and hence which type of tech-
nologies would be replaced by EVs and HPs. However, the result-
ing ranges can still only give an indication: The necessary sales data
over longer time periods are not yet available for EVs and HPs, and
it remains uncertain which types of fossil-fuel-based technologies they
might replace in each specific case.
Our analysis disaggregates global demand into 59 world regions, a
spatial resolution which is considerably higher than in any previous
forward-looking life-cycle study of EVs or HPs. Further research could
focus on the remaining variation within larger simulated world regions
(such as China (Wu et al., 2012) or the USA (Archsmith, Kendall, and
Rapson, 2015; Onat, Kucukvar, and Tatari, 2015)). Such studies could
also analyse the location-specific impacts of integrating EVs and HPs
into the electricity grid (Chen et al., 2018; Fischer and Madani, 2017;
Muratori, 2018; Richardson, 2013), and how this translates into vary-
ing marginal emission intensities over time (compared to the average
emission intensities used in this study) (Chen et al., 2018; Tamayao et
al., 2015).
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Finally, our findings imply (i) that support for high efficiency fossil-
fuel technologies may only be justified in the short term, when the
market uptake of EVs and HPs can still be constrained by limited pro-
duction capacities and necessary infrastructure adjustments, and (ii)
that policy-makers in most parts of the world can go ahead with am-
bitious end-use electrification policies, without the need to rely on fur-
ther power sector decarbonisation.
6.7 Methods
Greenhouse gas emission intensities. For estimating current and fu-
ture emission intensities of electricity generation, passenger road trans-
port and household heating, we combine estimates from the life-cycle
assessment literature with model projections of future technology up-
take and resulting emission intensities (Holden et al., 2018; Mercure
et al., 2018c) (section ‘Scenarios of technology uptake’), inspired by the
work in Gibon, Arvesen, and Hertwich (2017), Gibon et al. (2015), Her-
twich et al. (2015), Pauliuk et al. (2017), and Pehl et al. (2017). For both
the use and the production of technologies, we explicitly include the
projected emission changes which result from decarbonizing the elec-
tricity system over time.
Electricity generation. We base all calculations on the region-wide aver-
age grid emission intensities of electricity generation (gCO2eq/kWh),
which we calculate from the model-projected levels of total power sec-
tor emissions and electricity demand in each region and year. As we
divide total GHG emissions by total electricity demand (instead of gen-
eration), the resulting intensity values include transmission and distri-
bution losses. Historic data (up to 2012) is based on IEA, while rel-
ative future changes of these historic values are projected by E3ME-
FTT. We include indirect emissions from the extraction and process-
ing of fossil fuels, the construction of power generation technologies
(including necessary infrastructure and supply chain emissions), and
methane emissions (all based on the ‘most likely estimates’ from IPCC-
AR5, Schlo¨mer et al., 2014), as well as indirect emissions from biomass
use (Creutzig et al., 2015). The resulting life-cycle emission intensities
per year and region are given in Supplementary Table 6.2.
Electric cars (EVs). For all cars, we subdivide GHG emissions into use-
phase emissions (from driving the car), and production and end-of-
life emissions. We calculate use-phase emissions as the product of
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the car’s electricity use and the emission intensity of electricity gen-
eration in each region (as described above). Ranges of current and
future electricity use per vehicle-kilometre are based on estimates by
Cox et al. (2018) for 2015 (median: 0.19 kWh/v-km; 5th-95th percentile
range: 0.13-0.24 kWh/v-km) and 2040 (median: 0.15 kWh/v-km; 5th-
95th percentile range: 0.09-0.22 kWh/v-km, based on the ‘most likely
automation’ scenario), including auxiliary power demand and charg-
ing losses. These values are based on a review of currently available
EVs, and calibrated to match empirical energy use under real-world
driving conditions. We linearly interpolate the efficiency ranges be-
tween 2015-2040, and linearly extrapolate this trend to 2050. Relative
improvements compared to 2015 equal around -12% until 2030, and
-28% until 2050.
Production and end-of-life emissions are further subdivided into emis-
sions from electricity required for the production process, and non-
electricity emissions. Electricity requirements (excluding the battery)
were obtained from EcoInvent (Wernet et al., 2016), adding up the
electricity inputs of the foreground process (production of the car) and
of all background processes (production of parts and materials, trans-
port, mining, etc.). We determine electricity emissions by multiplying
the amount of required electricity with the projected GHG-intensity of
electricity generation in the country where the car is driven, thereby
abstracting from the import and export of cars (and car parts). For
the production of medium-sized EVs (curb weight of 1,500 kg), elec-
tricity requirements (excluding the battery) are estimated at 3.2*103
kWh (0.022 kWh/v-km, assuming a lifetime of 150,000 km) (Wernet
et al., 2016). Emissions from other sources in the car production (excl.
the battery) are set at 6.8*103 kgCO2eq (45 gCO2eq/v-km) (Wernet et
al., 2016). For the battery production, non-electricity emissions are es-
timated at 2.5*103 kgCO2eq (16.8 gCO2eq/v-km), and electricity re-
quirements at 4.0*103 kWh (0.03 kWh/v-km) (Cox et al., 2018). The
latter is estimated to linearly decrease to 2.6*103 kWh (0.02 kWh/v-
km) in 2040 (Cox et al., 2018), and we extrapolate this trend to 2050.
Note that electricity requirements and embodied emissions of the pro-
duction processes can be subject to large variation, something that is
not considered here (Cox et al., 2018).
Petrol cars. For use-phase emissions, we first calculate ‘tank-to-wheel’
emissions of cars based on the distributions of manufacturer-rated in-
tensities (without any blend of biofuels) of all liquid-fuel cars (petrol
and diesel, including non-plug-in hybrids) which are sold in a given
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region and year – based on empirical data at the start of the simu-
lation, and projected into the future by E3M3-FTT (section ‘Distribu-
tions of petrol cars and fossil boilers’). Real-world emissions of petrol
cars are widely recognized to exceed official manufacturer ratings, by
an average margin of 10-40% (based on empirical studies in Europe,
the USA and China) (Duarte, Gonc¸alves, and Farias, 2016; EPA, 2018;
Fontaras, Zacharof, and Ciuffo, 2017; Tietge et al., 2017; Zhang et al.,
2014). We therefore adjust all manufacturer ratings by the central es-
timate of 25%, consistent with the adjustment calculations by the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2018). For obtaining ‘well-to-
wheel’ emissions, we add upstream emissions from the extraction and
processing of fuels (26% of ‘tank-to-wheel’ emissions for petrol, and
28% for diesel) (International Council on Clean Transportation, 2014;
Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, 2014a,b). Emis-
sions from car production and end-of-life are sub-divided into emis-
sions from electricity required for the production process (including
background processes), and non-electricity emissions. Electricity re-
quirements for producing a medium-sized car (curb weight 1,600 kg)
are estimated at 3.8*103 kWh (0.03 kWh/v-km), and emissions from
other sources at 8.4*103 kgCO2eq (56 gCO2eq./v-km) (Wernet et al.,
2016).
Heat pumps (HPs). We differentiate between use-phase emissions (from
heating), and production and end-of-life emissions. We calculate use-
phase emissions as the product of HP point-of-use conversion efficien-
cies (i.e. the ratio of heat delivered to the electricity consumed over
the season), and the region-specific intensities in electricity generation.
The average efficiency is set to 300% in 2015 (range: 200%-600%), based
on the IEA-ETSAP expert ranges given for the most common types of
HPs (air-to-air, air-to-water, ground-source) (IEA/ETSAP and IRENA,
2013). The same source estimates that future efficiencies will improve
by 30-50% until 2030, and 40-60% until 2050. As HPs are a relatively
mature technology, we base our calculations on the lower bound es-
timates (30% efficiency improvement until 2030, 40% until 2050). We
linearly interpolate between 2015-2050, yielding average efficiencies of
390% in 2030 (range: 260-780%), and 420% in 2050 (range: 280-840%).
For the production and end-of-life stage of HPs, we estimate emissions
from non-electricity sources at 0.35 tCO2eq per kW of installed capacity
(Wernet et al., 2016). Large parts of these emissions stem from ethane-
flour compounds, partly due to the leakage of refrigerant liquids dur-
ing HP operation (included here in the production emissions). We con-
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vert into the functional unit of gCO2eq/kWhth, assuming an average
technical lifetime of 20 years (IEA, 2011) with 2,000 operating hours per
year (European Commission, 2013b), yielding production emissions of
8.6 gCO2eq/kWhth. Electricity requirements for the production of HPs
(including background processes) are set at 26 kWh per kW of installed
capacity (0.013 kWh/kWhth) (Wernet et al., 2016).
Fossil-fuel heating systems. We base our calculation of use-phase emis-
sions on the distribution of intensities of all decentral residential fossil-
fuel based heating systems (oil, gas and coal) being sold in a respec-
tive region and year, simulated until 2050 by E3ME-FTT (see section
‘Distributions of petrol cars and fossil boilers’). We assume conver-
sion efficiencies of 75% for oil and gas heating systems, 86% for ad-
vanced oil systems, and 90% for advanced gas systems (IEA/ETSAP,
2012). We combine these with IPCC emission factors to obtain emis-
sion intensities per technology. We add upstream emissions from the
extraction and processing of heating oil (equivalent to 28% of direct
emissions, based on the estimate for diesel Joint Research Centre of the
European Commission, 2014a, which is chemically near-equivalent to
heating oil), gas (23% of direct emissions Hauck et al., 2014), and coal
(6% of direct emissions Steinmann et al., 2014). For the production,
we base our calculations on EcoInvent estimates for gas and oil boilers
(Wernet et al., 2016), which constitute the large majority of global sales.
Electricity requirements (including background processes) are 18 kWh
per kW of installed capacity (0.01 kWh/kWhth, based on the same life-
times and operating hours as for HPs), and emissions of other sources
are 0.04 tCO2eq per kW (1.0 gCO2eq/kWhth) (Wernet et al., 2016).
Distributions of petrol cars and fossil boilers. We estimate the ranges
of emission intensities from empirically measured and projected sales
in the respective year and country (Supplementary Tables 6.4 and 6.5).
For cars, the distribution of current sales is derived from detailed mar-
ket data on vehicle sales (years 2004-2012), which we compiled by
matching sales data to manufacturer data for thousands of individ-
ual vehicle models currently on the market in 18 countries, and made
some proxies to infer values for countries where data is missing (Mer-
cure and Lam, 2015; Mercure et al., 2018b). Distributions of future
sales (2013-2050) are projected by E3ME-FTT (section ‘Integrated as-
sessment model’), based on the market data and simulated future con-
sumer choices. For some regions (mainly in Africa, Supplementary
Table 6.1), vehicle sales are approximated based on global averages,
due to the unavailability of empirical data. For heating systems, cur-
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rent and future sales are simulated by E3ME-FTT (from 2015-2050),
according to available data on fuel use and technology stocks (years
1990-2014) (Knobloch et al., 2017, 2019b). Both for cars and boilers, we
then calculate the mean and standard deviation of emission intensities
(incl. upstream emissions) of all sales in a respective region, for each
year until 2050, according to our simulations (Supplementary Tables
6.6-6.8). The intensity of each technology type is thereby weighted by
the number of model-projected sales in each world region. Emissions
from the production of technologies are added as a constant. This way,
future changes in the range of emission intensities are fully endoge-
nous, based on a gradually changing technology composition.
Net changes in GHG emissions. We estimate net changes in overall
emissions for each world region in each year. First, we calculate the
emissions from EVs and HPs, based on their model-projected region-
specific market shares and average emission intensities (section ‘Sce-
narios of technology uptake’). Second, we subtract avoided emissions
which otherwise would have been emitted by new petrol cars or fos-
sil boilers, if they would have been used to fulfil the same service
demand, also based on the projected average intensities of sales in
each region (without blend of biofuels). The use of region-specific
intensities results in relatively smaller/larger net savings in regions
where the average efficiency of new petrol cars/fossil boilers is rela-
tively higher/lower. Results depend on the assumed reference point:
On average, which type of fossil-fuel-based technology would have
been chosen instead? While many combinations are possible, what
matters for region-wide effects is the sum over all individual choices
of cars and heating systems within one region in any given year. While
the mean efficiencies in each region can change over time, we assume
that the structure of all sales remains distributed, i.e. that people would
not suddenly all buy economic small engine cars. Cumulative net
changes can then be approximated based on the region-specific means
of distributed intensities. Finally, we obtain global changes in emis-
sions as the sum of all region-specific estimates (Supplementary Table
6.9).
Overall GHG emissions over time. We calculate overall emissions as
the sum of direct use-phase emissions (tailpipe emissions from driv-
ing petrol cars, on-site emissions from burning fossil fuels for heating),
indirect use-phase emissions (from producing the required electricity
or fuels), and emissions from the production and end-of-life of cars
and heating systems. We estimate all emissions bottom-up, based on
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the projected emission intensities and demand for road transport (with
passenger cars) and household heating (space and sanitary water). The
resulting bottom-up estimates can be smaller than top-down emission
estimates from IEA fuel use data, which also includes other end uses
(such as freight transport or cooking). For the use of biomass/biofuels
in heating and transport (according to the policy-defined blend), we
add indirect emissions from their production and resulting land-use
changes in the category ‘production of fuels’ (assuming an average
emission intensity of 59 gCO2eq/kWh of energy content for biomass
used in heating, and of 99 gCO2eq/kWh of energy content for biofuel
used in transport (Creutzig et al., 2015).
Scenarios of technology uptake. We use E3ME-FTT model projections
of future technology diffusion and fuel use in three scenarios: (i) ‘cur-
rent technological trajectory’, (ii) ‘2°C policy scenario’, (iii) ‘end-use with-
out power policies’. These scenarios are chosen so that they allow to
simulate the emission trade-offs from electrification as realistically as
possible, given (i) what is likely from a current perspective, (ii) what
would be likely in a (hypothetical) case of ambitious climate policies
around the globe, and (iii) a worst-case scenario in which end-use elec-
trification is not matched by power sector decarbonisation. The first
two scenarios result from recent modelling studies (Holden et al., 2018;
Mercure et al., 2018a,c), and detailed descriptions of the underlying
policy assumptions are available in Mercure et al. (2018c). All policies
included in the scenarios are designed to match as closely as possible
real-world policy instruments, for example energy taxes, vehicle taxes,
feed-in tariffs, subsidies, direct regulation or efficiency standards.
(i) ‘current technological trajectory’. As a result of the path-dependent
simulation nature of E3ME-FTT, the model projects a baseline trajec-
tory in which technological change already takes place without the
implementation of additional policies. To differentiate from baselines
without any technological change, we refer to it as the ‘current tech-
nological trajectory’, in which several low-carbon technologies (such
as solar photovoltaics, EVs or HPs) already diffuse to some extent, fol-
lowing the trajectory observed in historical data, while other technol-
ogy types (such as low-efficiency petrol cars, coal and oil heating sys-
tems) are projected to decline in market shares, also observed in data.
For instance, in Europe, some regions are likely to reach set household
heating emissions targets without additional policies, while others re-
quire additional measures (Knobloch et al., 2017). The scenario implic-
itly includes current policies in the transport and heating sectors, given
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that they already had a measurable impact on empirically observed
technology uptake in our historic data sets. For the heating sector, we
furthermore assume that the average insulation efficiency of buildings
gradually increases over time (see Supplementary Section 6.2). For the
power sector, we explicitly include existing policy schemes, such as the
EU-ETS.
(ii) ‘2°C policy scenario’. We impose sets of sector-specific policies to
achieve a projected trajectory of global emissions which is consistent
with a 75% probability of not exceeding 2 °C global warming by the
end of the century. Policies are implemented in or after 2020. In elec-
tricity generation, transport and heating, they are defined so that they
either incentivise the uptake of low-carbon technologies (e.g. subsi-
dies or feed-in tariffs), disincentivise the use of fossil fuels (e.g. carbon
taxes), or regulate the use of fossil fuel technologies (such as efficiency
standards or a phase-out of coal power plants). In electricity genera-
tion, the main policies are (i) carbon pricing; (ii) subsidies for renew-
ables (biomass, geothermal, carbon capture and storage) and nuclear;
(iii) feed-in tariffs (for wind and solar); (iv) a ban on the construction
of new coal power plants; and (v) increased capacities for electricity
storage. In passenger road transport, the main policies are (i) fuel ef-
ficiency standards for newly sold petrol cars; (ii) a gradual phase-out
of older low-efficiency petrol cars; (iii) a gradually increasing fuel tax;
(iv) a purchase tax for vehicles proportional to their rated emission in-
tensity; (v) procurement programmes for EVs where they are not avail-
able yet; (vi) an increasing biofuel mandate (reaching up to 10%-30% in
2050, region-specific mandates extrapolate IEA projections). In house-
hold heating, the main policies are (i) a tax on the residential use of
fossil fuels (oil, gas and coal); (ii) subsidies on the upfront purchase
costs of renewable heating technologies (HPs, solar thermal and mod-
ern biomass), which start in 2020 and are linearly phased out after 2030;
and (iii) more stringent building regulations, implying that a large frac-
tion of houses are retrofitted to passive house properties (see Supple-
mentary Section 6.2). More details can be obtained in Mercure et al.
(2018a,c).
(iii) ‘End-use without power policies’. We combine the power sector trajec-
tory from scenario (i) with the road transport and heating trajectories
from (ii), making the scenario assumption that policy makers would
implement policies to push EVs and HPs while not pursuing any fur-
ther decarbonisation of electricity generation. No policies are imposed
on any other sectors. Although such a combination of policies is not
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necessarily likely in the real world, the scenario serves as a hypotheti-
cal worst case analysis.
Integrated assessment model. E3ME-FTT-GENIE is a simulation-
based integrated assessment model which combines bottom-up
representations of the power, transport and heating sectors with a
macro-econometric representation of the global economy, for 59
regions covering the globe (Supplementary Table 6.1) (Mercure et al.,
2018a).
FTT models. The FTT (Future Technology Transformation) family of
models project the uptake of energy technologies in the future until
2050, by extending the current trajectory of technological change with
a diffusion algorithm, which is calibrated on datasets of technology
uptake in recent history (up to 2012 for power and transport, 2014 for
heating) (Supplementary Tables 6.4 and 6.5). Each FTT model is based
on a bottom-up description of heterogeneous agents who own or
operate technologies that produce certain societal services (electricity
generation, road transport, household heating), and who consider
replacing such technologies according to lifetimes and contexts. As
such, it is both a model of choice and one of technology vintage (or
technology fleets). Replacement, or technological change, takes place
at rates determined by the survival in time of technology units and/or
the financing schedule. We assume that agents make comparisons
between technology options that they individually see as available in
their respective national markets, which we structure by pair-wise
comparisons of distributed preferences. The model is a discrete choice
model in which choice options are weighted by their own popularity,
a method that generates endogenous S-shaped technology diffusion
curves (Mercure, 2018). The technological trajectory is not based on
economy-wide optimisation, but endogenously evolves from the
sum of individual choices of heterogeneous agents with bounded
rationality. FTT models are characterised by strong path-dependence
of projected technology diffusion (equivalent to strong autocorrelation
in time), as it is typically found in technology transitions (Rogers, 2010;
Wilson, 2012), and for that reason, provides a good representation of
the inertia embedded in technological systems. It is thus well suited
to analyse existing technological trajectories as observed in recent
historical data. A description of how future demand for transport and
heating is determined is given in Supplementary Section 6.2. Further
descriptions of the individual FTT models can be found in Knobloch
et al. (2017, 2019b), Mercure (2012), and Mercure et al. (2014, 2018b).
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E3ME model. The FTT models are part of E3ME (hard-coupled within
the same computer code), which represents in a top-down aggregate
perspective relationships between macroeconomic quantities through
a chosen set of econometric relationships that are regressed on the past
45 years of data and are projected 35 years into the future (until 2050).
The macroeconomics in the model determine total demand and trade
for manufactured products, services and energy carriers, output and
employment for 43 economic sectors, 24 fuel users and 12 fuels. The
model is path-dependent, such that different policy scenarios generate
different techno-economic and environmental trajectories that diverge
from each other over time. Using the ‘what if’ mode of impact assess-
ment, policies are chosen, and resulting outcomes can be projected.
Meeting policy objectives (such as emissions targets) is not achieved
by means of maximising or minimising some target function (such as
welfare or costs). Instead, the model is run iteratively until the tar-
get would be met with a chosen set of policies. The model is regu-
larly used in policy analyses and impact assessments for the European
Commission and elsewhere (Cambridge Econometrics, 2013; Mercure
et al., 2016b). See Mercure et al. (2018a) for a detailed description of the
integrated model, and Cambridge Econometrics (2014) for the E3ME
manual.
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7.1 Key questions
In this thesis, I have explored how the uptake and diffusion of energy
end-use technologies can be modelled in a realistic and feasible way
via the following two research questions:
1. How can the choice of energy end-use technologies and the social dy-
namics of technology diffusion be modelled from a behavioural perspec-
tive?
2. How do model assumptions on technology choice behaviour and tech-
nology diffusion dynamics influence recommendations for the design of
decarbonisation policies?
The first question was addressed in chapter 2 from a conceptual
perspective, and in chapters 3-5 in the context of a newly developed
bottom-up model for the simulation of heating technology diffusion,
FTT:Heat. The implications of behavioural assumptions for
policy-making have been analysed throughout the whole of this thesis
(chapters 2-6).
In chapter 2, I have demonstrated by means of a conceptual model
that bounded rationality and Prospect Theory are useful starting points
for a realistic model representation of technology choices by hetero-
geneous decision-makers. In chapter 3, I have introduced FTT:Heat,
which uses behavioural representations of decision-making for simu-
lating the uptake and replacement of residential heating technologies
by heterogeneous households. In chapter 4, the FTT:Heat model was
extended to 59 world regions covering the globe, which allowed to
simulate global decarbonisation scenarios, and to analyse how their
feasibility rests on behavioural assumptions. In chapter 5, I have in-
cluded a representation of reference-dependent loss aversion into the
FTT:Heat model, and simulated the importance of loss aversion on
technology uptake and policy effectiveness. In chapter 6, I have in-
vestigated from a life-cycle assessment perspective the interactions be-
tween uncoordinated technology choice behaviour in the heating and
transport sectors with parallel decarbonisation in the power sector.
With regard to the modelling of technology choices (research ques-
tion 1), the main cross-cutting findings are presented in section 7.2.
In section 7.3, I summarise the resulting insights for the design of de-
carbonisation policies (research question 2). The main limitations and
uncertainties of the behavioural modelling of technology choices are
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discussed in section 7.4. Section 7.5 provides the main conclusions of
the thesis.
7.2 Modelling technology choice from a behavioural
perspective
Observed technology choice behaviour is often inconsistent with
the assumptions of rational choice theory. Psychological research
reports that individuals only have limited information, time and
cognitive capacities to evaluate alternative options, and are subject
to behavioural biases in their decision-making (Clayton et al., 2015;
Kahneman, 2003; Thaler, 1980). Throughout this thesis, it was
therefore argued that the assumption of rational utility maximisation
by a fully informed decision-maker is an oversimplified representation
of technology choice behaviour in reality. In chapter 2, a simple model
of technology choice by heterogenous decision-makers was presented,
which combines elements from bounded rationality and Prospect
Theory, and thereby allows to simulate technology uptake from
different theoretical perspectives (illustrated in Figure 7.1). It was
shown that the consideration of behavioural factors and heterogeneity
can at least partly explain observed investments into energy efficient
technologies by firms after energy efficiency audits, which are
found to be consistently lower than what appears as rational from a
normative-optimising outside perspective: due to the use of decision
heuristics (such as simplified payback-time calculations) and the
impact of loss aversion, upfront investment costs have a relatively
stronger impact on choices than future energy savings, which makes
energy efficiency investments less attractive from the subjective
perspective of individual decision-makers. This is consistent with
empirical literature on the adoption of energy-efficient technologies,
which has identified behavioural explanations as important for the
often lower-than-expected uptake of seemingly attractive energy
technologies (also referred to as the ‘energy efficiency gap’) (Gerarden,
Newell, and Stavins, 2017; Sorrell, Mallett, and Nye, 2011). While
in principle it remains possible to explain observed decisions based
on unobserved costs or agent expectations (Sutherland, 1991), the
underlying assumption of rational cost-minimisation is inconsistent
with evidence from choice experiments, which makes such an
explanation unlikely on its own (Gillingham and Palmer, 2014).
However, a combination of unobserved economic barriers with
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Figure 7.1: The three levels of decision-making for the evaluation of technol-
ogy options by agents, as they were introduced in chapter 2: optimising, sat-
isficing, and behavioural.
behavioural barriers is likely, and further empirical research is needed
to distinguish the two more clearly from each other.
Technology choices are made in a diversity of individual contexts,
driven by social dynamics. Agents differ in their individual charac-
teristics and subjective perspectives, and their technology choices are
often informed by their peers and what they see being used (Abra-
hamse and Steg, 2013; Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012; McShane, Brad-
low, and Berger, 2012; Pettifor et al., 2017b). It was shown that due
to such heterogeneity of agents and contexts, individual choices at the
micro-level can differ even when faced with the same decision problem
(chapter 2). It was furthermore demonstrated that at the macro-level,
the sum of all individual, uncoordinated decisions is therefore differ-
ent from the least-cost optimum as it would be determined by a single,
fully rational agent or social planner (as discussed by Kirman, 1992).
The cumulative effect of agent heterogeneity, imperfect information
and social influence implies that the diffusion of new technologies does
not happen instantaneously once they become economically attractive,
but typically follows an S-shaped trajectory, as it is consistently found
in empirical research on technology diffusion (as shown for the exam-
ple of heating technology diffusion in chapters 3 and 4) (Gross et al.,
2018; Gru¨bler, Nakic´enovic´, and Victor, 1999; Rogers, 2010; Wilson,
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2012).
Dynamic technology diffusion can be modelled in a stylised but
tractable way. While individual choices will remain uncertain, it was
demonstrated that it is at least possible to construct an overview of
how choices are distributed, based on plausible assumptions on pa-
rameter distributions (chapter 2). In FTT:Heat, the representation of
decision-making was then extended to a dynamical setting of technol-
ogy diffusion over time, in which decisions are driven and constrained
by social and industrial dynamics (chapters 3 and 4) (see Figure 7.2
for a schematic overview). The model simulates technology diffusion
based on statistically distributed parameters, which implies a diversity
of choices by heterogeneous households. The non-linearities in tech-
nology growth are mathematically modelled by means of a dynamic
differential equation, in which the rate of a new technology’s growth is
endogenously tied to its popularity in the market (based on Mercure,
2015). This serves as a stylised representation of social influence and
limited production capacities for producing and installing new tech-
nologies, and endogenously reproduces the typical characteristics of
technology diffusion. While undoubtedly remaining a stylised repre-
sentation of underlying behavioural, social and industrial dynamics,
it allows to shed light on important diffusion interactions. For exam-
ple, the consideration of social influence and industrial constraints in
the model makes it more likely that households choose technologies
which are already dominant in the local market. This implies a strong
path-dependence of technological change (discussed further below),
and is consistent with the findings of research on technological transi-
tions (Geels, 2002; Geels et al., 2017b).
Heterogenous technology choices imply that technological change
is path-dependent and subject to inertia. Due to the self-reinforcing
dynamics within the FTT:Heat model, simulated technological trajec-
tories are subject to inertia and path-dependence. This means that
technological trajectories cannot change direction rapidly, even when
costs change drastically (chapter 3) — consistent with recurrent empir-
ical findings on the diffusion of innovations (Gross and Hanna, 2019;
Gru¨bler, Nakic´enovic´, and Victor, 1999; Nakic´enovic´, 1986; Rogers,
2010). For the same reason, a gradual substitution between technolo-
gies can take place when costs remain constant. FTT:Heat’s property
of path dependence is further amplified by the representation of en-
dogenous technological learning, in which the costs of technologies
decrease over time, depending on the level of installations within ev-
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Figure 7.2: The representation of behavioural factors in the simulation of tech-
nology uptake by FTT:Heat, as described in chapters 3-5. Premature replace-
ment decisions are represented based on an empirically derived behavioural
payback threshold in chapters 3 and 4, and based on a Prospect Theory loss
aversion function in chapter 5.
200
ery subsequent year. Taken together, the dynamics of path dependence
imply that small changes in parameters can accumulate over time, and
lead to unexpected outcomes at the macro level. For example, iner-
tia keeps the model projections of technology diffusion in a trajectory
that has momentum, and projected changes in technology uptake only
unfold very gradually. Once a technology transition has gained suffi-
cient momentum itself, however, the new trajectory can become hard
to reverse: when new technologies start to dominate, it becomes in-
creasingly difficult to buy the older technologies that are disappear-
ing, since the expertise is disappearing, while new technologies be-
come more competitive (due to endogenous reductions in their upfront
costs). This is different to optimisation models in which the system can
in principal adjust to price changes instantaneously, within the bounds
of exogenously defined growth constraints (DeCarolis et al., 2017).
Rapid technological change is constrained by behavioural decision-
making on premature technology replacements. The maximum rate
of technological change depends on the frequency at which technolo-
gies are being replaced. In the simplest case, this happens at the end
of a technology’s lifetime. For technologies with relatively long aver-
age lifetimes, such as heating systems, this implies that decarbonisa-
tion can only take place relatively slowly. In chapter 4, it was shown
that a faster rate of change is possible if households decide to prema-
turely replace technologies ahead of time. From a normative rational
choice perspective, this would be beneficial once the savings (due to
reduced operating costs) exceed the investment costs of the alternative
technology. In reality, empirical evidence suggests that most house-
holds only consider a premature replacement of their heating system if
the potential savings exceed the necessary upfront investment within
a relatively short period of time, around three years on average (Ol-
sthoorn et al., 2017). In chapters 3 and 4, premature technology re-
placements in FTT:Heat were represented based on such empirical esti-
mates: households were assumed to ignore future energy cost savings
which occur beyond a limited number of years, the so-called payback
threshold, which was derived from surveys. Mathematically, this is
equivalent to discounting future monetary savings by an empirically
derived discount rate, which is a common way to mimic observed
household decisions in energy models (e.g., in the IMAGE, IMACLIM
and GEM-E3 models, see Li, Trutnevyte, and Strachan, 2015). Impor-
tantly, in FTT:Heat, different discount rates/payback thresholds were
applied to regular and premature technology replacements, the values
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of which were based on choice experiments (Jaccard and Dennis, 2006;
Olsthoorn et al., 2017). It was shown that the decision-making in pre-
mature replacements has large importance for the feasibility of rapid
global decarbonisation pathways in residential heating: while an al-
most complete decarbonisation is projected to be feasible until 2050 if
households were to apply an average payback threshold of three years,
the same degree of decarbonisation could be achieved around 2035 if
household decisions were to apply a payback threshold of 15 years
(chapter 4). While the modelling of premature replacements based on
behavioural payback thresholds can replicate preferences as stated by
households, the method remains agnostic with regard to the underly-
ing reasons. In chapter 5, it was argued that household preferences for
premature replacements can be explained by more fundamental prin-
ciples of their decision-making behaviour, such as loss aversion. It was
shown that as an alternative to the use of empirical payback thresh-
olds, it is possible to explicitly model the underlying decision-making
dynamics by means of an empirically derived Prospect Theory value
function (see paragraph below).
Reference-dependence and loss aversion can lead to a status-quo
bias in technology choices. In Prospect Theory, decisions depend on
losses and gains, as they are perceived relative to a subjective reference
point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
Loss aversion describes the empirical observation that losses have a
relatively stronger impact on decisions, compared to equally seized
gains. Due to loss aversion, people perceive deviations from their
current situation as less attractive than what rational choice theory
would imply, and tend to prefer technologies that are already familiar
to them, which increases the likelihood of choosing the ‘status quo’
option — even if it should, rationally, result in higher overall costs
(Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990; Schleich et al., 2018; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1991). In chapter 5, it was shown how loss aversion
can be included into a global energy model, taking the example of
FTT:Heat. Importantly, the effect of loss aversion on technology
choices is asymmetric, as it always depends on the reference point.
This means that the subjectively perceived attractiveness of a new
technology partly depends on the technology that someone currently
owns: for example, switching from a gas boiler to a heat pump is
evaluated differently than switching from a heat pump to a gas boiler.
In the model projections, this is reflected in the observation that
technologies that have low market shares at the start of the simulation
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have a disadvantage, which happen to be the same technologies that
have higher upfront costs (low-carbon technologies). Accordingly,
not considering loss aversion in the model overestimates the market
uptake of renewable technologies. Furthermore, it was demonstrated
that the effect of loss aversion does not simply correspond to an
undervaluation of future energy savings, as it would be captured by
a higher discount rate (or a lower payback threshold): discounting
is applied to all gains and losses, loss aversion only to subjectively
perceived losses, which depend on the reference point. A higher
coefficient of loss aversion means that choices depend more strongly
on the current technology stock, while a higher discount rate implies
that choices depend more strongly on upfront costs. This illustrates
that an explicit representation of behavioural decision-making
dynamics can improve the model projection of technology choices,
and allows a more nuanced simulation of policy instruments,
compared to the reliance on empirically derived discount rates or
payback thresholds (as used in chapters 3 and 4).
7.3 Implications for the recommendation of policy
instruments
Policies aiming at energy transitions must be designed with an un-
derstanding of technology choice behaviour and actual diffusion dy-
namics. In chapters 2-6, it was shown that understanding choice be-
haviour in a dynamic setting is particularly relevant for policies aimed
at energy end-use sectors, such as residential heating or passenger car
road transport, where technology choices are made by billions of indi-
viduals, and are not centrally coordinated. In such a context, assum-
ing optimal and rational decision-making may result in expectations of
the effectiveness of policy instruments that are far too optimistic. For
example, this could result in the wrong expectation that a carbon tax
which was identified as being economically optimal from a normative
perspective would automatically lead to the envisioned degree of de-
carbonisation in the real world, although stronger or different policy
instruments may be required in the context of actual diffusion dynam-
ics. In chapters 2-5, it was demonstrated how simulation-based mod-
elling can help to estimate and compare the effectiveness of different
policy instruments ex ante, according to different theoretical perspec-
tives (optimising behaviour, satisficing behaviour based on payback
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thresholds, behavioural decision-making which is subject to loss aver-
sion). From a practical viewpoint, this allows to adjust policies accord-
ingly, and save governments time and money by avoiding costly pol-
icy failures. This is particularly important in the case of climate policy.
Due to the need for rapid emission reductions, decarbonisation policies
should be implemented as soon as possible, and no time is left for ex-
perimenting with ineffective policy strategies, which could prove hard
to reverse once implemented.
The effectiveness of policy instruments is subject to the inertia of
technological change. Due to bounded rationality and limited infor-
mation on part of individual decision-makers, the influence of poli-
cies on the technology composition can only unfold very gradually.
This inertia is further amplified in case of relatively long technical life-
times, such as in the residential heating sector. The simulation of de-
carbonisation policies for this sector has demonstrated that reactions
to policy changes are therefore not instantaneous (chapters 3-5). For
example, my simulation results suggest that, while a carbon tax can
be sufficient for slowly steering technology choices away from fossil
fuel based technologies, its short-term impact is severely limited by
the inertia of the technological trajectory. Even if all households should
prefer renewable technologies from a hypothetical optimisation per-
spective, not all households would immediately choose them in real-
ity. Unlike in equilibrium models, where the system adjusts to price
changes instantaneously (within the bounds of exogenously defined
growth constraints) (DeCarolis et al., 2017), it takes years to steer the
system towards a new direction. Inertia keeps technological change
in a trajectory that has momentum, and policies are used to alter the
direction of the trajectory, which is henceforth maintained even if poli-
cies are removed. This is consistent with findings from the literature
on evolutionary economics, which explicitly stresses the importance of
path dependence for technological change and the design of environ-
mental policies (Freeman and Louc¸a˜, 2001; van den Bergh et al., 2006).
The results imply that market-based policy instruments (such as taxes
and subsidies) should be implemented sufficiently early, and should
not be expected to show their full effectiveness immediately.
Policy mixes can be more effective for decarbonisation than relying
on a single policy instrument. Simulation results for the residential
heating sector suggest that policy mixes are more effective for incen-
tivising the uptake of low-carbon technologies, compared to a carbon
tax or subsidy implemented in isolation (chapters 3-4). The reason is
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that policies interact: While a carbon tax on its own would set the stage
for making renewables more cost-competitive, larger emission reduc-
tions could be achieved by richer policy mixes. For example, com-
bining a carbon tax with upfront subsidies on renewable technologies
is projected to trigger more fuel efficient pathways of technological
change, with relatively higher market shares for more capital-intensive
technologies. Applied in isolation, scenarios suggest that a carbon tax
could lead to much higher electricity use, leading to higher energy ex-
penses for households and indirect emission increases in the power
sector. These findings are consistent with economic research on the de-
sign of policy incentives in the presence of behavioural biases (Allcott,
Mullainathan, and Taubinsky, 2014) and modelling studies on climate
change mitigation strategies within the constraints of political feasibil-
ity (Bertram et al., 2015). The need for sector-specific policy mixes is
also stressed in the latest IPCC report, and considered as particularly
important for enabling energy-efficient technological pathways in en-
ergy end-use sectors (Rogelj et al., 2018a). Nevertheless, most mod-
elling studies on decarbonisation focus on least-cost pathways from an
optimisation perspective, relying on a carbon tax as the only policy to
induce technological change (Deetman et al., 2013).
Price-based polices on their own may not always be sufficient for ef-
fective decarbonisation. Scenarios for the heating sector suggest that
the short-term impact of price-based policies could be limited in coun-
tries where a new technology’s uptake is very low or absent so far
(chapters 3-4). Due to imperfect information (limited first-hand ex-
perience with such technologies within the social network) and sup-
ply constraints (limited capacities for producing and installing new
technologies), the diffusion of new technologies cannot be scaled up
instantaneously. This implies a need for policies which can drive ini-
tial markets for new technologies, thereby enabling the spread of rel-
evant first-hand experiences and the build-up of necessary expertise
and industry capacities. In the FTT:Heat model, this was conceptu-
alised as a ‘kick start’ policy: a hypothetical policy instrument which
is not market-based, but introduces a new technology by means of a
procurement scheme, use obligation, or other regulation. A real-world
example for such a policy would be the purchase and installation of
low-carbon heating technologies in publicly owned buildings, initiated
by city councils (Connor et al., 2013).
Loss aversion can reduce the effectiveness of price-based policies,
which implies the need for stronger policy instruments for achieving
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decarbonisation targets. By implementing reference-dependent loss
aversion for technology choices into FTT:Heat, it was possible to com-
pare the simulated effectiveness of policy instruments with and with-
out loss aversion (chapter 5). Results suggest that when the coefficient
of loss aversion is around two (Neumann and Bo¨ckenholt, 2014; Tver-
sky and Kahneman, 1991), the same reductions in overall emissions re-
quires policy incentives which are twice as stringent, due to a ‘conser-
vative shift’ in technology uptake. Furthermore, due to loss aversion
there is a much larger reliance on low-carbon technologies with larger
market shares at the start of the simulation, compared to decarbonisa-
tion scenarios without loss aversion. It may prove more effective for
decarbonisation policies to aim at reducing the relative disadvantages
of renewable technologies (such as their higher upfront costs, which
can be reduced via subsidies), than aiming at further increasing their
relative advantages (such as future savings in energy costs, relative to
fossil-based technologies, which can be increased via a carbon tax).
Policies can seek to change the way in which the assessment of
technological options is carried out by consumers and firms. As
loss aversion and other behavioural biases reduce the effectiveness
of price-based policies, policy instruments could aim at raising
awareness for the availability of different technology options and
their potential advantages for consumers and firms (such as energy
savings), using methods such as information campaigns. Possible
examples for such policies could be the promotion of energy audits
or training programmes, which may increase the rates of technology
uptake (chapter 2) (Anderson and Newell 2004). Ideally, interventions
could contribute to reduce the effect of behavioural biases, such as
loss aversion, by providing information to people how it influences
their decision-making (Gillingham and Palmer 2014). If this is
possible, such policies could become more effective than trying to
impact technology choices via monetary incentives (such as taxes
or subsidies), without the need for substantial monetary transfers
(such as in the case of subsidy payments). However, available
evidence suggests that biases such as loss aversion are hard or even
impossible to overcome, given that they are perhaps deeply-wired
patterns in human behaviour (chapter 5) (Griskevicius and Kenrick,
2013). Alternatively, policies could attempt to frame technology
choices in a way that take advantage of known biases, for example
by suggesting that not investing in renewable technologies should
be perceived as a loss. This is similar to the concept of behavioural
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‘nudging’ or libertarian paternalism, which aims at influencing the
decision-making of individuals based on known behavioural biases,
without restricting their freedom of choice (Allcott and Mullainathan,
2010; Thaler and Sunstein, 2009).
Despite behavioural uncertainties, end-use electrification is a robust
policy strategy for decarbonisation. Due to self-reinforcing social and
industrial dynamics, real-world climate mitigation strategies could in
principle lead to trajectories in which end-use electrification and power
sector decarbonisation take place at completely different rates, thereby
perhaps leading to increases in economy-wide emissions. However,
scenario results show that current and future life-cycle emissions from
electric vehicles and heat pumps are on average lower than those of
new petrol cars and fossil boilers in almost all countries, accounting
for 95% of the global transport and heat demand, even without the
implementation of additional climate policies (chapter 6). The analy-
sis suggests that policy-makers in most parts of the world can go ahead
with ambitious electrification policies for passenger road transport and
household heating, which can reduce economy-wide greenhouse gas
emissions even in the absence of further power sector decarbonisation.
This result is consistent with studies on future life-cycle emissions of
electric cars in individual countries (Bauer et al., 2015; Onat, Kucukvar,
and Tatari, 2015) and at the global level (Cox et al., 2018; Mendoza Bel-
tran et al., 2018), which have also included model projections on the
future technology mix in the power sector. However, no other study
has previously analysed the future emission trade-offs from end-use
electrification in comparison with future types of fossil-based technolo-
gies, based on forward-looking model simulations of heterogeneous
consumer choices. Furthermore, existing studies on future life-cycle
emissions of energy end-use technologies are largely restricted to elec-
tric vehicles. There is thus large potential for combining life-cycle as-
sessment with dynamic scenario simulations from energy models for
the forward-looking analysis of other technologies.
7.4 Limitations and uncertainties
There remains a considerable degree of uncertainty regarding technol-
ogy choice behaviour of individuals, and how it depends on their so-
cial and cultural contexts. It can manifest as parametric uncertainty
about the values of behavioural parameters within the model (such as
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the degree of loss aversion), as well as in the form of structural un-
certainty regarding the conceptual model-representation of decision-
making processes (such as the role of social influence). The results pre-
sented in this thesis indicate that behavioural uncertainties are particu-
larly relevant in the context of policies aiming at rapid decarbonisation:
On the one hand, such policies need to be stringent enough to imme-
diately steer technology choices into a low-carbon direction, without
putting a politically or economically infeasible burden on households.
On the other hand, such ambitious policies are outside of what has
so far been implemented in most countries, which means that little is
known on how people react to them under real-world conditions.
Even if models of technology choice behaviour are based on the best
available knowledge, it therefore remains an unsolved question how
they can be reasonably validated, given that they are meant for simu-
lating policy-induced technological change which has no direct prece-
dence in human history. As the context of technology choices in energy
transitions is constantly evolving (such as technological characteristics,
policies, preferences), it also remains inherently uncertain to which ex-
tent model structures and parameters (such as empirically determined
preferences) remain valid in the (distant) future, or if they might need
to be adjusted in the light of new developments. For example, will
human decision-making on energy technologies at one point be sup-
plemented by artificial intelligence, and how would this change the
impact of behavioural biases or social influences on technology up-
take?
It is likely that aspects of technology choice behaviour are relevant for
the design of decarbonisation policies which were not explicitly con-
sidered in this thesis, such as the influence of norms and attitudes,
or the conditions of everyday domestic life (Kastner and Stern, 2015;
Steg, Perlaviciute, and Werff, 2015; Wilson, Crane, and Chryssochoidis,
2015). However, representing all relevant behavioural factors in quan-
titative energy models inevitably remains an unachievable benchmark:
any model is by definition an abstraction of reality, and it is practi-
cally impossible to know what are the relevant factors for an adequate
model representation beforehand. As famously stated by Box (1976):
“Since all models are wrong the scientist must be alert to what is im-
portantly wrong.” (p. 792) As a compromise, I have therefore ex-
plored the modelling of behavioural features in a form which remains
tractable for dynamical modelling at the global scale, while enabling
to capture behavioural dynamics which are important for the projec-
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tion of technology diffusion. I find that such simulation-based model
representations of technology choices are potentially more suitable for
performing impact assessments of policy instruments, in comparison
to optimisation models that assume perfect rationality. If such (nor-
mative) models were used for projecting technology diffusion and pol-
icy impacts (i.e. for answering positive research questions), this could
potentially lead to overly simplistic policy strategies for incentivising
the decarbonisation of energy end-use sectors, based on unrealistic be-
havioural assumptions.
Nevertheless, my analysis largely remains restricted to a utilitarian
perspective on decision-making by individuals, based on empirical ev-
idence from Europe and North America. Experimental findings on
individual choice behaviour cannot necessarily be generalised to dif-
ferent contexts and cultures (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan, 2010;
Henrich et al., 2001). More fundamentally, it remains uncertain to
which degree experimental insights on decision-making of individu-
als are valid on their own when decisions are taken in social contexts,
which can also be driven by group dynamics or moral considerations
(Wilk and Cliggett, 2007). It is possible that social interactions lead to
properties of the resulting macro-behaviour that are more than simply
the sum of individual decisions, depending on whether interactions
between agents lead to driving forces for technology choices that are
stronger or weaker than individual decision-making processes (Kir-
man, 1992). In the FTT:Heat model, such social dynamics of technology
diffusion are conceptually represented by means of the dynamic shares
equation, which endogenously determines how quickly new technolo-
gies can grow within the market. While being consistent with histori-
cally observed technology transitions, the method remains a first order
approximation of real-world complexities.
More empirical research is needed, in order to better understand
which types of choice behaviour are most appropriate for explaining
the uptake of which type of energy technologies, and which other
behavioural factors might be relevant in which specific choice
situations (Clayton et al., 2015, 2016). In particular, it would be
important to improve the understanding of choice dynamics in
different social and cultural contexts, making use both of controlled
behavioural experiments and the evaluation of choices and policy
impacts under real-world conditions. In the presence of remaining
uncertainties, the planning and design of decarbonisation policies
inevitably constitutes a wicked problem, as defined by Rittel and Webber
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Chapter 7. Synthesis
(1973): Due to incomplete information and limited understanding
of all relevant system properties, the process of solving the policy
question becomes identical with the process of understanding its
underlying drivers. As climate change mitigation requires a rapid
decarbonisation of the energy system, little time is left, and further
research in the direction of behavioural science and modelling will
need to be carried out in conjunction with the introduction and
assessment of policies.
7.5 Conclusions
It can be concluded that uncoordinated technology adoption choices
by billions of people determine the effectiveness of policy instruments,
the diffusion of energy end-use technologies, and in the end the suc-
cess or failure of energy transitions. As policy-making requires to be
informed by some sort of quantitative analysis in order to improve its
chances of success, the realistic representation of technology choice be-
haviour in energy models is of utmost importance. While the exact de-
tails of choice behaviour can vary between contexts and likely remain
uncertain for individual decisions, it is at least possible to model dis-
tributed choices and behavioural biases in a stylised form that mimic
the macro-economic reality in a defensible way. More specifically, the
main conclusions of my thesis are:
• Rational utility maximisation is an oversimplified model repre-
sentation of real-world technology choice behaviour, which may
result in expectations of the effectiveness of policy instruments
that are far too optimistic.
• Some useful types of technology choice behaviour by heteroge-
nous agents can be feasibly represented in bottom-up simulation
models of energy technology diffusion, even at the global scale.
• The consideration of behavioural factors and heterogeneity in
models can at least partly explain observed technology choices
by firms and consumers.
• Simulating technology choice behaviour can help to estimate and
compare the effectiveness of different policy instruments ex ante.
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• Reference-dependence and loss aversion can lead to a status-quo
bias in technology choices, which reduces the effectiveness of
price-based policy instruments.
While I have demonstrated the value of including behavioural features
into the modelling of technology choices, this thesis only touched upon
the full potential of behaviourally-oriented energy modelling. Much
remains unknown on the behavioural details that underpin technol-
ogy choices and how they interact with the dynamics of technology
diffusion, especially in a context of rapid technological change. As
demonstrated in this thesis, future work on the modelling of technol-
ogy choice behaviour can benefit substantially from considering the
available knowledge on decision-making and social dynamics in fields
such as behavioural economics, psychology, sociology and anthropol-
ogy.
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Appendix to Chapter 3: FTT:Heat — A simulation
model for technological change in the European
residential heating sector
Table 1: Model assumptions for residential heating technologies. All costs
refer to mean values. Cost, conversion efficiencies and lifetime assump-
tions are taken from Fleiter, Steinbach, and Ragwitz (2016), Danish Energy
Agency (2013, 2016), IEA/ETSAP (2012) and European Heat Pump Associ-
ation (EHPA) (2016), the learning rates from Weiss et al. (2010) and Henkel
(2012).
I O&M CE LR τ
Euro/kWth Euro/kWth pa kWth/kWh % y
Mean SD Mean SD Mean Mean Mean
Oil 471 157 19 6 0.75 0 20
Oil condensing 512 171 20 7 0.86 -0.06 20
Gas 391 133 8 3 0.75 0 20
Gas condensing 434 145 9 3 0.9 -0.06 20
Biomass stove 440 147 0.1 0.03 0.70 0 20
Biomass boiler 523 174 2 0.7 0.85 -0.07 20
Coal 247 82 5 2 0.75 0 20
District heating 265 88 16 4 0.98 0 20
Direct electric 538 179 0.5 0.2 1.00 0 20
HP - ground source 1400 467 14 5 3.50 -0.35 20
HP - air/water 750 250 15 5 2.50-2.70 -0.35 20
HP - air/air 510 170 51 17 2.50-2.70 -0.35 20
Solar thermal 773 258 8 3 — -0.20 20
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Table 2: Technology group market shares in EU-wide residential heat de-
mand, under current technology trends and in policy scenarios 1-3. 2014
shares are calculated from historical data, 2030 and 2050 shares are model
projections by FTT:Heat.
Start Current trends Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
2014 2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Oil 13% 6% 1% 5% 1% 4% 0% 5% 0%
Gas 40% 40% 30% 34% 17% 33% 2% 36% 7%
Biomass 16% 17% 15% 20% 18% 20% 20% 19% 19%
Coal 4% 3% 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0%
District heat 11% 13% 6% 13% 5% 13% 4% 14% 6%
Direct electric 9% 7% 2% 7% 1% 7% 1% 8% 3%
Heat pumps 6% 13% 39% 18% 52% 19% 65% 15% 59%
Solar thermal 1% 2% 5% 3% 7% 3% 8% 2% 6%
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Appendix to Chapter 4: Simulating the deep
decarbonisation of residential heating for limiting
global warming to 1.5°C
Table 3: Grouping of the 59 E3ME regions (right) into eleven major world re-
gions (left) (aggregation is only for presentation of results, FTT:Heat simulates
all 59 regions individually).
Western Europe Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal,
Finland, Sweden, UK, Cyprus, Malta, Norway, Switzer-
land, Iceland, Turkey
Central and Eastern
Europe
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,
Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia,
Macedonia
North America USA, Canada
Latin America Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Rest of Latin Amer-
ica
Former Soviet Union Russia, Belarus, Ukraine
China China
South and Pacific
Asia
Indonesia, Rest of ASEAN, India, Korea, Taiwan
Oceania (Pacific
OECD)
Australia, New Zealand, Japan
North Africa and
Middle East
Saudi Arabia, OPEC excl. Venezuela, Africa OPEC
Sub-Saharan Africa Nigeria, South Africa, Rest of Africa
Rest of World Rest of World (all other countries)
Estimation of intangible cost components
The technology- and region-specific empirical parameter γi is
estimated in a two-step calibration procedure (shown in Figure 3):
first, we run the model based on the cost estimates of LCOHi only,
with γi = 0 for all technologies. For each region, we then compare the
growth of technologies as projected by the model with the diffusion
trend as observable in the historic data, using a graphical interface. If
there are deviations, we iteratively adjust the values of γi (upwards or
downwards), until the projected diffusion at the start of the simulation
is consistent with the empirical trends. The estimated values of
‘intangibles’ are assumed to be constant over the simulation period,
since we have no possibility to estimate future preferences.
On average, we find that oil, gas (incl. LPG) and district heating are
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Figure 1: Projected CO2 emission intensities in the power sector until 2050 (in
gCO2/kWh of electricity), under (i) a scenario with a power sector decarbon-
isation trajectory consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C (green),
and (ii) a scenario without further decarbonisation of the power sector (red).
Emission intensities refer to global averages, trends for individual regions are
reported in the Supplementary Material. In case that power sector emissions
in a region turn negative due the deployment of negative emission technolo-
gies (e.g., biomass with CCS), the region’s emissions are counted as ‘zero’, in
order to avoid attributing such negative emissions to household heating.
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Figure 2: Global direct fuel demand in the residential heating sector, under
current trends (a), improved building insulation (b), improved insulation and
retrofitting (c), and seven policy scenarios aimed at technology uptake (d-j,
based on improved levels of insulation from scenario c). Model simulations
by FTT:Heat start in 2015 (indicated by vertical dashed lines). Natural gas
includes LPG.
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Figure 3: Estimation of ‘intangible’ cost components with FTT:Heat, at the ex-
ample of Japan. (i) shows the historic (2008-2014) and projected trends in tech-
nology shares (2015-2022) without ‘intangibles’, (ii) shows the graphical inter-
face for adjusting the values of ‘intangibles’, (iii) shows the resulting trends
in technology shares with the ‘intangibles’. The dashed vertical lines indicate
the start of the model simulation.
slightly more attractive to households than suggested by the pure
costs, leading to values of γi in the range of -10% to -15%, relative
to the pure LCOHi. For electric resistance heating, the average γi is
equivalent to -30% of its LCOHi. The opposite holds for coal and
biomass heating, for which typical γi values are between +40% and
+80%. For solar thermal and heat pumps, values differ by region,
usually between -20% and +20%.
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Detailed technology data
Conversion efficiencies refer to the ratio of thermal energy ‘leaving’
the heating system, relative to the necessary energy input, covering
both space and water heating. In case of traditional biomass, lower
conversion efficiencies (10-50%) are assumed in developing countries
(IEA, 2014). For heat pumps, efficiency values are defined as their sea-
sonal performance factor (the annual average ratio of delivered heat to
electricity input), which differs by climate region. For solar thermal,
local productivities are calculated from data by the IEA Solar Heat
Programme (Mauthner, Weiss, and Spo¨rk-Du¨r, 2016), which we inte-
grate into the model as region-specific capacity factors (i.e., units of
heat produced per unit of capacity installed). The average technical
life expectancy is set to 20 years for all technologies, based on literature
estimates (the actual lifetime may be shorter if households decide to re-
place a system earlier for economic reasons) (Danish Energy Agency,
2013; IEA/ETSAP, 2012).
Regional technology pathways in scenario i
Figure 4 summarises the simulated future development of residential
heating systems in five major world regions, together accounting for
80% of heat demand and direct heating CO2 emissions in 2014. Tech-
nology composition and emissions by region are shown for a projec-
tion under improved levels of building insulation (scenario c) on the
left, and under additional policies for technological decarbonisation of
heating (scenario i) on the right.
In Western Europe and North America, heating is currently
dominated by gas. Under baseline conditions, their technology
composition would stay relatively constant, while the ongoing
diffusion of more efficient gas heating systems and a limited uptake
of renewables implies a continued, but slow decrease of emissions.
Under policies in scenario h, fossil fuel heating and direct electric
heating in both regions would be substituted by a mix of heat pumps
and solar thermal, with only limited diffusion of modern biomass.
In Central and Eastern Europe, large shares of the heating demand are
currently serviced by district heat networks, biomass and gas. Most
direct emissions, however, originate in a relatively large share of coal
heating, compared to other world regions. Modern renewables are
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Current trends scenario (c) Decarbonisation scenario (i)
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Figure 4: Technology composition and CO2 emissions (direct on-site and in-
direct electricity emissions) in the residential heating sector in five world
regions, under current technology trends with improved insulation and
retrofitting (c) and a scenario with -95% global direct decarbonisation by 2050
(i). Model simulations by FTT:Heat start in 2015 (indicated by vertical dashed
lines). Horizontal dashed lines represent 2014 levels. Solid curves show the
baseline demand trends from scenario a, and dashed curves the total emis-
sions should the power sector not be decarbonised. Percentage values re-
fer to the change by 2050, relative to 2014. Bold percentage values indicate
the reduction in annual total CO2 emissions (direct + indirect), the values in
brackets show the corresponding reduction in direct on-site CO2 emissions.
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Table 5: Model assumptions for residential heating technologies. Costs re-
fer to mean values. (Data sources: Fleiter, Steinbach, and Ragwitz (2016),
IEA/ETSAP (2012), Danish Energy Agency (2013), European Heat Pump As-
sociation (EHPA) (2016).)
Upfront cost O&M cost Efficiency Learning rate
(Euro/kWth) (Euro/kWthpa) (kWth/kWh) (%)
Oil 471 19 0.75 —
Oil condensing 512 20 0.86 -10%
Gas 391 8 0.75 —
Gas condensing 434 9 0.9 -10%
Biomass stove 440 0.1 0.1-0.7 —
Biomass boiler 523 2 0.85 -10%
Coal 247 5 0.75 —
District heating 265 16 0.98 —
Direct electric 538 0.5 1.00 —
HP- ground source 1400 14 3.50 -30%
HP- air/water 750 15 2.50-2.70 -30%
HP- air/air 510 51 2.50-2.70 -30%
Solar thermal 773 8 — -10%
mostly absent under current technology diffusion trends. Under de-
carbonisation policies, our model suggests that fossil fuels would be
substituted by a mix of biomass and heat pumps, while the projected
uptake of solar thermal remains low.
In China, fossil fuels still play a smaller role in heating. Historically,
most emissions result from coal. Oil and gas are on the rise, however,
and would continue their ongoing growth under baseline conditions.
At the same time, a widespread uptake of solar thermal systems and
heat pumps is taking place, so that baseline emissions are projected to
peak around 2030 and decrease afterwards. With additional policies,
the shift to renewables would be accelerated, with solar supplying the
equivalent of two-thirds of the water heating demand by 2050. Impor-
tantly, China is also the region with largest projected demand increases
until 2050, driven by continuously rising incomes (and coming from
historically very low values of heating intensity).
In the Former Soviet Union, 60% of heat is currently provided by dis-
trict heating systems, the remaining fraction by gas and oil. No use of
renewables is reported, limiting the potential for a fast technology tran-
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sition. Therefore, only little change would take place in the baseline,
with slowly rising emission levels until 2050. With decarbonisation
policies, only the introduction of ‘kick start’ schemes would eventually
lead to a limited uptake of renewables. Most emissions occur not on
site, but in centralized heat plants. A parallel decarbonisation would
thus need to take place in the country?s district heating systems, which
are not explicitly modelled here (the same holds for central heating in
other world regions).
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Summary
The Paris Agreement aims at limiting global warming to well below
2°C, which requires a rapid decarbonisation of the energy system
worldwide. Decarbonisation scenarios and policies aimed at the
uptake of low-carbon technologies are usually analysed by means
of energy models. At their core, these models describe how the
technology composition of the energy system might change over time,
and project the resulting influence on energy use and greenhouse gas
emissions.
Large-scale energy models are typically based on optimisation algo-
rithms, which aim at identifying feasible pathways at the lowest over-
all economic costs. While this is useful to identify desirable and fea-
sible system configurations in a normative frame, it may result in ex-
pectations of the effectiveness of decarbonisation policies that are far
too optimistic in reality. Technological change depends on the unco-
ordinated decisions of billions of people, who act according to their
different individual needs and perceptions. In particular for the case
of energy end-use sectors, the design of effective policy instruments
therefore requires a thorough understanding and appropriate model
representation of how individuals choose between energy technolo-
gies, based on empirical behavioural research.
The goal of this thesis was to explore how the uptake and diffusion of
energy end-use technologies can be modelled in a realistic and feasible
way with the following related two research questions:
1. How can the choice of energy end-use technologies and the social dy-
namics of technology diffusion be modelled from a behavioural perspec-
tive?
2. How do model assumptions on technology choice behaviour and tech-
nology diffusion dynamics influence recommendations for the design of
decarbonisation policies?
In chapter 2, a simple simulation model of technology adoption with
behavioural elements was constructed and tested. Decision-makers
were modelled as heterogeneous agents with different behavioural
responses. To predict technology choices, the model simulates agent
decisions from different theoretical points of view, corresponding
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to different analytical perspectives on technology choice behaviour:
optimising, satisficing, and behavioural. From the optimisation
perspective, agents were modelled as fully rational utility maximisers,
who decide according to the normative axioms of microeconomic
theory. From the satisficing perspective, agents were represented
as decision-makers with bounded rationality, who decide based on
simplified decision heuristics. From the behavioural perspective,
decision-making was modelled based on a Prospect Theory loss
aversion function, which is calibrated to empirically observed
choice behaviour. For all three analytical perspectives, agents were
assumed to be heterogeneous, with different individual perceptions
of technology characteristics. It was shown that although relevant
model parameters are uncertain at the micro-level, representing agent
diversity by means of randomised distributions can provide a useful
starting point to simulate the macro adoption rate of technologies. To
demonstrate the model’s abilities, it was calibrated using empirical
data from energy efficiency audits in firms. For the case of energy
efficient electric motors, the consideration of agent heterogeneity and
behavioural decision-making reduced significantly expected adoption
rates: from 81% using a normative optimisation perspective, down to
20% when including a behavioural perspective. It was also found that
the consideration of behavioural decision-making and agent diversity
increased the model’s predictive power significantly compared to a
classical optimisation approach, and therefore allows to simulate the
potential impact of policy instruments more accurately.
In chapter 3, a new bottom-up model for simulating technology
choices in the residential heating sector was introduced, called
FTT:Heat. The model simulates the uptake and replacement of
heating technologies in all Member States of the European Union
up to 2050, and allows to simulate the potential effect of real-world
policy instruments aiming at an increased uptake of low-carbon
technologies. It features an explicit representation of technology
choices, based on observed preferences and non-linear diffusion
dynamics. Decision-makers were modelled as individual households,
which are subject to limited information and bounded rationality.
Their decisions reflect behavioural factors and preferences at
the micro-level, and may result in sub-optimal outcomes from a
macroeconomic perspective. This allows to reproduce the typical
dynamics of technology transitions, which makes the model
well-suited for an ex-ante impact assessment of policies. The model
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was applied to evaluate policy instruments to increase the share of
renewable heating by 10 percentage points in each Member State until
2030, in line with the European Union’s renewable energy policy
objectives. It was shown that even if households should hypothetically
prefer renewable heating technologies in a direct comparison (from
an outside engineering perspective), not all households would
immediately choose them (from their individual perspective) — both
due to imperfect information, and limited availability due to supply
constraints. Substantial changes in the technology composition can
therefore only be expected several years after the introduction of
decarbonisation policies. Policy efforts required were found to be
very different among the Member States. Under current trends of
technology diffusion, in eight Member States the renewable heating
target is expected to be met without additional policy instruments,
while other Member States would hardly see any changes without
new policies. The results indicate that more policy effort is required
to change the technology trajectory in countries with initially low
market shares of renewables.
In chapter 4, FTT:Heat was extended to the global scale, and used to
simulate policies for a global transition towards low-carbon heating in
a context of inertia and bounded rationality. It was argued that plan-
ning for a technological transition in the heating sector requires infor-
mation on policy strategies that can generate the right level of incentive
to achieve the required changes in consumer choices. It was projected
that a carbon tax on its own could drive an initial decarbonisation (up
to 84% reduction in direct plus indirect greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions by 2050), but would also induce a shift of technology choices to-
wards relatively less efficient options, such as electric resistance heat-
ing. A more ambitious decarbonisation (up to 90% reduction in direct
plus indirect GHG emissions) at lower tax rates and final energy use
can be achieved when the carbon tax is supplemented by subsidies and
procurement policies for renewables. Such policy mixes were projected
to be more effective for driving the market uptake of low-carbon tech-
nologies by households, resulting in lower cumulative net GHG emis-
sions and reduced cost burdens, compared to a carbon tax on its own.
In accordance with the findings in chapter 3, it was shown that tech-
nology transitions in residential heating would need decades rather
than years, in parts simply due to long average lifetimes of heating
equipment. Given such time-scales, the model projections suggested
that a complete decarbonisation until 2050 does not only require an im-
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mediate ramp-up of low-carbon investments, but also that households
replace a substantial share of inefficient heating systems prematurely.
Therefore, the simulated effectiveness of policies inevitably depends
on behavioural assumptions on premature replacement decisions. As
such very ambitious decarbonisation policy is outside of what has so
far been implemented in most parts of the world, there remains a con-
siderable degree of uncertainty regarding technology choice behaviour
in such contexts.
In chapter 5, it was demonstrated how loss aversion can be included
into a simulation model of heating technology uptake by households
at the global scale, and to which extent it influences model projections
of technological change and the effectiveness of climate policies. Loss
aversion describes the empirical observation that losses have a rela-
tively stronger impact on decisions, compared to equally seized gains,
as they are perceived relative to a subjective reference point. On aver-
age, the impact of losses is found to be around twice as strong. As a
result, people perceive deviations from their current situation as less
attractive than what rational choice theory would imply, and there-
fore show stronger than expected preferences for technologies which
are already familiar to them. Using heating technology uptake as a
case study, it was found that ignoring the implications of loss aver-
sion on technology choices overestimates substantially the market up-
take of renewable and highly efficient heating technologies: projected
global market shares of renewables in 2050 are around 6-18 percentage
points lower by accounting for loss aversion. Loss aversion therefore
implies relatively higher projected CO2 emissions by households, and
the need for much stronger policy instruments for achieving decarbon-
isation targets. In the case of residential heating, a carbon tax of 200
e/tCO2 was projected to reduce overall emission levels to a similar
extent than a carbon tax of 100 e/tCO2 without the consideration of
loss aversion. Even for similar degrees of decarbonisation, accounting
for loss aversion implies substantial changes in the underlying heating
technology composition. With loss aversion, there is a much larger re-
liance on low-carbon technologies with larger market shares at the start
of the simulation, such as traditional biomass, district heating, or direct
electric heating. Without loss aversion, in contrast, there is a relatively
larger market penetration of relatively newer technologies such as heat
pumps and solar thermal. Overall, the results imply that policies may
need to become much more stringent to overcome the loss aversion ef-
fect, and that it may prove more effective for policies to aim at reducing
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relative disadvantages (such as higher upfront costs via the payment of
subsidies), than aiming at further increasing relative advantages (such
as lower energy costs). It was concluded that loss aversion has major
implications for the modelling of energy technology uptake, as well
as for the planning and ex-ante evaluation of policies, and warrants
substantial further investigation.
In chapter 6, it was explored where and when the diffusion of electric
cars and heat pumps could, under a failure to decarbonise electricity
generation, increase overall GHG emissions. It was argued that time
and location-specific differences in emission intensities stem not only
from the power sector fuel mix, but also from individual preferences
and technology choices by people. The detailed emissions trade-offs
in 59 world regions were analysed by combining bottom-up life-cycle
assessment with forward-looking simulations of technology diffusion
from the E3ME-FTT model, based on a bottom-up representation of
technology uptake in transport, heating and electricity generation. It
was shown that already under current carbon intensities of electric-
ity generation, existing electric cars and heat pumps are less emission-
intensive than fossil-fuel-based technologies in 54 of 59 world regions,
accounting for 95% of global road transport demand and 96% of global
heat demand. The E3ME-FTT model was used to approximate what
the markets for fossil-fuel-based technologies will most likely look like
in different countries, and hence which type of technologies would be
replaced by electric cars and heat pumps. Under the ‘current tech-
nological trajectory’ without additional decarbonisation policies in the
power sector, electric cars and heat pumps are on average less emis-
sion intensive than fossil alternatives in all world regions by 2045 and
2035, respectively. Over time, in more and more regions even inef-
ficient electric cars and heat pumps are less emission intensive than
using the most efficient new petrol cars or fossil boilers instead. Even
a complete lack of policy coordination would therefore unlikely lead
to emission increases from end-use electrification. It was concluded
that policy-makers in most parts of the world can go ahead with am-
bitious end-use electrification policies, without the need to rely on fur-
ther power sector decarbonisation.
In chapter 7, the main results of this thesis were synthesised and
discussed. It was concluded that uncoordinated technology adoption
choices by billions of people determine the effectiveness of policy
instruments, the diffusion of energy end-use technologies, and in the
end the success or failure of energy transitions. As policy-making
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requires to be informed by some sort of quantitative analysis in
order to improve its chances of success, a realistic representation
of technology choice behaviour in energy models is of utmost
importance. It was demonstrated that rational utility maximisation
is an oversimplified model representation of real-world technology
choice behaviour, which may result in expectations of the effectiveness
of policy instruments that are far too optimistic. While the exact
details of choice behaviour can vary between contexts and likely
remain uncertain for individual decisions, it is at least possible to
model distributed choices and behavioural biases in a stylised form
that mimic the macro-economic reality in a defensible way, which
can be feasibly integrated in bottom-up simulation models of energy
technology diffusion at the global scale. This allows to at least partly
explain observed technology choices by firms and consumers, and can
help to estimate and compare the effectiveness of different policy
instruments ex ante.
Future research may further investigate the question which types of
choice behaviour are most appropriate for explaining and modelling
the uptake of energy technologies, and which other behavioural fac-
tors might be relevant. In particular, it would be important to improve
the understanding of choice dynamics in different social and cultural
contexts, making use both of controlled behavioural experiments and
the evaluation of choices and policy impacts under real-world condi-
tions.
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Samenvatting
Het akkoord van Parijs heeft tot doel de opwarming van de aarde
te beperken tot ruim onder de 2°C. Dit vereist een snelle beperking
van broeikasgasemissies in het wereldwijde energiesysteem. In
dit verband worden energiemodellen gebruikt om beleid gericht
op de introductie en acceptatie van koolstofarme technologiee¨n
te onderbouwen. In de kern beschrijven deze modellen hoe de
technologiesamenstelling van het energiesysteem in de loop van de
tijd kan veranderen en hoe dit het energieverbruik en de uitstoot van
broeikasgassen beı¨nvloedt.
Grootschalige energiemodellen gebruiken meestal optimalisatie-
algoritmen, die gericht zijn op het identificeren van geschikte
technologische combinaties om de klimaatdoelen te halen tegen de
laagste totale economische kosten. Hoewel deze optimalisatie nuttig
is om configuraties van het energiesysteem in een normatief kader te
identificeren, kan het echter resulteren in te optimistische verwachtin-
gen van de effectiviteit van het klimaatbeleid. Technologische
verandering hangt namelijk af van de ongecoo¨rdineerde beslissingen
van miljarden mensen, die handelen volgens hun verschillende
individuele behoeften en percepties. Met name het voorspellen van
veranderingen in de aanschaf van technologiee¨n door consumenten,
bijvoorbeeld verschillende opties voor het verwarmen van huizen of
voor personenvervoer, vereist een grondig empirisch begrip en een
passende modelweergave van de manier waarop individuen kiezen
tussen energietechnologiee¨n. De wetenschap kan nog sterk worden
verbeterd als het gaat om dergelijke voorspellingen.
Het doel van dit proefschrift was om te onderzoeken hoe de
verandering in de aanschaf van energietechnologiee¨n door
consumenten op een realistische en haalbare manier kan worden
gemodelleerd op macroschaal, aan de hand van de volgende twee
onderzoeksvragen:
1. Hoe kan de keuze van energietechnologiee¨n door eindgebruikers en de
daaruit volgende sociale dynamiek van technologiediffusie worden
gemodelleerd vanuit een gedragsperspectief?
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2. Hoe worden beleidsaanbevelingen beı¨nvloed door modelaannames over
keuzegedrag en diffusiedynamiek van energietechnologiee¨n?
In hoofdstuk 2 is een simulatiemodel van technologie-acceptatie,
waarin gedragselementen een rol spelen, gebouwd en getest.
Beslissers hebben in het model verschillende gedragsreacties.
Om technologische keuzes te voorspellen, simuleert het model
beslissingen vanuit drie verschillende perspectieven op technologisch
keuzegedrag: optimale, acceptabele en gedragsmatige besluiten. Vanuit
het oogpunt van optimalisatie zijn beslissers gemodelleerd als volledig
rationeel waarbij een zo groot mogelijk economisch nut wordt
nagestreefd. Vanuit een acceptabel perspectief hebben beslissers
een beperkte rationaliteit, waarbij beslissingen worden genomen
op basis van vereenvoudigde beslissingsheuristieken. Vanuit het
gedragsmatige perspectief is de besluitvorming gemodelleerd op basis
van het voorkomen van verlies, die is gekalibreerd op empirisch
waargenomen keuzegedrag. Voor alle analytische perspectieven
is verondersteld dat individuele beslissers niet hetzelfde zijn, met
verschillende individuele percepties van technologische kenmerken.
De resultaten laten zien dat het expliciet modelleren van diversiteit
in beslissers een bruikbaar startpunt is om de acceptatiesnelheid
van technologiee¨n op macroschaal te simuleren. Om de capaciteiten
van het model te demonstreren, is het gekalibreerd met behulp
van empirische gegevens van audits van energie-efficie¨ntie in
bedrijven. In het geval van energie-efficie¨nte elektromotoren is door
rekening te houden met heterogeniteit in gedragsbeslissingen de
verwachte acceptatiegraad aanzienlijk verlaagd: van 81% bij een
normatief optimalisatie perspectief, tot 20% bij een gedragsmatig
perspectief. Uitgaan van heterogeen, empirisch waargenomen gedrag
in besluitvorming verhoogt de voorspellende kracht van het model
aanzienlijk in vergelijking met een klassieke optimalisatiebenadering.
Dit maakt het dus mogelijk om de invloed van beleidsinstrumenten
nauwkeuriger te simuleren.
In hoofdstuk 3 is een nieuw bottom-up model geı¨ntroduceerd
voor het simuleren van technologische keuzes in de verwarming
van huishoudens, genaamd FTT:Heat. Het model simuleert de
opname en vervanging van verwarmingstechnologiee¨n in alle
lidstaten van de Europese Unie tot 2050, en maakt het mogelijk het
effect na te bootsen van beleidsinstrumenten die gericht zijn op een
verhoogde opname van technologiee¨n die leiden tot verminderende
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opwarming van de aarde. Het model biedt een expliciete weergave
van technologische keuzes, gebaseerd op waargenomen voorkeuren
en niet-lineaire diffusiedynamiek. Beslissers zijn gemodelleerd als
individuele huishoudens met beperkte informatie en begrensde
rationaliteit. Beslissingen weerspiegelen gedragsfactoren en
voorkeuren op microniveau en kunnen uiteindelijk resulteren
in suboptimale resultaten vanuit macro-economisch perspectief.
Hierdoor kan de typische dynamiek van technologische overgangen
worden gereproduceerd, wat het model geschikt maakt voor een
ex ante effectbeoordeling van beleid. Het model is toegepast om
beleidsinstrumenten te evalueren die tot doel hebben het aandeel
verwarming door hernieuwbare energiebronnen in elke lidstaat
met 10 procentpunten te verhogen in 2030, in overeenstemming
met de doelstellingen van het beleid van de Europese Unie. De
modelresultaten laten zien dat grootschalige veranderingen in de
verwarmingssector pas jaren na de introductie van hernieuwbaar
energiebeleid kunnen worden verwacht. Deze vertraging kan
worden verklaard door onvolledige informatie over de technologiee¨n
bij consumenten en een relatief beperkt aanbod van nieuwe
technologiee¨n in de startfase. Een ander resultaat is dat de vereiste
beleidsinspanningen zeer verschillend zijn tussen de lidstaten. Op
basis van de huidige trends in technologiediffusie wordt verwacht dat
het streefcijfer voor hernieuwbare verwarming in acht lidstaten zal
worden gehaald zonder aanvullende beleidsinstrumenten, terwijl
andere lidstaten nauwelijks veranderingen zullen zien zonder nieuw
beleid. De resultaten laten verder zien dat er meer beleidsinspanning
nodig is om het technologisch traject te veranderen in landen met een
aanvankelijk laag aandeel hernieuwbare energiebronnen.
In hoofdstuk 4 is FTT:Heat uitgebreid naar de gehele wereld en
gebruikt om de invloed van herneuwbaar energiebeleid zo realistisch
mogelijk te simuleren. Het model voorspelde dat een CO2-belasting
op zich al een flinke verbetering kan veroorzaken: een wereldwijde
reductie in directe en indirecte broeikasgasemissies tot 2050 van 84%
door het verwarmen van huizen. Een ambitieuzere doelstelling (tot
90% reductie van directe en indirecte broeikasgasemissies) zonder
veel extra kosten kan worden bereikt wanneer de koolstofbelasting
wordt aangevuld met startsubsidies voor hernieuwbare energie.
In overeenstemming met de bevindingen in hoofdstuk 3, is
verder aangetoond dat technologie-overgangen in residentie¨le
verwarming tientallen jaren nodig heeft vanwege de relatief lange
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gemiddelde levensduur van verwarmingsapparatuur. Gezien deze
tijdsduur, suggereren de modelprojecties dat het behalen van de
klimaatdoelen in 2050 niet alleen een onmiddellijke stimulans van
investeringen vereist in technologiee¨n met lage broeikasgasemissies,
maar ook dat huishoudens een aanzienlijk deel van inefficie¨nte
verwarmingssystemen voortijdig moeten vervangen. Daarom is de
gesimuleerde effectiviteit van beleid onvermijdelijk afhankelijk van
gedragsmatige aannames over voortijdige vervangingsbeslissingen.
Aangezien een dergelijk zeer ambitieus klimaatbeleid verder gaat dan
wat in de meeste delen van de wereld is geı¨mplementeerd, blijft er
een aanzienlijke mate van onzekerheid bestaan met betrekking tot
technologisch keuzegedrag.
In hoofdstuk 5 is uitgewerkt hoe verliesaversie kan worden
opgenomen in een simulatiemodel van de opname van
verwarmingstechnologie door huishoudens op wereldschaal, en in
welke mate dit invloed heeft op modelprojecties van technologische
verandering en de effectiviteit van klimaatbeleid. Verliesaversie
beschrijft de empirische observatie dat verliezen een relatief sterkere
invloed hebben op beslissingen, vergeleken met winsten van gelijke
omvang, aangezien ze worden waargenomen ten opzichte van een
subjectief referentiepunt. Gemiddeld is de invloed van verliezen
ongeveer twee keer zo sterk als de invloed van winnen. Daarom
beschouwen mensen afwijkingen van hun huidige situatie als
minder aantrekkelijk dan wat rationele keuzetheorie impliceert.
Mensen hebben daarom sterker dan verwachte voorkeuren voor
technologiee¨n die hen al bekend zijn. Gebruikmakend van het
voorbeeld van de adoptie van verwarmingstechnologie, bleek dat
het negeren van de implicaties van verliesaversie op technologische
keuzes de marktintroductie van hernieuwbare of zeer efficie¨nte
verwarmingstechnologiee¨n aanzienlijk overschat: het geraamde
wereldwijde marktaandeel van hernieuwbare energie in 2050 volgens
bestaand beleid is ongeveer 6-18 procentpunten wanneer rekening
wordt gehouden met verliesaversie. Verliesaversie kan er dus voor
zorgen dat de huishoudens relatief meer CO2 uitstoten, en dat er
veel krachtiger beleidsinstrumenten nodig zijn om de CO2-uitstoot
doelstellingen te behalen. Rekening houdend met verliesaversie bij
de verwarming van woningen is ingeschat dat een CO2-belasting
van 200 e/tCO2 nodig is om de totale emissieniveaus net zo te
verlagen als onder een CO2-belasting van 100 e/tCO2 zonder
rekening te houden met verliesaversie. Zelfs bij een vergelijkbare
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afname aan broeikasgassen impliceert het rekening houden met
verliesaversie substantie¨le veranderingen in de onderliggende mix
van verwarmingstechnologiee¨n. Met verliesaversie is er een veel
grotere afhankelijkheid van technologiee¨n met grotere marktaandelen
aan het begin van de simulatie, zoals traditionele biomassa,
stadsverwarming of directe elektrische verwarming. Zonder
verliesaversie daarentegen, is er een relatief grotere marktpenetratie
van nieuwere technologiee¨n zoals warmtepompen en thermische
zonne-energie. Deze resultaten laten zien dat het beleid mogelijk veel
stringenter moet worden om het verliesaversie-effect te ondervangen,
en dat het effectiever kan zijn om beleidsmaatregelen te richten op
het verminderen van nadelen (zoals het verminderen van hoge
initie¨le kosten via subsidies), dan op het vergroten van voordelen
(zoals het verlagen van energiekosten). Verliesaversie heeft dus
waarschijnlijk grote gevolgen voor de modellering van de opname
van energietechnologiee¨n, alsook voor de planning en ex ante
evaluatie van beleid.
In hoofdstuk 6 is onderzocht waar en wanneer de verspreiding van
elektrische auto’s en warmtepompen de totale uitstoot van broeikas-
gassen zou kunnen verhogen, ook wanneer elektriciteitsopwekking
niet klimaat-neutraler wordt. In dit hoofdstuk is beargumenteerd
dat de tijd- en locatie specifieke verschillen in emissie-intensiteit van
elektrische auto?s en warmtepompen niet alleen voortkomt uit de
brandstofmix van de elektriciteitssector, maar ook uit individuele
voorkeuren en technologische keuzes door mensen. De gedetailleerde
emissie trade-offs in 59 wereldregio’s zijn geanalyseerd door een
bottom-up levenscyclusanalyse te combineren met toekomstgerichte
simulaties van technologiediffusie van het E3ME-FTT-model,
gebaseerd op een representatie van technologie-opname in transport,
verwarming en elektriciteitsopwekking. De resultaten laten zien
dat al met de huidige wijze van elektriciteitsopwekking, bestaande
elektrische auto’s en warmtepompen tot minder broeikasgasemissies
leiden dan op fossiele brandstoffen gebaseerde technologiee¨n in 54
van de 59 wereldregio’s, goed voor 95% van de wereldwijde vraag
naar wegtransport en 96% van de wereldwijde vraag naar warmte.
Het E3ME-FTT-model is ook gebruikt om na te gaan hoe de markten
voor op fossiele brandstoffen gebaseerde technologiee¨n er uit kunnen
zien in de verschillende landen, en welke typen technologiee¨n dus
zou worden vervangen door elektrische auto’s en warmtepompen.
Met de huidige trends zouden, zonder extra beleidsmaatregelen
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in de energiesector, elektrische auto’s en warmtepompen in 2045
en 2035 gemiddeld minder emissie-intensief zijn dan hun fossiele
alternatieven in alle regio’s van de wereld. In de loop van de tijd
zijn in steeds meer regio’s zelfs inefficie¨nte elektrische auto’s en
warmtepompen beter voor het klimaat dan het gebruik van de meest
efficie¨nte nieuwe benzineauto’s of fossiele boilers. Zelfs een volledig
gebrek aan beleidscoo¨rdinatie zou daarom waarschijnlijk niet leiden
tot emissieverhogingen door elektrificatie van personen wegtransport
of de verwarming van huishoudens. Beleidsmakers in de meeste
delen van de wereld kunnen dus een ambitieus elektrificatiebeleid
voor deze eindgebruiksectoren doorvoeren, zonder te hoeven
vertrouwen op klimaatbeleid voor de elektriciteitssector.
In de synthese zijn de belangrijkste resultaten van dit proefschrift
geı¨ntegreerd besproken. Uit het proefschrift blijkt dat ongecoo¨rdi-
neerde keuzes voor de adoptie van technologie door miljarden
mensen de effectiviteit bepalen van beleidsinstrumenten, de
verspreiding van energie-eindgebruikstechnologiee¨n en uiteindelijk
het succes of falen van energietransities. Een realistische weergave van
technologiekeuzegedrag in energiemodellen is daarom van erg groot
belang. Dit proefschrift laat verder zien dat rationele maximalisatie
van behoeftes een te eenvoudige modelrepresentatie is van empirisch
technologisch keuzegedrag, wat kan leiden tot veel te optimistische
inschattingen van de effectiviteit van beleidsinstrumenten. Hoewel
de exacte details van keuzegedrag kunnen varie¨ren per context en
waarschijnlijk onzeker blijven voor individuele beslissingen, is het op
zijn minst mogelijk om gedistribueerde keuzes en gedragsvoorkeuren
in een gestileerde vorm te modelleren, zodat de macro-economische
realiteit op een verdedigbare manier kan worden nagebootst. Dit
kan vervolgens worden geı¨ntegreerd in wereldwijde bottom-up
simulatiemodellen van de diffusie van energietechnologiee¨n. Dit
maakt het mogelijk om de waargenomen technologische keuzes van
bedrijven en consumenten ten minste gedeeltelijk te verklaren, en het
kan helpen om de effectiviteit van verschillende beleidsinstrumenten
ex ante in te schatten en te beoordelen.
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Zusammenfassung
Das Abkommen von Paris zielt darauf ab, die globale Erwa¨rmung auf
deutlich unter 2 °C zu begrenzen, was eine rasche weltweite Dekarbon-
isierung des Energiesystems erfordert. Dekarbonisierungsszenarien
und Strategien, die auf die Einfu¨hrung kohlenstoffarmer Technologien
abzielen, werden oft anhand von Energiemodellen analysiert. Diese
Modelle beschreiben, wie sich die technologische Zusammensetzung
des Energiesystems im Laufe der Zeit a¨ndern ko¨nnte, und projizieren
den daraus resultierenden Energieverbrauch und Treibhausgasemis-
sionen.
Energiemodelle basieren ha¨ufig auf Optimierungsalgorithmen, um
Dekarbonisierungsszenarien mit den niedrigsten wirtschaftlichen
Gesamtkosten zu ermitteln. Dies ist zwar nu¨tzlich, um normativ
wu¨nschenswerte und technologisch umsetzbare Systemkonfiguratio-
nen zu identifizieren, kann jedoch zu Erwartungen an die Wirksamkeit
von Dekarbonisierungsmaßnahmen fu¨hren, die viel zu optimistisch
sind. In der realen Welt beruht technologischer Wandel auf den
unkoordinierten Entscheidungen von Milliarden von Menschen,
abha¨ngig von ihren unterschiedlichen individuellen Bedu¨rfnissen und
Wahrnehmungen. Insbesondere fu¨r Energieendverbrauchssektoren
erfordert die Konzeption wirksamer politischer Instrumente daher ein
fundiertes Versta¨ndnis und eine mo¨glichst realistische Modellierung
des menschlichen Entscheidungsverhaltens, das der Auswahl
von Energietechnologien zu Grunde liegt — idealerweise auf der
Grundlage empirischer Verhaltensforschung.
Das Ziel dieser Doktorarbeit war es daher zu untersuchen, wie die
Auswahl und Verbreitung von Energietechnologien auf realistische
und praktikable Weise modelliert werden kann, ausgehend von
folgenden zwei Forschungsfragen:
1. Wie kann die Auswahl von Energietechnologien sowie die zugrunde
liegenden sozialen Dynamiken der Technologiediffusion aus einer ver-
haltenswissenschaftlichen Perspektive modelliert werden?
2. Wie wirken sich Modellannahmen zur individuellen Entscheidungs-
findung bei der Technologieauswahl auf Politikempfehlungen und
Dekarbonisierungsstrategien aus?
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In Kapitel 2 wurde ein einfaches Modell vorgestellt, das die
Auswahl von Energietechnologien unter Beru¨cksichtigung
verschiedener verhaltenswissenschaftlicher Annahmen simuliert. Die
Entscheidungstra¨ger wurden hierzu als eine heterogene Gruppe mit
unterschiedlichen Verhaltensreaktionen modelliert. Zur Vorhersage
der Technologieauswahl simuliert das Modell deren Entscheidungen
aus verschiedenen theoretischen Perspektiven, basierend auf
verschiedenen analytischen Theorien zur Entscheidungsfindung:
Optimierung, Zufriedengeben, und Verhaltensbasiert. Aus der
Perspektive der Optimierung wurden Agenten als vollsta¨ndig
rationale Nutzenmaximierer modelliert, die nach den normativen
Axiomen der mikroo¨konomischen Theorie entscheiden. Aus
zufriedengebender Sicht wurden Agenten als Entscheidungstra¨ger
mit begrenzter Rationalita¨t dargestellt, die auf der Grundlage
vereinfachter Heuristiken entscheiden. Aus der verhaltensbasierten
Perspektive wurde Entscheidungsverhalten auf der Grundlage einer
Verlustaversionsfunktion modelliert, die auf empirisch beobachteten
Entscheidungen beruht. Fu¨r alle drei analytischen Perspektiven
wurde angenommen, dass die Entscheidungstra¨ger heterogen sind:
Sie unterscheiden sich in ihrer individuellen Wahrnehmung der
Welt, und entscheiden zudem in verschiedenen realen Kontexten.
Obwohl relevante Modellparameter zwangsla¨ufig ungewiss fu¨r jeden
individuellen Entscheidungstra¨ger bleiben, kann die Auswahl von
Technologien innerhalb der Gruppe auf Grundlage randomisierter
Verteilungen der unbekannten Parameterwerte gescha¨tzt werden.
Um das Modell zu testen, wurde es anhand empirischer Daten
aus Energieeffizienzaudits in Unternehmen kalibriert. Die
Beru¨cksichtigung von Heterogenita¨t und verhaltensbasierter
Annahmen zur Entscheidungsfindung reduzierte deutlich den
gescha¨tzten Anteil der Unternehmen, die in einen ihnen empfohlenen
energieeffizienten Motor investieren wu¨rden: von 81% unter
Annahme einer normativen Optimierungsperspektive, auf 20% unter
Annahme einer verhaltenswissenschaftlichen Perspektive. Es konnte
somit gezeigt werden, dass eine Beru¨cksichtigung von Heterogenita¨t
sowie verhaltenswissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse die Vorhersagekraft
des Modells wesentlich erho¨ht hat (im Vergleich zu einem klassischen
Optimierungsansatz), und daher eine genauere Simulation der
potenziellen Auswirkungen politischer Instrumente ermo¨glicht.
In Kapitel 3 wurde ein neues Modell zur Simulation von
Technologieentscheidungen im Geba¨udesektor vorgestellt, FTT:Heat.
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Das Modell simuliert die Auswahl und den Austausch von
Heizungstechnologien in allen Mitgliedstaaten der Europa¨ischen
Union bis zum Jahr 2050 und ermo¨glicht es so, die potenziellen
Auswirkungen verschiedener politischer Instrumente zur
Dekarbonisierung zu simulieren. Das Modell basiert auf einer
expliziten Darstellung der Technologieauswahl durch Haushalte,
unter Beru¨cksichtigung empirisch beobachteter Pra¨ferenzen sowie
nichtlinearer Diffusionsdynamiken. Entscheidungstra¨ger wurden
als individuelle Haushalte mit begrenzter Rationalita¨t modelliert,
die auf Grundlage unvollsta¨ndiger Informationen entscheiden. Die
Entscheidungen der Haushalte sind gepra¨gt durch ihre individuellen
Pra¨ferenzen sowie durch verhaltenswissenschaftliche Faktoren auf
der Mikroebene, und ko¨nnen somit zu suboptimalen Ergebnissen
aus makroo¨konomischer Perspektive fu¨hren. Dies erlaubt es, die
typische Dynamik von technologischem Wandel zu reproduzieren,
wodurch sich das Modell gut fu¨r eine Ex-ante-Folgenabscha¨tzung
von Politikinstrumenten eignet. Das Modell wurde angewendet,
um politische Instrumente zur Erho¨hung des Anteils erneuerbarer
Energien im Wa¨rmesektor um 10 Prozentpunkte in jedem
EU-Mitgliedstaat bis 2030 zu simulieren, basierend auf den politischen
Zielen der Europa¨ischen Union. Es wurde gezeigt, dass Haushalte
selbst dann nicht unbedingt erneuerbaren Heizungstechnologien
auswa¨hlen wu¨rden, wenn dies aus der Perspektive eines externen
Beobachters hypothetisch sinnvoll erscheint — sowohl aufgrund
begrenzter Informationen, als auch aufgrund der eingeschra¨nkten
Verfu¨gbarkeit neuer Technologien. Wesentliche A¨nderungen in
der Technologiezusammensetzung sind daher erst einige Jahre
nach Einfu¨hrung neuer Politikinstrumente zu erwarten. Es
wurde zudem gezeigt, dass unterschiedlich stringente politische
Anstrengungen in verschiedenen EU-Mitgliedstaaten no¨tig sind, um
dieselben Dekarbonisierungsziele zu erreichen. Auf Grundlage der
gegenwa¨rtig zu beobachtenden Trends ko¨nnten acht Mitgliedstaaten
das EU-Ziel fu¨r erneuerbare Wa¨rme ohne Einfu¨hrung zusa¨tzlicher
politischer Instrumente erfu¨llen. In anderen Mitgliedstaaten ist
ohne neue politische Maßnahmen jedoch kaum eine A¨nderung
der Technologiezusammensetzung zu erwarten. Die Ergebnisse
deuten darauf hin, dass gro¨ßere politische Anstrengungen
insbesondere in La¨ndern erforderlich sind, in denen erneuerbare
Heizungstechnologien bislang nur geringe Marktanteile aufweisen.
In Kapitel 4 wurde FTT:Heat auf alle Weltregionen ausgeweitet und
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dann verwendet, um Szenarien fu¨r eine globale Dekarbonisierung
des Wa¨rmesektors unter Beru¨cksichtigung begrenzter Rationalita¨t
zu simulieren. Es wurde argumentiert, dass die Planung
einer Energiewende im Wa¨rmesektor nur mo¨glich ist, wenn
die potenziellen Effekte verschiedener Politikinstrumente auf
Verbraucherentscheidungen korrekt eingescha¨tzt werden ko¨nnen.
Es wurde prognostiziert, dass die Einfu¨hrung einer CO2-Steuer
die direkten und indirekten Treibhausgasemissionen bis 2050
zwar bis zu 84% reduzieren ko¨nnte. Zugleich ko¨nnte die
alleinige Einfu¨hrung einer solchen Steuer jedoch dazu fu¨hren,
dass Haushalte weniger energieeffiziente Heizungstechnologien
wa¨hlen. Eine daru¨berhinausgehende Dekarbonisierung (um
bis zu 90% bis 2050) kann zu niedrigeren Steuersa¨tzen erreicht
werden, wenn die CO2-Steuer durch Subventionen und o¨ffentliche
Beschaffungsmaßnahmen fu¨r erneuerbare Technologien erga¨nzt
wu¨rde. Es wurde prognostiziert, dass solche Kombinationen von
Politikinstrumenten ein effektiverer Weg sein ko¨nnen, um die
Markteinfu¨hrung kohlenstoffarmer Technologien voranzutreiben. Im
Vergleich zu einer CO2-Steuer als alleinigem Instrument wu¨rde eine
solche Kombination sowohl die kumulierten Treibhausgasemissionen,
als auch die Kostenbelastung fu¨r Haushalte reduzieren. Die
Ergebnisse zeigten zudem, dass eine Energiewende im Wa¨rmesektor
nicht in wenigen Jahren abgeschlossen werden kann, sondern mehrere
Jahrzehnte dauern wird. In Anbetracht solcher Zeitra¨ume erfordert
eine vollsta¨ndige Dekarbonisierung bis 2050 nicht nur eine sofortige
Erho¨hung der Investitionen in kohlenstoffarme Technologien, sondern
auch, dass die Haushalte einen erheblichen Teil ihrer bestehenden,
ineffizienten Heizungssysteme vorzeitig ersetzen. Die simulierte
Wirksamkeit von Politikinstrumenten beruht daher zwangsla¨ufig
auf den getroffenen verhaltenswissenschaftlichen Annahmen, unter
welchen Voraussetzungen Haushalte ihre Heizungssysteme vorzeitig
austauschen wu¨rden. Da derart ehrgeizige Dekarbonisierungspla¨ne
bisher noch nirgendwo auf der Welt umgesetzt wurden, besteht nach
wie vor ein erhebliches Maß an Unsicherheit hinsichtlich des zu
erwartenden Entscheidungsverhaltens von Haushalten in solchen
Situationen.
In Kapitel 5 wurde gezeigt, wie Verlustaversion in ein Modell inte-
griert werden kann, welches die Auswahl von Energietechnologien
durch Haushalte simuliert. Es wurde zudem demonstriert, inwieweit
dies die potenzielle Wirksamkeit klimapolitischer Instrumente
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beeinflusst. Verlustaversion beschreibt die empirische Beobachtung,
dass Verluste einen relativ sta¨rkeren Einfluss auf Entscheidungen
haben als gleich große Gewinne, relativ zu einem subjektiv
wahrgenommenen Referenzpunkt. Im Durchschnitt ist der Einfluss
von Verlusten etwa doppelt so hoch. Infolgedessen empfinden
Menschen Abweichungen von ihrer aktuellen Situation als weniger
attraktiv, als es die Rational-Choice-Theorie implizieren wu¨rde. Sie
zeigen daher unerwartet starke Pra¨ferenzen fu¨r Technologien, die
ihnen bereits vertraut sind. Anhand einer Fallstudie zur Auswahl
von Heizungstechnologien wurde gezeigt, dass die Marktakzeptanz
erneuerbarer und hocheffizienter Heizungstechnologien erheblich
u¨berscha¨tzt wird, wenn die Auswirkungen von Verlustaversion auf
das individuelle Entscheidungsverhalten ignoriert werden: Unter
Beru¨cksichtigung von Verlustaversion fallen die prognostizierten
globalen Marktanteile erneuerbarer Energien im Jahr 2050 6
bis 18 Prozentpunkte niedriger aus. Verlustaversion impliziert
daher einen relativ ho¨heren prognostizierten CO2-Ausstoß durch
Haushalte, sowie die Notwendigkeit stringenterer Politikinstrumente
zur Erreichung gegebener Dekarbonisierungsziele. Im Falle
des Geba¨udesektors fu¨hrte eine CO2-Steuer von 200 e/tCO2
unter Beru¨cksichtigung von Verlustaversion zu einer a¨hnlichen
Emissionsreduzierung wie eine CO2-Steuer von 100 e/tCO2
ohne Beru¨cksichtigung von Verlustaversion. Sogar wenn durch
eine Anpassung des Steuersatzes eine a¨hnlich hohe Reduktion
der Treibhausgasemissionen erreicht wird, fu¨hrt Verlustaversion
dennoch zu einer anderen Auswahl der Heizungstechnologien
durch Haushalte. Unter Beru¨cksichtigung von Verlustaversion
steigt die Verbreitung jener kohlenstoffarmer Technologien, die
bereits gro¨ßere Marktanteile zu Beginn der Simulation hatten, z. B.
Biomasseheizungen oder Fernwa¨rme. Ohne Verlustaversion hingegen
ist eine relativ gro¨ßere Marktdurchdringung neuerer und effizienterer
Technologien zu beobachten, z.B. Wa¨rmepumpen und Solarthermie.
Insgesamt implizieren diese Ergebnisse, dass Politikinstrumente
mo¨glicherweise stringenter gestaltet werden mu¨ssen, um den
Verlustaversionseffekt zu u¨berwinden. Es ko¨nnte sich zudem als
wirksamer erweisen, relative Nachteile von Technologien (z.B.
ho¨here Investitionskosten) zu verringern (z.B. durch Subventionen),
anstatt ihre bereits bestehenden relativen Vorteile (z. B. niedrigere
Energiekosten) weiter zu steigern. Es wurde geschlussfolgert,
dass Verlustaversion erhebliche Auswirkungen sowohl auf die
Modellierung der Technologieauswahl durch Haushalte, als auch auf
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die Planung und Ex-ante-Bewertung von Politikinstrumenten hat.
In Kapitel 6 wurde untersucht, wo und wann die Verbreitung von
Elektroautos und Wa¨rmepumpen zu erho¨hten Treibhausgasemis-
sionen fu¨hren ko¨nnte, wenn die Stromerzeugung nicht zeitgleich
dekarbonisiert wu¨rde. Es wurde argumentiert, dass zeit- und
ortsspezifische Unterschiede in der Emissionsintensita¨t nicht nur
vom Technologiemix im Stromsektor abha¨ngen, sondern auch von
individuellen Vorlieben und Entscheidungen der Menschen. Die
derzeitigen und zuku¨nftigen Emissionsintensita¨ten elektrischer und
fossiler Technologien wurden fu¨r 59 Weltregionen analysiert, indem
Daten zu den technologiespezifischen Treibhausgasemissionen u¨ber
den gesamten Lebenszyklus hinweg mit Modellsimulationen der
zuku¨nftigen Technologiemixe im Strom-, Verkehrs- und Wa¨rmesektor
kombiniert wurden. Die Ergebnisse haben gezeigt, dass derzeitige
Elektroautos und Wa¨rmepumpen in 54 von 59 Weltregionen bereits
heute weniger emissionsintensiv sind als fossile Technologien.
Diese Regionen entsprechen 95% des weltweiten Marktes fu¨r
Personentransport und 96% des globalen Wa¨rmebedarfs. Das
E3ME-FTT-Modell wurde verwendet, um abzuscha¨tzen, wie die
zuku¨nftigen Ma¨rkte fu¨r fossile Technologien in verschiedenen
La¨ndern sich entwickeln werden, und welche fossilen Technologien
daher durch Elektroautos und Wa¨rmepumpen ersetzt wu¨rden.
Unter Annahme der derzeitigen technologischen Entwicklung
ohne zusa¨tzliche Dekarbonisierungsanstrengungen im Stromsektor
sind Elektroautos und Wa¨rmepumpen bis 2045 bzw. 2035 in
allen Weltregionen im Durchschnitt weniger emissionsintensiv
als fossile Alternativen. Im Laufe der Zeit sind in immer mehr
Regionen sogar ineffiziente Elektroautos und Wa¨rmepumpen
weniger emissionsintensiv als die effizientesten neuen Benzinautos
oder fossilen Heizungen. Die Elektrifizierung der Verkehrs- und
Wa¨rmesektoren wu¨rde daher sogar dann die Gesamtemissionen
senken, wenn keine zusa¨tzlichen Dekarbonisierungsanstrengungen
im Stromsektor erfolgen sollten. Es wurde der Schluss gezogen, dass
Politiker in den meisten Teilen der Welt ehrgeizige Maßnahmen zur
Elektrifizierung von Endverbrauchssektoren ergreifen ko¨nnen, ohne
sich auf die weitere Dekarbonisierung des Stromsektors verlassen zu
mu¨ssen.
In der Synthese wurden die Hauptergebnisse dieser Doktorarbeit
zusammengefasst und diskutiert. Es wurde der Schluss gezogen, dass
die unkoordinierte Auswahl von Endverbrauchstechnologien durch
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Milliarden von Menschen die Wirksamkeit politischer Instrumente,
die Verbreitung von Endverbrauchstechnologien und letztendlich
den Erfolg oder das Scheitern einer Energiewende bestimmen.
Da eine vorausschauende Politikgestaltung eine quantitative
Analyse erfordert, um ihre Erfolgschancen zu verbessern, ist eine
realistische Darstellung menschlichen Entscheidungsverhaltens
in Energiemodellen von gro¨ßter Bedeutung. Es wurde gezeigt,
dass die Annahme rationaler Nutzenmaximierung eine u¨berma¨ßig
vereinfachte Modelldarstellung der realen Entscheidungsfindung von
Menschen bei der Technologieauswahl ist, was zu unrealistischen
und zu optimistischen Erwartungen hinsichtlich der Wirksamkeit
von Politikinstrumenten fu¨hren kann. Die genauen Details des
Entscheidungsverhaltens sind kontextabha¨ngig und werden fu¨r
einzelne Entscheidungen wahrscheinlich ungewiss bleiben. Es
ist jedoch zumindest mo¨glich, die statistische Verteilung von
Entscheidungen in Gruppen in einer stilisierten Form zu modellieren,
welche die makroo¨konomische Realita¨t in einer vertretbaren Weise
abbildet. Es ist zudem mo¨glich, solche abstrahierten Repra¨sentationen
von Entscheidungsverhalten in existierende Energiemodelle auf
globaler Ebene zu integrieren. Die dargestellte Methodik erlaubt es,
beobachtetes Technologieauswahlverhalten von Unternehmen und
Verbrauchern zumindest teilweise zu erkla¨ren, und die Wirksamkeit
verschiedener Politikinstrumente somit im Voraus besser einscha¨tzen
und vergleichen zu ko¨nnen.
Weitergehende Forschung sollte untersuchen, welche weiteren
verhaltenswissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse relevant sein ko¨nnten, um
Technologieauswahlverhalten besser erkla¨ren und modellieren zu
ko¨nnen. Insbesondere wa¨re es wichtig, ein besseres Versta¨ndnis der
Entscheidungsdynamik in verschiedenen sozialen und kulturellen
Kontexten zu erlangen. Dies ko¨nnte sowohl auf Grundlage
kontrollierter Verhaltensexperimente geschehen, als auch durch die
systematische Evaluierung von Technologieauswahlverhalten und
der Wirksamkeit verschiedener Politikinstrumente unter realen
Bedingungen.
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